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Zusammenfassung 
Die Milleniumsentwicklungsziele und andere verwandte Maßnahmen wie das 
Übereinkommen über die biologische Vielfalt und das Kyoto-Protokoll stellen die Welt vor 
eine Herausforderung, die nur durch Kooperation gemeistert werden kann. Kooperative 
Politik ist notwendig von der höchsten Ebene, also internationaler Politik und Abkommen, 
über regionale und nationale Abmachungen und Bestimmungen, bis hin zur lokalen Ebene, 
auf der Politik konkret umgesetzt wird. Um einige Lücken im Verständnis der in Frage 
kommenden Politikinstrumente zu schließen, betrachtet die vorliegende Dissertation einige 
Schlüsselthemen des Umweltschutzes mit Implikationen für marktbasierte Instrumente. Die 
fünf verschiedenen Forschungsthemen sind 1) der EU Bioenergiehandel, 2) der Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), 3) ein Vergleich der Effektivität von Produktzertifizierung, 
Ökosystemzertifizierung und Ausgleichshandel in Feuchtgebieten, 4) internationale 
marktbasierte Instrumente für afrikanische Schutzgebiete und 5) die Entscheidungsfindung 
lokaler Akteure in ländlichen Ökosystemen von Entwicklungsländern. 
Bioenergiekonsum, -produktion und -handel sind in den letzten Jahrzehnten stark angestiegen, 
hauptsächlich durch Nachfrage in EU-Ländern und den USA. Dabei ist es in der EU fraglich 
ob diese Handelsströme hauptsächlich von EU-Handelspolitik oder gezielter 
Bioenergiepolitik verursacht werden. Eine sektorspezifische Analyse, die die Struktur der 
Bioenergieindustrie mit einbezieht, ist notwendig, um den Einfluss dieser zwei Politikfelder 
einzuschätzen. Ein häufig angewandtes Instrument zur Analyse einer solchen 
Handelssituation ist das Gravitätsmodell, das auch hier benutzt wurde. Wegen null-
inflationierter Daten wurde dieses Modell durch den Heckman-Ansatz ergänzt. Zusätzlich 
wurden eine räumliche Gewichtung und Anderson & Van Wincoops multilateraler 
Widerstand einbezogen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich der Effekt der Beimischungsquote 
positiv auf den Handel auswirkt, andere Maßnahmen wie Investitionssubventionen aber 
keinen Effekt haben und Handelsintegration sogar einen negativen Effekt auf den Handel 
zwischen EU-Ländern hat. Dieses Ergebnis zur Handelsintegration kann durch den 
erschöpften europäischen Roh- und Zwischenproduktmarkt für Biodiesel in der EU erklärt 
werden. Das Ergebnis bleibt selbst dann robust, wenn für die Struktur der Industrie 
kontrolliert wird. 
Bioenergiegesetze wie die Beimischungsquote sind nur einige der EU-Maßnahmen zur 
Verminderung von Treibhausgasen. Den zugehörigen internationalen politischen Rahmen 
bildet das Kyoto-Protokoll. Im Einklang mit dem Protokoll hat die EU den EU-
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Emissionshandel eingeführt, der als eine von vielen grünen Maßnahmen Partnerschaften 
zwischen Akteuren in Industrie- und Entwicklungsländern für Projekte zur 
Treibhausgasvermeidung hervorbringen soll. Durch internationale Kooperation in diesen 
CDM-Projekten sollen Entwicklungsländer die Möglichkeit bekommen, ihre Wirtschaft 
rechtzeitig auf nachhaltiges Wachstum umstellen zu können. Allerdings haben bisher gerade 
die ärmsten der Entwicklungsländer nur wenige CDM-Projektpartnerschaften: Afrikanische 
Länder haben nur an zwei Prozent aller CDM-Projekte Anteil. Die vorliegende Dissertation 
untersucht, warum dies so ist, indem ein Gravitätsmodell die Determinanten der Certified-
Emission-Reduction-Ströme zwischen den Projektfinanziererländern und den Projektländern 
untersucht. Die besondere Rolle ausländischer Direktinvestitionen (FDI), offizieller 
Entwicklungshilfe (ODA) und des Handels werden in diesem Kontext gesondert betrachtet. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass FDI, ODA und Handel einen positiven Einfluss auf 
Projektanbahnung haben, auch dann wenn für Determinanten dieser Faktoren kontrolliert 
wird. Eine Unterscheidung in der Analyse zwischen jeweils ersten Projekte und der Menge 
der erzeugten Emissionszertifikate ergibt zwei zusätzliche Ergebnisse: 1) FDI und Handel 
tauschen ihre Bedeutung für Projektanbahnung und 2) das spezifische Versagen afrikanischer 
Staaten liegt darin, Erstprojekte einleiten zu können. Das weißt auf ein Versagen im Prozess 
der Projektgestaltung als Grund für die geringe Anzahl afrikanischer Projekte im Vergleich zu 
anderen Entwicklungsländern hin. 
Der CDM, einschließlich der mit ihm verbundenen Mechanismen, ist eins von vielen 
marktbasierten Instrumenten, die zum Umweltschutz eingesetzt werden. Neben 
Ausgleichshandel wie dem CDM sind einige andere neuere marktbasierte Instrumente 
geeignet, um sich entwickelnden Regionen zu helfen. Diese Regionen können durch neuere 
marktbasierte Instrumente internationale Partner finden, ohne diese sich auf ihre Regierung 
und hiesige Institutionen verlassen zu müssen. Vor dem Hintergrund von Projekten in 
Feuchtgebieten werden die folgenden drei für internationale Zusammenarbeit für 
Ökosystemschutz vorgeschlagenen Instrumente in der vorliegenden Dissertation untersucht: 
1) Produktzertifizierung für feuchtgebietbasierte Güter 2) der ‚Wetland Mitigation Trading‘ 
genannte Ausgleichshandel und 3) Ökosystemzertifizierung. Ein Modell der komparativen 
Statik wird angewendet, um die Eignung dieser drei marktbasierten Instrumente zu 
untersuchen. Am Beispiel von Landwirtschaft und Gewässerbewirtschaftung zeigen die 
Ergebnisse ein Potential aller drei Instrumente, die Wohlfahrt innerhalb des Ökosystems zu 
erhöhen. Allerdings hat Produktzertifizierung den Nachteil, dass es von starken 
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Interdependenzen unter den Ökosystemdienstleistungen beeinflusst wird. Wetland Mitigation 
Trading und Ausgleichshandel sind in diesem Modell optimale Lösungen, solange 
Ökosystemdienstleistungen entsprechend quantifiziert werden können und 
Transaktionskosten nicht prohibitiv sind. 
Solche marktbasierten Instrumente werden selbstverständlich nicht nur als theoretische 
Politikmaßnahmen betrachtet, sondern finden auch praktische Anwendung. Zum Beispiel 
stellen existierende marktbasiert Instrumente eine Auswahl an Maßnahmen zum Management 
und zur Finanzierung von Schutzgebieten dar. Viele Schutzgebiete in Entwicklungsländern 
sind allerdings nach wie vor stark unterfinanzierte ‚Papierparks‘, die den Ressourcen, die sie 
beinhalten nur ungenügenden Schutz zukommen lassen. Mit einem Fokus auf Schutzgebiete 
in Subsahara-Afrika untersucht die vorliegende Dissertation Möglichkeiten und Hürden für 
einen internationale Kooperation unter Einbeziehung marktbasierter Instrumente zur 
Schutzgebietfinanzierung. Geringe Effektivität, hohe Transaktionskosten und beschränkte 
Effizienz haben dazu geführt, dass bisher nur relativ wenige internationale marktbasierte 
Projekte in Subsahara-Afrika zustande gekommen sind, verglichen mit Asien und 
Lateinamerika. Die gegenwärtige Umorientierung von einem Schutzzonenmanagementsystem 
der ‚Zahlungen und Zäune‘, das auf nationalen Regierungsorganisationen basiert, hin zu 
integrierten Konzepten der nachhaltigen Nutzung erlauben eine bessere Integration 
internationaler marktbasierter Instrumente in Schutzgebietkonzepte.  
Internationale Kooperation dieser Art wird jedoch keine guten Ergebnisse erzielen können, 
wenn das Management vor Ort nicht funktioniert. Kooperation unter lokalen Akteuren 
müssen internationalen Bemühungen folgen, wenn internationale marktbasierte Instrumente 
erfolgreich sein sollen. In Entwicklungsländern ist diese Kooperation vor Ort oft ein Fall von 
Management in der Gemeinschaft. Auch wenn die Literatur zur Ökonomie des Verhaltens von 
Gemeinschaften im Angesicht von Allmendeproblemen weitläufig ist, wurde das 
Zusammenspiel zwischen Gruppenzusammenhalt, Governance und einem realistischerem 
Framing von Experimenten noch nicht ausreichend untersucht. Da Faktoren dieser Kategorien 
die Interpretation von Experimentergebnissen beeinflussen, untersucht die vorliegende 
Dissertation wie Teilnehmer in Allmende-Experimenten in Gegenwart dieser Faktoren 
kooperieren. Die Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung zeigen, dass die Stärke von Regeln in einem 
Experiment die Relevanz von Gruppenkonformität für die Entscheidungsfindung bestimmen 
kann. Tatsächlich verliert der wichtigste Indikator für Konformität in den Experimenten in 
Gegenwart starker Regeln seine Relevanz. Andere Formen der Orientierung wie persönliche 
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Beziehungen und Meinungsführerschaft behalten ihre Relevanz, selbst in Gegenwart starker 
formeller Regeln. Des Weiteren zeigen die Experimente, dass Framing, wenn es realistischer 
die tatsächlichen Umstände eines Ökosystems abbildet, einen entsprechenden Einfluss hat. 
Dies impliziert die Möglichkeit, Experimente für spezifischere Untersuchungen anzupassen: 
Falls Experimente konkrete Informationen über lokale Situationen oder sogar Hinweise für 
Kapazitätsbildung liefern sollen, dann können diese auf lokale Gegebenheiten angepasst 
werden und damit bessere Informationen liefern. 
Schlagworte: Marktbasierte Instrumente, Bioenergie, Clean Development Mechanism, 




The Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2000) and, by extension, such efforts 
as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto Protocol, 1997), 
present mankind with a challenge that can only be overcome through cooperation. 
Cooperative policies are necessary from the highest level, i.e. international policies and 
treaties, to regional and national agreements, down to the local level, where policies are 
actually enacted. To close some gaps in the understanding of applicable policy instruments, 
this dissertation looks at a few key topics of environmental protection with implications for 
market-based instruments. The five different research areas are 1) EU bioenergy trade, 2) 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 3) comparison of the effectiveness of product 
certification, ecosystem certification and offset mechanisms in wetland ecosystems, 4) 
international market-based instruments for African protected areas and 5) local stakeholder 
decision making in rural ecosystems of developing countries. 
Bioenergy consumption, production and trade have been increasing worldwide in the recent 
decade, mostly due to demand from EU countries and the USA. Taking the example of the 
EU, it is questionable if these trade flows are caused mainly by EU trade rules or targeted 
bioenergy policies. A sector-specific analysis taking industry patterns into consideration is 
necessary to evaluate the impact of these two policy areas on trade flows. A common way to 
analyze trade flows is the gravity model, which is employed here. Because of zero-inflated 
trade data, the model is expanded using the Heckman approach and augmented by spatial 
weights and Anderson & Van Wincoop's controls for multilateral resistance. The obtained 
results suggest that while the mandatory biofuel blending quota has a positive impact on 
trade, investment subsidies cannot be shown to have any effect and trade integration might 
even have a trade inhibiting effect among EU members. The surprising latter result can be 
explained by an exhausted domestic European market for raw and intermediate materials for 
biodiesel and proves stable even when controlling for sector specific variables. 
Enacting bioenergy policies like the mandatory biofuel quota is one of many EU policies to 
curb greenhouse gas emissions and combat climate change. The corresponding international 
policy framework is the Kyoto Protocol. In line with the Protocol, the EU created its EU 
Emission Trading Scheme, which, among other green measures, encourages partnerships 
between stakeholders in industrialized and developing countries for greenhouse gas avoidance 
projects. Through international cooperation within these CDM projects, developing countries 
have the possibility to adjust their economy to grow sustainably. However, the poorest 
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developing countries have only few CDM project partnerships: African countries take part in 
only two per cent of all CDM projects. This dissertation finds out why that is by using a 
gravity model to analyze flows of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) between host and 
financier countries. The special roles of foreign direct investments (FDI), official 
development aid (ODA) and trade are scrutinized closely in this context. Findings show that 
FDI, ODA and trade have a positive influence on project attraction, even when holding 
determinants of these factors constant. A distinction between mere CER flow existence and 
CER flow size yields two additional results: FDI and trade switch places in importance as 
determinants for project attraction and the specific failure of African countries is the initial 
attraction of investors. This points to an inadequacy in the initial process of project generation 
as reason for Africa’s lack of projects in comparison to other developing regions. 
The CDM, including its underlying and flanking mechanisms, is one of many possible 
market-based instruments (MBIs) for environmental protection. Next to offset mechanisms 
like the CDM, some newer forms of MBIs are particularly suited to help developing regions 
find international partners without having to rely on their government and their country’s 
institutions too much. Employing the background of wetland-based projects, the following 
proposed instruments for international ecosystem protection partnerships are analyzed: 1) 
product certification for wetland-based goods, 2) an offset mechanism called wetland 
mitigation trading and 3) ecosystem certification. A static optimization model analyzes the 
applicability of these three MBIs. Taking the example of agriculture and aquaculture, findings 
suggest a potential to increase welfare for all three instruments. However, product 
certification suffers from drawbacks owing to strong interdependencies between the 
ecosystem services. Wetland mitigation trading and ecosystem certification are first-best 
choices within this model as long as ecosystem services can be quantified properly and 
transaction costs are not prohibitive. 
Such MBIs are of course not only considered as theoretical policy measures, but also 
implemented practically. For example, the set of existing MBIs provides a choice of 
instruments for managing and financing Protected Areas (PAs). Many PAs in developing 
countries are severely underfinanced ‘paper parks’, though, which offer only scant protection 
for the resources they contain. Focusing on sub-Saharan African (SSA) PAs, this dissertation 
reviews opportunities for and obstacles to international cooperation for the use of MBIs to 
provide supplemental financing of PAs. Low effectiveness, high transaction costs and limited 
efficiency have resulted in relatively few international MBI projects in SSA compared to Asia 
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or Latin America. The current shift from state-based ‘fines and fences’ PA management 
towards integrated sustainable use concepts will allow for a better integration of international 
MBIs into PA concepts, as exemplified by Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance 
(CCBA) certified PAs.  
This international cooperation will not yield results though, if local management fails. Local 
cooperation efforts have to follow international cooperation for international MBIs to 
succeed. In developing countries this local cooperation is often a matter of community 
management. Though behavioral economics literature on communities facing a common-pool 
resource dilemma is vast, the interplay between group cohesion, governance and a more 
realistic framing of an experiment has not been fully explored yet. Because factors of these 
categories influence the interpretation of experimental results, this dissertation analyzes how 
participants in common-pool resource experiments cooperate in their presence. Results show 
that the strength of rules in an experiment can determine the relevance of group conformity 
for decision making: The most important indicator for conformity in the experiment loses 
relevance in the presence of strong rules. Other forms of guidance like personal relationships 
and leadership retain relevance, even in strong rules settings. Furthermore, the experiments 
show that framing similar to real circumstances changes results in the field. This implies the 
possibility to tailor experiments to their specific use: If they are meant to give concrete 
information on the situation on the ground or even help with capacity building, they can be 
adapted to the relevant local situation. 
Keywords: Market-based instruments, bioenergy, clean development mechanism, Africa, 
offset mechanism, ecosystem service, economic experiment 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and background 
As prominently reflected in goal 7 of the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 
2000) as well as other large scale efforts like the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, environmental protection has become a topic demanding global answers. 
The world economy is built on the use of natural resources like fossil fuels, local ecosystems 
or the atmosphere. However, market failures attributed to the distribution and utilization of 
these resources resulted in the decline in the quality and quantity of natural resources. To halt 
this decline environmental policies are needed at all levels: From international to the local 
level. The policy interventions recommended by environmental economists are often market-
based instruments (MBIs), like taxes, subsidies and, more recently, offset mechanisms and 
certification schemes. As these policies have to permeate all political levels and cross national 
borders, successful policy measures will have to be flexible. 
MBIs have to be able to facilitate cooperation between all kinds of partners – governmental, 
non-governmental, companies, consumers, local stakeholders, developed and developing 
countries – at all kinds hierarchical levels – international, national, regional and local. Simply, 
policies need to be more than national measures. However, attempts to create international 
policies constantly run into political opposition (Angelsen, 2008; Hulme, 2009) or fail for 
reasons inherent to the policies themselves (Babiker, 2005; Duffy, 2006; Kuik & Gerlagh, 
2003). Analyzing the applicability and effectiveness of environmental policies and their 
interplay with the cooperation of stakeholders, from the local to the international level, is the 
topic of this dissertation. 
The first of these analyzed policies, which chapter 2 examines, is the EU reaction to the 
increasingly pressing problem of energy security and climate change mitigation. As one 
policy measure, the EU decided to bolster the biofuel industry (Florin & Bunting, 2008). The 
main policy instrument for an increase in biofuel use is a mandatory biofuel blending quota 
(Schnepf, 2006). While some of the newer EU member countries increased their production 
capacities as a reaction to the new legislation (European Biodiesel Board, 2008), a substantial 
amount of biofuel raw material had to be imported from outside of the EU; i.e. it takes 
international cooperation in bioenergy production to satisfy the demand caused by production 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
2 
increases. In fact, the increase in trade of canola oil for non-food use, the main raw product 
this research looks at, was almost solely due to an increase in EU imports (FAOSTAT, 2009). 
Another environmental protection measure against climate change the EU takes part in, is the 
Kyoto Protocol. Under the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) helps developing countries to partake in climate change mitigation by 
granting tradable emission credits to project developers who prove a reduction in emissions 
(Kyoto Protocol, 1997). This mechanism is the focus of chapter 3. About 80 per cent of these 
CDM projects are the result of collaborations between partners in an eligible developing 
country and a counterpart in an industrialized country (UNFCCC, 2010). African countries 
hold a surprisingly small share of existing CDM projects. This is true even when African 
countries’ economic capability, total emissions or other factors identified in literature as 
important to CDM partnerships like ODA, trade and FDI (Dinar, Rahman, Larson, & 
Ambrosi, 2008; Dolšak & Bowerman Crandall, 2007; Winkelman & Moore, 2011) are 
considered. 
Although CDM as an MBI has had limited success, there may be other MBIs that could be 
more applicable to Africa and its ecosystems. In its analysis of MBIs for ecosystem 
protection, chapter 4 especially considers wetland ecosystems. Wetlands have a far-reaching 
impact on the global ecosystem due to their many ecosystem services (ESS), despite covering 
less than 10 per cent of the Earth’s landmass (McCartney, Rebelo, Senaratna Sellamuttu, & de 
Silva, 2010; Mitsch & Gosselink, 2007). Accordingly MBIs minding the complexity in these 
ecosystems are necessary and need to be evaluated. 
However, even beyond the case of wetlands and beyond what official statistics let on, 
protected areas (PA) are endangered. As the overview chapter 5 shows, especially in sub-
Saharan African countries protection is usually carried out by state organizations which often 
do not have full or even any control over enforcing environmental protection (Duffy, 2006; 
Wilkie, Carpenter, & Zhang, 2001). Better protection mechanisms are needed. However, the 
appropriate mechanism is not only determined by the different enforcement measures but also 
by the institutional and social environment, as well as the way of financing projects. These 
complex dynamics of institutional, social and financial constraints may lend themselves to an 
MBI solution. State-led instruments usually do not offer the opportunity to find financing 
partners from other countries. Innovative MBIs which can do that exist though. They could 
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combine setting the incentives right, which a command and control measure might fail to do, 
and providing finances in the same cooperative scheme. However, domestic financers as well 
as those from abroad need to be sure of the effectiveness of innovative MBIs even in sub-
Saharan circumstances. 
As much as a project is dependent on finances, though, it is dependent on local stakeholders 
as well. As chapter 6 shows, local stakeholders’ decision making and especially their reaction 
to their own environmental problems are key to enacting policies on the ground. No MBI can 
work properly if stakeholders do not react to incentives in the way anticipated by policy 
makers. To successfully implement MBIs in rural communities, the instruments have to fit 
communal societies. Innovative MBIs need to be constructed so that the existent cooperative 
institutions can be interwoven with new structures. 
1.2 Research objectives 
The overarching objective of this thesis is an analysis of cooperation in the production and 
trade of environmental goods and services and the policies which facilitate that. The research 
assists efforts of environmental protection which go beyond national and regional political 
measures by providing research on alternative policy measures. In this context, the research 
questions of this thesis are: 
1. How do EU policies influence international trade of bioenergy? (Chapter 2) 
2. What facilitates the coordination in CDM projects between industrialized and 
developing countries? (Chapter 3) 
3. According to theory, which market-based instruments are best used for ecosystem 
protection in the presence of complex ecosystem interactions? (Chapter 4) 
4. What market-based instruments for ecosystem protection are applicable to the 
situation in sub-Saharan Africa? (Chapter 5) 
5. What are the drivers in a community to adopt policies for ecosystem protection? 
(Chapter 6) 
These five research questions will be answered in chapters 2-6. Chapter 2 starts with an 
analysis of the impact of EU bioenergy regulations on trade of intermediate goods for biofuel 
production to answer question 1. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of partnerships between 
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actors in different countries for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to answer 
question 2. It specifically focusses on the lack of African CDM projects. To answer question 
3, chapter 4 deals with an analysis of MBIs for ecosystem protection. Though the results are 
generalizable to other ecosystems, the analysis is geared towards wetland protection. Chapter 
5 contains an overview of existent international MBI schemes and focusses on MBIs which 
are applicable to sub-Saharan African countries, and so answers question 4. To answer 
question 5, chapter 6 analyses behavior of local actors and reevaluates common-pool resource 
governance measures and, more generally, the experimental method as evaluation tool. The 
common-pool resource experiments were conducted in the Namibian nature conservancy 
Sikunga. 
1.3 Methods 
This dissertation contains a number of methods for the evaluation of environmental policy 
measures. Methodologically, chapters 2 and 3 are based on the gravity model. This model is 
well suited to analyze any flow between two entities, for example, the trade in bioenergy raw 
material, which is the topic of chapter 2. The gravity model is an established and valid method 
for trade analysis. It is based on the original economic models of Tinbergen (1962) and 
Pöyhönen (1963) and the theoretical backing of its use have been provided by Anderson 
(1979), Bergstrand (1985, 1989) and Deardorff (1998). Some additions have been made to the 
model over time, which are necessary in the bioenergy context as well. Since the bioenergy 
trade analysis is an analysis of a specific good, the data set suffers from what is commonly 
called a zero-inflation: Many potentially trading pairs of countries do not trade bioenergy raw 
materials. In response, the gravity model is estimated using a two-step Heckman procedure, as 
advised by Linders & de Groot (2006). More recently highlighted concerns about gravity 
trade analysis by Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) are multilateral resistance and suspicions 
of spatial autocorreletation. These two problems are countered by the appropriate methods 
described in Behrens et al. (2007) and Porojan (2001), and applied in chapter 2. 
For the analysis of CDM project partnerships in chapter 3, however, a simpler gravity model 
suffices. While there are no multilateral resistance and spatial autocorrelation problems, the 
CDM data demands a panel analysis. Accordingly the regressions of chapter 3 use dummy 
variable least squares (DVLS) to yield fixed effects results. 
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As opposed to the empirical analysis of chapters 2 and 3, chapter 4 analyses the effectiveness 
of certain MBIs on a theoretical basis. The comparative statics analysis starts by formulating a 
utility function for a wetland holder. This utility function is then extended with a term 
capturing the externalities of using the ecosystem as an input to production. These equations 
respectively represent the privately and socially optimal use of the ecosystem. The difference 
between the two is discussed based on results from comparative statics. Once the privately 
and socially optimal use of the ecosystem is established, these equations operate as a baseline. 
This baseline is then compared to a maximization of private utility under the regime of three 
different MBIs.  
Chapter 6 returns to empirical analysis. It blends the two empirical methods of experimental 
field analysis, which follows on from the influential work of Ostrom and colleagues (Gardner, 
Ostrom, & Walker, 1990), and regression analysis. Each of the two methods covers one layer 
of behavior. The experiment reveals data on the cooperation within the groups of participants 
when faced with the potential overuse of a common pool resource. Following the call of 
Anderies et al. (2011), as a methodological improvement the experiments presented here were 
purposely framed with different environmental contexts to analyze the difference in reaction 
of participants. To gain more detailed insight into the method of common pool resource 
experiments, I combine the experimental results with regression analysis, following the Tobit 
specification of Velez et al. (2009). Regression results help illuminate the impacts of framing 
and the observed participant motivation factors beyond just the simple descriptive and purely 
experimental data. The focus of this analysis of factors for decision-making is on rules, 
conformity (Hayo & Vollan, 2011) and framing. 
1.4 Results 
Chapter 2 answers the question, what influence EU policies have on trade flows; specifically 
if trade regulations, environmental regulations or solely industry patterns are the drivers of 
trade. Results of the gravity model analysis show that trade integration within the EU has a 
counter-intuitive, negative effect on the trade of canola oil for biofuel use. This effect is due 
to the import pull of the whole union. Although the EU wide pro-biofuel policy also spurs 
intra-EU trade, the EU consumes much more canola oil that it can produce on its own and 
therefore needs to import considerable volumes. This result is stable even in the presence of a 
proxy for production costs. Accordingly, also the main political policy, a mandatory biofuel 
blending quota, has a positive impact on trade: The higher the quota, the more a country 
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trades. Further, the regression reveals that the value chain backs up this picture of the EU 
biodiesel sector: More home production of raw materials leads to less dependence on trade 
and therefore less import. Higher consumption leads to a stronger dependence and more 
imports. Introducing market-based policy instrument variables shows that they do not have an 
impact. The strong regulation through the quota determines the market, for better or worse, 
and renders additional instruments insignificant. 
As for research question 2 on the factors of African CDM project partnerships, results of the 
gravity model in chapter 3 show that the reasons for project partners to engage in CDM 
projects are different from the reasons for the size of the accumulated certificates of CDM 
projects: The specific shortcoming of African countries is a lack in initial attraction of 
financiers. Once African countries have their initial project, they attract projects and thus CER 
production based on the same measurable macroeconomics factors as other CDM-eligible 
countries. This points to an inadequacy in the initial process of project generation as one 
reason for Africa’s small share of projects. As far as the full amount of certificates from 
projects is concerned, after controlling for the selection bias in the initiation process, having 
an African country in the pair of partners does not make a difference to how many certificates 
are created between the two countries. Further, the selection and the outcome equation show a 
difference with respect to two determinants: While the amount of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) between two partners determines project initiation, trade seems to swap with FDI as a 
determinant as soon as the amount of certificates is concerned. The conclusion is that initial 
CDM projects are much more dependent on the immeasurable factors captured by FDI than is 
increasing the number of projects (and therefore certificates). For an increase, trade seems to 
matter, while FDI does not. Since there is no reason to suspect that engaging in trade itself has 
a causal effect, the conclusion is that trade serves as a proxy for its immeasurable 
determinants like personal and institutional relationships, just as FDI does for an initial 
project between a pair. Accordingly this research supports past policy decisions to increase 
cooperation at the political level for project initiation. Partnership facilitation is especially 
important where new projects are concerned (Hinostroza, 2008), and the conclusion of 
research on CDM’s dependency on present technical, procedural and institutional capabilities 
(Desanker, 2005; Ellis, Winkler, Corfee-Morlot, & Gagnon-Lebrun, 2007; Karani, 2002; 
Michaelowa, 2003) will be helpful in this regard. 
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The most interesting result of the comparative statics analysis of MBIs in chapter 4 is that 
product certification might have an overall negative effect. As the negative impact of the 
certified product on other products declines, production of these other goods becomes more 
appealing, which in turn might have negative impacts on the ecosystem’s integrity. Therefore, 
the effectiveness and efficiency of product certification hinges on the indirect effects through 
other production in that ecosystem. This does not mean that certification can be dismissed, but 
rather that it ranks as an applicable second-best option next to mitigation trading and wetland 
certification. These other two analyzed policy options do not suffer from drawbacks such as 
the indirect effects of product certification. If parameters were set right, mitigation trading or 
wetland certification would lead to a socially optimal outcome by providing the right 
incentives to wetland holders. However, setting these parameters right is a considerable 
practical problem. In practice, for example, it will be hard to agree on how to measure certain 
types of damage to ESS such as biodiversity (de Groot, Alkemade, Braat, Hein, & Willemen, 
2010), as would be necessary for mitigation trading to be all-encompassing over the different 
ESS. Similarly, agreeing on goals for wetland management and measuring them might be a 
practical drawback to wetland certification. However, as the results show, going as far with 
these instruments as possible realizes efficiency potential. Thus, the theoretical analysis shows 
that offset mechanisms akin to the ones created following the Kyoto Protocol would indeed be 
applicable to the protection of ecosystems. Further, the theoretical analysis of an offset 
mechanism for ecosystem protection shows that an offset mechanism is similarly efficient as a 
wetland certification mechanism and superior to a solution based on subsidies (which is 
analogous to product certification as far as the theoretical model is concerned). 
Chapter 5 contains an overview of existing international MBI schemes. The overview is 
geared towards the situation in sub-Saharan countries, its political, institutional and social 
environment. These factors make the choice, implementation and financing of MBIs 
particularly difficult. The overview takes this into account by focusing on concepts from the 
strand of ‘Integrated Natural Resource Management’, which have been applied more recently 
(Ash et al., 2010; Carew-Reid, 2003; Reid, Berkes, Wilbanks, & Capistrano, 2006), and are 
financed or at least able to be financed, by international partners. 
Chapter 5 also contains three broader categories of instruments: Carbon markets (CDM, 
REDD and related schemes), sustainability certification and product certification. Though 
many of these schemes are applicable to the African situation in principle, they demand a high 
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effort from local partners and often demand a project scale which is unrealistic in a sub-
Saharan context. Implementation certainly suffers from the local social, financial and 
institutional situation, but environmental protection schemes can be improved by keeping 
these things in mind. The overview demonstrates that protected areas (PAs) do not have to 
stay what is known as ‘paper parks’; PAs which exist only on paper but do not fulfill any of a 
PA’s function. A properly working international MBI could link all actors in the necessary 
value chain, from local stakeholders to international financiers and their customers. However, 
even with international MBIs which are less dependent on national governments, transaction 
costs for application, verification and enforcement will be problematically high. 
Chapter 6 finishes this dissertation with an analysis of local stakeholder group decision 
making when confronted with a common-pool resource dilemma. The bare results on the 
effectiveness of governance treatments of experimental groups have shown that all kinds of 
introduced governing rules (cheap talk, unlikely punishment for unsocial behavior and likely 
punishment for unsocial behavior) make a difference to the behavior of participants and 
improve the situation. However, rules differed in progress and sustainability of effect.  
The results of the regression analysis based, among other things, on the introduction of 
governance treatments shows that conforming to the behavior of the rest of the group plays a 
role as long as the consequences of unsocial behavior are less certain. However, if more 
certain consequences (i.e. likely fines) are introduced, conformity becomes insignificant. 
Context consistently swayed participants to behave a certain way, especially if they identified 
as gaining their livelihood from within context (e.g. fisherman participating in a fishing based 
common-pool resource experiment), and other factors like leadership and group cohesion had 
the expected effect on behavior as well. These results hold one important behavioral and one 
important methodological implication. Behaviorally, it matters what a participant thinks the 
others do, as long as the rules are not strong enough to render a good prediction of other’s 
behavior. Methodologically, the experiment shows that the degree of abstraction and sort of 
behavioral pattern the experiment invokes need to be considered in experimental design. 
Generalized experiments might grant representative insights, but they might not be applicable 
to the situation even at the site of the experiment. If these insights are meant to lead to 
changes at the site of the experiment, the experiment should be tailored to it. Otherwise it runs 
the risk of not being specific enough and implying inefficient or even wrong policies. 
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All in all the results of my dissertation show the potential but also the many complexities of 
MBIs. Establishing them cannot possibly be done in a one-size-fits-all manner. Even if we 
could abstract from the surrounding macro-economic and political circumstances, the 
differences in ESS and in stakeholder perceptions and preferences make a case-to-case 
consideration inevitable. Finding a system or frame that can include and manage this kind of 
economic, ecologic and social diversity without losing the efficiency of markets will be a 
future challenge of environmental economists. 
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This chapter is an extended version of: 
Röttgers, D., Faße, A. and U. Grote (2010): The Canola Oil Industry and EU Trade Integration: A 
Gravity Model Approach. 
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010 No. 32,  
Verein für Socialpolitik. 
2 The Canola Oil Industry and EU Trade Integration: A Gravity 
Model Approach 
Abstract 
In the last years, biodiesel used for blending of fossil fuels has become prominent in European 
Union (EU) countries. The rapidly increasing domestic production and consumption of 
biodiesel is accompanied by increasing trade flows of inputs such as crude vegetable oil from 
canola seeds into the EU. It is questionable which factors significantly determine the trade of 
canola oil used for biodiesel production in the EU. Two factors are emphasised: (1) Bioenergy 
policies and (2) Potential trade barriers for non-EU countries. A sector-specific analysis 
taking industry patterns into consideration is necessary to evaluate the impact different policy 
instruments on trade flows. A common way to analyse trade flows is the so-called gravity 
model, which is applied here. Because of zero-inflated trade data, the model is expanded 
using the Heckman approach and augmented by spatial weights and Anderson and Van 
Wincoop's controls for multilateral resistance. The obtained results suggest that while the 
mandatory biofuel blending quota has a significant positive impact, investment subsidies 
cannot be shown to have any effect. Trade integration even has a trade inhibiting effect 
among EU members. The latter result can be explained by an exhausted domestic European 
market for raw and intermediate materials for biodiesel and proves stable even when 
controlling for sector specific variables. 
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2.1 The Production and Trade Situation in the Biodiesel Sector 
In recent years, many developed countries emphasized the support for the production of 
biofuels in their political agenda (Butterbach-Bahl and Kiese, 2013). This new interest in 
biofuels arose mainly from the quest for increasing national energy sovereignty. Specifically, 
governments aimed at becoming more independent from fossil fuels - due to strong 
fluctuations of crude oil prices - and reducing emission of greenhouse gases (Florin and 
Bunting, 2009). Hence, the European Union (EU) set mandatory quotas introduced by the 
Biofuel Directive 2003/30/EC to encourage the use of biofuel within the European transport 
sector: 2 per cent by the end of 2005, 5.75 by 2010 and 10 per cent by 2020 (Schnepf, 2006; 
Lamers et al. 2011).  
Further national and supranational measures followed, such as raising excise taxes or 
providing capital subsidies for green investments (Kutas et al., 2007). These political 
requirements set by the Commission at the supranational level are passed down to and 
enforced by the individual states at the national level. In the case of the mandatory biofuel 
quota, this resulted in different pathways of EU member states for the fulfilment of these 
requirements. For other measures the picture is even more diverse: Capital subsidies and 
excise tax raises, for example, are fully implemented in some countries while non-existent in 
others (Wiesenthal et al., 2009). Transfers associated with these EU policies in support of 
biofuels amounted to around 3.7 billion Euros in 2006 alone (Kutas et al., 2007). However, 
many European member states have not succeeded in reaching their targeted blending quota 
yet (Charles et al. 2013). 
With these market stimulating policies, Europe has quickly become the world’s most 
important producer of biodiesel (Timilsina and Shrestha, 2011) (Figure 2.1). 
The main biodiesel feedstock in the European Union is canola oil (Lamers et al. 2011; Firrisa 
et al. 2013). However, Landeweerd et al. (2012) stated that it is not very likely that the EU is 
not able to produce the biomass needed for biodiesel domestically at its own. Therefore, 
additional canola oil is imported into the EU. Indeed, the import volume of canola oil is 
smaller compared to other vegetab le oils such as palm and soybean oil, though its relevance 
for the European biodiesel sector is significant (Lamers et al. 2011). Figure 2.2 shows the 
increase of canola oil imports in the past. As can be seen, the import increase can be partly 
attributed to the European Union, especially in the period from 2003 to 2006 when the 
biodiesel production in Europe soared. The political setting lead to a biodiesel market in the 
European Union which is mainly demand driven through the mandatory biodiesel quotas set 
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in the transport sector. Banse et al. (2008) confirmed based on a CGE model that, without 
policy intervention stimulating the use of biofuel crops, the mandatory blending quota will not 
be met. 
Figure 2.1 
Source: Timilsina and Shrestha (2011) 
Figure 2.1: World biodiesel production 2004-2009  
Figure 2.2 
 
Source: FAOStat (2013) 
Figure 2.2: Canola oil import of the European Union (lower curve) in 
tonnes, (upper curve: World Import) 
Due to available land, labour, and favourable climate developing countries are regarded as a 
suitable producer and exporter of biomass (Landeweerd et al., 2012). These countries’ 
governments, especially net importers of crude oil, value biofuels as a means for stimulating 
their economy and reducing the dependency on fossil fuels (Arndt et al. 2011). Although most 
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developing countries are still lagging behind in biofuel implementation on a larger scale, they 
aim at participating in the production of biomass utilized for the biofuel production.  
Lamers et al. (2011) hypothesised that the promotion of domestic biofuel in the EU affects the 
pattern of international biofuel trade. The authors assumed that import duties significantly 
influence trade volumes often resulting in trade barriers for less developing countries. It is 
obvious that being a member of the EU makes a difference for trade patterns of a country. 
Thus it creates a difference among members and, more importantly, between members and 
non-members.  
The aim of this paper is to analyse the determinants of canola oil trade based on a gravity 
model. We assess the impact of the two important factors derived from the literature from the 
perspective of the European Union: Trade regulations and bioenergy policies. To correctly 
analyse this question, biodiesel production and consumption patterns have to be taken into 
consideration as well. Therefore the employed gravity model is expanded with sector specific 
variables.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of the gravity model and 
its specification and the data set used here. Section 2.3 shows the results of the model 
estimations and interpretation. Based on these results, section 2.4 concludes. 
2.2 Methodological Framework and Data Collection 
To analyse trade relationships for canola oil, we apply the gravity model based on the 
Newtonian formulation of the gravitational concept. The gravity model describes the amount 
of trade between two countries as directly related to the size of the two countries involved and 
inversely related to the geographical distance between them (Bergstrand, 1985). The basic 
theoretical model of the gravity model on trade between two countries takes the following 
form: 
     
    
   
       (1) 
Here Xij represents the trade flows in values from origin i to destination j. A is a constant of 
proportionality. Mi and Mj are indicators for the economic sizes of origin i and destination j, 
respectively, reflecting the ability to produce and consume. Dij represents the distance 
between the trading countries. It functions as a proxy for transaction costs including transport 
costs which generally decrease trade. 
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Since the first application of the gravity model by Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963), its 
use has been justified on theoretical grounds by Anderson (1979), Deardorff (1998) and 
Bergstrand (1985, 1989). The model has been used for the analysis of bilateral flows as 
diverse as tourism (Lerch and Schulze, 2007) and migration (Afifi and Warner, 2008), but 
mainly for trade flows (e.g. Anders and Caswell, 2007; Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2008; Rose, 
1999). A gravity model applied to estimate the determinants of bioenergy trade has not been 
found in the literature yet.  
The model can be expanded by other possible influential factors. However, when including 
other variables in equation (1), a choice has to be made between including it in a 
multiplicative or other form. After taking logs on both sides of the equation, a variable added 
multiplicatively. A variable added to equation (1), which is the power of the Euler’s number, 
would however enter the regression as just one more summand. Compared to economic sizes 
of countries, it has to be determined if the new variable would automatically lead to zero trade 
if itself is zero. If that is the case, it would enter the gravity equation in multiplicative form. 
Otherwise it can be made the power of Euler's number for convenience, so it is just one more 
straightforward summand in the regression equation. 
The flow analysed here is the import of canola oil for non-food use (TARIC: 15141110) into 
EU countries (EU Export Helpdesk, 2009). The data set is based on the trade data from 2006. 
It spans trade of 39 different countries, 23 EU members and 16 non-EU countries, leading to 
1300 potential pairs of trade partners. However, by far not all of those 1300 actually trade; 
only 107 do. This leads to what is known as a zero-inflated dependent variable. Unfortunately, 
simply eliminating the irrelevant cases of non-trading pairs is not possible because there is no 
easy way to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant cases. 
However, since this zero-inflation can be treated as a selection bias problem, it can be 
resolved using the method of Heckman (1979) as advised by Linders and de Groot (2006). 
Among the possible specifications, Martin and Pham (2008) prompt to use the two-step-
Heckman approach for this specific case. With this specification, the Heckman method 
calculates a selection equation in its first step. This equation tries to determine the impact of 
certain factors on the probability to trade canola oil at all rather than their impact on the 
amount traded. Consequentially, the dependent variable for this equation is a dummy which is 
equal to 1 if trade actually occurs between the pair and 0 otherwise.  The selection equation 
used here contains the classic gravity variables 'economic sizes' and 'distance', and is 
augmented by canola seed production and block fixed effects, which are explained further 
below. 
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The results of the selection equation allow the calculation of the so-called inverse Mill's ratio 
(IMR). To counter the bias caused by the zero-inflation, the IMR can be introduced into the 
outcome equation, which includes the variables of interest. If it is significant, it is interpreted 
as an account for an assumed selection bias. 
Even with this correction the outcome equation might still suffer from two more flaws. These 
two other possible problems are omitted multilateral resistance and spatial autocorrelation. 
Omitted multilateral resistance is caused by the lack of inclusion or observability of countries' 
alternatives to trade with a particular partner. While the amount of actual trade between two 
partners can be measured, the amount of potential trade occurring if certain factors of trade 
were different is impossible to know. This is not a new concept to the gravity model: The 
distance term already tries to control for the resistance to trade. However, as Anderson and 
Van Wincoop (2003) argue, this is not enough. There are other factors about possible trade 
partners which are not included in a standard gravity analysis. Therefore, they advise to use a 
term controlling for prices in potential other trade partner countries and transaction costs. 
This would require vast amounts of data on prices, not only of goods, but also of transport and 
information services. Since these data are not available for the canola oil case, the proposed 
model here reverts to a method described in Behrens et al. (2007). Instead of calculating the 
omitted multilateral resistance term from a plethora of data for all countries, a fixed effects 
dummy is introduced for every country. This dummy is assumed to hold constant for all 
immeasurable factors concerning trade this country faces, thereby controlling for omitted 
factors causing resistance to trade. 
By the assumption, these dummies rather serve as indicators for having trade at all than 
having more or less trade. Therefore, they are introduced in the selection equation rather than 
the main regression. Instead of using these country fixed effects as proposed by Behrens et al. 
(2007), the selection equation contains effects for country blocks. This is done to save degrees 
of freedom and essentially does not yield results very different from the use of country fixed 
effects due to the composition of countries in our data set. 
Unlike multilateral resistance, which deals with the availability of trade alternatives, a further 
possible problem, spatial autocorrelation, deals with trade similarities. This kind of 
autocorrelation stems from being part of a cluster of traders or, conversely, being remote from 
clusters. As suggested by Porojan (2001), to correct for the part of trade that is explained by 
being part of a cluster, spatial weights are included in the gravity model. These weights 
summarize the relationship of the importer to all its trade partners relative to all other trade 
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partners. They are used to weigh the dependent variable, which is then introduced as another 
right hand-side variable. Thus the part of trade caused by the importer being part of a cluster 
is controlled for. The most relevant kind of cluster is a geographical one. Therefore, the model 
here includes distance weights. Distance weights are                     . Here dij is the 
distance between the importer i and the exporter j and therefore the sum is the sum of 
distances between the importer i and the exporters j. 
Additionally to distance, measured in kilometres according to a geographical approach 
developed in Mayer and Zignago (2006), the previously described IMR, country fixed effects 
and weighted trade values, the two regressions contain the following variables. 
The total GDPs in current dollars taken from the IMF (2009) are used to account for the 
economic sizes of the trade partners in the selection equation. In the outcome equation total 
GDP of the exporter is replaced by the total GDP produced by agriculture, taken from 
Earthtrends (2007). The size of the agricultural industry reflects the ability to produce and 
therefore export canola better than the less related total GDP. If both countries of the pair are 
members of the EU in 2006, the 'EU Both Dummy' is equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. There are 
two variables indicating political intervention. The first, biofuel quota, is compiled using 
mainly the REN21 (2009) database and Kutas et al. (2007), complemented by individual 
country data, for a mandatory quota for the amount of biodiesel that has to be blended with 
conventional diesel. The second is a dummy indicating if a capital subsidy for green energy 
projects exists taken again from the REN21 database. Furthermore, the model includes three 
variables describing the biofuel industry. Production cost ratio is an indicator for the disparity 
between the costs of production in the respective countries in a given pair. The data stem from 
Johnston and Holloway (2007). Canola seed production and biofuel consumption in the 
transport sector are indicators for the size of the respective parts of the value chain. Numbers 
for canola seed production were taken from FAOSTAT (2009) and biofuel consumption data 
stem from IEA (2009). Adding the error term leaves the outcome regression as follows, with 
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Canola Importij= a 
 + β1 log GDPi  
 + β2 log Agricultural GDPj 
 + β3 log Distanceij 
 + β4 EU Both Dummyij 
 + β5 Biofuel Quotai 
 + β6 Subsidy Dummyi                                                                                                                                                         
 + β7 log Production Costs Ratioij 
 + β8 Canola Seed Productioni  
 + β9 Canola Seed Productionj 
 + β10 Biofuel Consumption Transporti  
 + β11 Biofuel Consumption Transportj 
 + β12 wij * log Canola Importij 
 + β13 Inverse Mill's Ratioij 
 + eij 
To prevent skewing of results through outlying observations, the most likely candidates 
identified by both a QQ-plot and Cook's distance are removed. Moreover, the models are 
tested for heteroscedasticity with a Breusch-Pagan test and for multicollinearity using the 
variance inflation factor. The goodness of fit is verified by the Akaike’s information criterion. 
2.3 Results 
The results of the selection equation are shown in table 2.1 in order to identify the variables 
explaining the (non)-participation in canola oil trade. The coefficient for the exporter's as well 
as the importer's GDP are positive and significant. From the point of view of the importer, this 
suggests that the size of the economy has a pull effect on the probability of canola oil import. 
Similarly the GDP of the exporter countries is according to the expectation acting as a proxy 
of national economic output expressed in monetary units. As expected, distance has a 
significant negative effect on the probability of canola oil trade. This is consistent with the 
usual interpretation of the distance variable as a proxy for transaction costs: A longer route 
between two places will cause larger travel costs and is often also associated with other 
transaction costs such as costs of communication and information to bridge geographical, 
cultural and linguistic divides.  
All regional 'block'-variables controlling for fixed-effects have a positive significant effect on 
the probability of canola oil trade except for an insignificant non-EU-European Block 
representing European countries not being a member of the European Union. This might be 
surprising since being closer to the EU should lead to a higher probability for trade 
relationships between non-EU Europeans and EU countries. However, large parts of this 
(2) 
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effect are taken up by the distance variable already. Exporters’ production of canola seeds for 
canola oil has no significant effect on the probability to export canola oil, whereas the 
importers’ production of seeds decreases the probability of importing canola oil.  
 
Table 2.1: Selection equation of the Heckman model 
Dependent Variables Independent Variable: Existence of Intern. Canola Trade (1=yes) 
 Coefficient t-value 
Intercept 3.09 *** 3.72 
Log GDPi 0.40 *** 8.13 
Log GDPj 0.31 *** 6.03 
Log Distanceij -1.18 *** -10.18 
Block North Americaj    1.35 ***  3.83 
Block South Americaj 1.44 ** 2.52 
Block Non-EU-Europeansj 0.27 1.33 
Block Asiaj 1.43 *** 2.99 
Block Africaj 1.76 *** 4.85 
Log Canola Seed Productioni -0.04 *   -1.72 
Log Canola Seed Productionj 0.02 0.79 
Adjusted R² 0.34  
AIC 492.60  
N 1295  
Denotation: i = importer, j = exporter; *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%; Source: 
Own calculation. 
The results of the second step - the outcome equation - of the gravity model are shown in 
table 2.2. The outcome equation is used to estimate the determinants affecting the amount of 
the actual trade volume. The sample size for the sample of trading pairs is 107. Nine outliers 
needed to be dropped due to an unduly high influence on the outcome of the estimation 
process according to QQ-Plots and Cook's Distance. The dependent variable is the log-
transformed import volume in Euro. 
The Global Moran's I statistic as a measure for spatial autocorrelation in the data set suggests 
negative spatial correlation. To correct for the spatial autocorrelation, the variable 'value 
weighted distance' has been included in all four models. It uses a distance related weight on 
the trade value. The results show that 'value weighted distance' is robust and significant. 
Therefore we can conclude that cluster effects exist and are controlled for.  
As indicated in all four estimations by a significant coefficient for the IMR, zero-inflation 
caused omitted variable bias and was countered by introducing the IMR. It also carries the 
country fixed effects from the first stage into the second stage of the regression.  
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The first estimation shown in table 2.2 represents the basic gravity model including only total 
GDP of the importer and the agricultural GDP of the exporter and the distance between them. 
Here, only the distance as a measure for transaction costs has a significant impact on trade and 
interestingly exhibits a positive coefficient. As opposed to the selection model result, distance 
does not seem to act as a barrier in terms of additional costs due to transportation and other 
distance-related transaction cost. An economic explanation could be economics of scale in 
terms of production and transportation costs.  
 Table 2.2: Outcome equation: Determinants of canola oil import to the European Union 
Variables 
Basic Gravity Model + Trade Integration 
Effect 
+ Biofuel Policy 
Effect 
+ Value Chain Effect 
Dependent Variable Log (Import Value Canola Oil) 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
Intercept 4.89*** 2.51 9.40***  3.92 9.14***  4.02 11.15*** 4.99 
Log GDPi 0.23 1.20 0.39
**   2.04 0.23 1.20 0.19 0.75 
Log Agricultural GDPj -0.01 -0.09 0.06 0.34 0.01 0.06 -0.22 -1.19 
Log Distanceij 1.04
***  3.61 0.40 1.15 0.26 0.83 -0.04 -0.12 
EU Bothij Dummy   -1.83
***  -3.00 -1.98***  -3.51 -1.67*** -3.05 
Biofuel Quotai     0.90
***  2.87 0.85*** 2.79 
Subsidy Dummyi     0.98 1.22 1.18 1.45 
Log Product. Costs 
Ratioij 
      0.89 0.86 
Canola Seed Productioni       -4.59·10
-07*  -1.88 
Canola Seed Productionj       1.72·10
-07**  2.04 
Biofuel Cons. Transporti       8.65·10
-04***  2.64 
Biofuel Cons. Transportj       1.30·10
-04**  2.10 
Value Weighted 
Distanceij 
4.16·10-06***  6.39 4.09·10-06***  6.54 3.79·10-06***  6.72 3.21·10-06***  5.68 
Inverse Mill's Ratioij -0.64
**  -2.37 -0.59**  -2.27 -0.58**  -2.46 -0.50** -2.20 
Adjusted R² 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.24 
AIC 429.59 429.22 408.94 402.12 
Breusch-Pagan Test  insignificant insignificant insignificant insignificant 
Global Moran's I Test -0.28 
N 98 98 98 98 
Denotation: i = importer, j = exporter; *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%; Source: 
Own calculation. 
The GDP of the importer and the agricultural GDP of the exporter country are insignificant. In 
the case of the importer's GDP this is not surprising since GDP is a very broad indicator for 
the economic size included in an analysis for a very specific sector. However, the GDP 
generated only from the agricultural sector in the exporter country has no significant effect on 
the trade volume either. In conclusion, the basic gravity model, even with further 
specifications, does not seem to explain trade well. That is also reflected in the relatively low 
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adjusted R² of 13 per cent. 
In the second model, the dummy variable for EU trade integration, 'EU Both Dummy' is 
added. A negatively significant coefficient indicates that the trade volume is higher if one of 
the partners is a non-EU country. This is a sign that the border effect of the European Union 
seem not to be a trade inhibitor for trade partnership of two EU countries but rather for a non-
EU/EU-partnership. That is consistent with the interpretation of the distance coefficient of the 
first outcome equation: It indicates that higher transaction costs due to distances and tariffs 
play a minor role in the trade volume. After all, if both countries are in the EU it also means 
that they are close neighbours, which was captured by distance before the introduction of the 
new dummy. Therefore, once this effect is taken up by the newly introduced ‘EU Both’ 
Dummy, distance becomes insignificant. This is the opposite compared to the findings of 
Salamon et al. (2006) who found for the European ethanol market trade diverting effects. In 
particularly, regional agreements reduce the linkage to international markets and increase the 
intra-European trade. In the case of biodiesel, the production input canola oil seems to be 
scarce, wherefore a trade protection would threaten the European biodiesel industry.  
In the third model, biofuel quotas and a dummy for the existence of subsidizing the green 
industry are introduced to gauge the effect of political measures. Biofuel quotas have a 
positive and significant coefficient whereas the dummy for a subsidization of the green 
industry in the importer country is not significant. The result concerning the quota is expected 
since the quotas are clearly defined and their ultimate goal demands an increase in production 
and consumption of biodiesel. Naturally that would lead to increased imports of intermediate 
products, too. The insignificance of the subsidy dummy could be due to the summary of very 
diverse subsidization schemes that are not even necessarily targeted at bioenergy in just one 
dummy variable. A variable that is more differentiated might have yielded a clearer result. 
Lastly, the fourth and best specified model controls for up- and down-streamed value chain 
stages of the biodiesel chain. To avoid multicollinearity between the possible value chain 
variables and endogeneity with the dependent variable, we introduced only the two extreme 
ends of the biodiesel chain instead of variables for the whole chain: The production of raw 
material, for which canola seed production is a proxy, on the one hand and the consumption of 
the product, for which liquid biofuel consumption for transport is a proxy, on the other hand. 
Both parts of the value chain are assumed to affect the trade of canola oil: Raw material 
because of its role for sector specific supply and liquid biofuel consumption for its role for 
sector specific demand.  For the value chain stages, all coefficients for the importer and 
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exporter countries are significant and have the expected sign, except for the biodiesel 
consumption of exporter countries exhibiting a positive coefficient. This indicates that the 
demand in biodiesel for transport of exporter countries might have an effect on a high level of 
canola oil production which is not only being consumed but also exported. However, the 
coefficient of the importer's biodiesel transportation sector is much higher, indicating that the 
pull is stronger on the importer side due to a higher biodiesel consumption level.  
2.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The main objective of this analysis is to identify the effect of different EU policies on the 
canola oil import of the European Union and the trade integration of non-EU member 
countries. The estimation results show a negative coefficient for the EU trade integration 
dummy. This indicates that even though EU trade integration has been set up to foster trade 
among members, in the case of canola oil, EU members do rather import from outside. This 
negative relationship could possibly be explained by the import pull caused by exhausted 
input production of canola oil in the biodiesel value chain. The magnitude of a mandatory 
biofuel quota showed a significantly positive influence on the import of canola oil. Though 
not surprising, it reinforces the interpretation that demand of biodiesel is policy driven and the 
demand for raw or intermediate inputs for biodiesel production cannot be satisfied within the 
EU. Therefore these intermediates have to be imported from non-EU countries. Accordingly 
the answer to our research question is that 1) political measures seem to have a positive 
influence on trade whereas 2) the EU trade integration cannot be found to have an inhibiting 
effect on canola oil trade.  
Apart from these results, we have to withhold judgement on the effect of further political 
measures since the coefficient for a green investments subsidy dummy was insignificant. This 
warrants a closer look at the specific kinds of different political measures and their 
effectiveness. 
In contrast to the interpretation of distance based on the outcome equation, the decision 
whether to import canola oil at all is significantly negatively affected by distance, as can be 
seen in the selection equation. Here, a closer look at economies of scale and resource scarcity 
in the importer country needs to be taken. The value chain structure, which also affects the 
trade volume of canola oil, has to be taken into account as well. 
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Röttgers, D. and U. Grote: Africa and the Clean Development Mechanism: What determines project 
investments? 
Submitted to the journal World Development 
3 Africa and the Clean Development Mechanism: What Determines 
Project Investments? 
Abstract 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol allows companies in 
developed countries to meet their carbon emission commitments by financing projects for 
certified emission reductions (CERs) in developing countries. These can benefit by turning 
their environmental problems into investment opportunities. However, African countries so 
far have hardly used this opportunity to implement CDM projects. This paper finds out why 
by identifying factors which promote CDM projects in African countries. A gravity model is 
used to analyze flows of CERs between host and financier countries. The special roles of 
foreign direct investments (FDI), official development assistance (ODA) and trade are 
scrutinized closely in this context. Findings show that FDI, ODA and trade have a positive 
influence on project attraction, even when holding determinants of these factors constant. A 
distinction between mere CER flow existence and CER flow size yields two additional 
results: FDI and trade switch places in importance as determinants for project attraction and 
the specific failure of African countries consist of a failure in initial attraction of investors. 
This points to an inadequacy in the initial process of project generation as reason for Africa’s 
lack of projects in comparison to other developing regions. 
3.1 Introduction 
Only in 2005, eight years after it was drafted to mitigate global climate change, the Kyoto 
Protocol entered into force. It sets maximum amounts of greenhouse gas emission rights 
allowed per year by individual developed countries. One of the most important instruments 
created as a consequence is an emission rights trading scheme to manage these emission 
ceilings. Each country allocates the amount of rights under its ceiling to domestic companies. 
The main market for this is the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) which calls these 
tradable rights Emission Reduction Units (ERU). The companies under such a scheme can 
further increase their emission rights by financing emission reduction projects in developing 
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countries. Generally a partner finances a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project in 
return for the resulting emission rights (Certified Emission Reductions; CERs). The 
possibility to invest in projects abroad is an opportunity for companies and state organizations 
in developed countries to produce emission rights cheaper than buying them on carbon 
markets (Tian & Whalley, 2008). This is a targeted outcome of the Kyoto Protocol 
(Michaelowa & Dutschke, 1998), partly for the promotion of technology transfer to 
developing countries.  
Though in recent years demand and therefore the price of certificates is low, the price 
difference between certificates like the ERU and CERs was notable in the first period after the 
Kyoto Protocol was enacted in 2005. But even then the opportunity for emission reduction in 
most developing countries was largely untapped (UN, 2010). Of the circa 3800 projects 
started up to spring 2010, about 80 per cent have been started by companies in developing 
countries with financing from partners in developed countries in return for emission rights 
(UNFCCC, 2010).  The remaining 20 per cent of the CDM projects are financed by 
companies in developing countries themselves and are therefore not the cases of interest here. 
Of the 80 per cent, only about two per cent are located in Africa (UNFCCC, 2010). As the 
next section will show, the lack of overall development in Africa, when compared to other 
regions in the world, does not explain this small share of CDM projects. The question is: 
What does? Answering this first of two research question of this paper may help identifying 
constraints for CDM project investments in Africa. Overcoming these constraints could help 
African countries create payment benefits and spill-over effects attributed to CDM projects, 
such as technology transfer. 
In this respect it is important to know which channels project realization takes. The process of 
starting CDM projects is long-wound and complicated. Decision-making in this process might 
be influenced differently by certain factors like foreign direct investment (FDI) (Dinar et al., 
2008; Winkelman & Moore, 2011), trade (Dolsak & Dunn, 2006) and aid flows (Dolšak & 
Bowerman Crandall, 2007) at different stages. Though some of these factors might influence 
project creation in general, they might not be crucial for the stage at which African countries 
are at a disadvantage to attract projects. Other factors might be crucial at just that one stage 
but not at others. Identifying these factors and their more particular influence will help 
targeted re-structuring of either facilitating agencies at the country level or re-alignment of the 
CDM process. Evaluating channels and their influence on project initiation and expansion is 
therefore a second research question of this paper. 
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To set the stage for an answer to the two posed research questions, the next section will 
review relevant literature and describe the links between FDI, ODA and CDM projects 
further. After that, section 3.3 discusses the employed gravity model and data for the analysis, 
before the actual results of the research are presented and discussed in section 3.4. Section 3.5 
will close with summarizing remarks on climate change policy and further research needs. 
3.2 Background and Literature  
The establishment of CDM projects, although facilitated by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the United Nations Environmental Program 
(UNEP) and others (Hinostroza, 2008), seems to be particularly hard for African countries. 
Accordingly African countries lack projects compared to other CDM eligible countries. Basic 
economic intuition fails to explain this lack of projects in Africa, as indicated in Namanya 
(2008): The number of projects is small even when set in relation to factors associated with 





Figure 3.1. Comparison certificates relative to GDP, per capita Africa versus other 
eligible countries (2005-2007; source: UNFCCC (2010), World Bank (2010)) 
                                                 
1 The conclusions drawn from this descriptive analysis are only valid, if the assumed relationship is linear. 
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Figure 3.1 shows the average number of CERs per total GDP PPP per capita, a proxy for 
economic welfare, separately for African countries and all other eligible countries from 2005 
to 2007. Figure 3.2 shows the average number of CERs per total GDP PPP, a measure for the 
size of the economy. 
Figure 3.2 
Figure 3.2. Comparison certificates relative to GDP, Africa versus other eligible 
countries (2005-2007; source: UNFCCC (2010), World Bank (2010)) 
Both, total GDP and GDP per capita have been identified as determinants of CDM 
partnerships (Dinar et al., 2008; Wang & Firestone, 2010): A richer or a larger economy 
generally point to more abatable greenhouse gas emissions and a better economic capability 
for abatement. But the welfare or size of an economy alone does not explain the number of 
CERs. As can be seen from figures 3.1 and 3.2, the conditional CER output in Africa is on 
average ten times lower than in other regions. Similarly, comparing numbers of CERs issued 
per total emissions and per capita emissions respectively, show a large gap between African 









Figure 3.3. Comparison certificates relative to total emissions, Africa versus 
other eligible countries (2005-2007; source: UNFCCC (2010), World Resource 
Institute (2010)) 
Figure 3.4 
Figure 3.4. Comparison certificates relative to emissions per capita, Africa 
versus other eligible countries (2005-2007; source: UNFCCC (2010), World 
Resource Institute (2010)) 
If no other particular factor influences African project numbers, the relation of those 
indicators to CERs should be similar to that in other regions. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 clearly show, 
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however, that even when the relation between the above discussed and previously identified 
determinants for CERs, FDI (Dinar et al., 2008; Winkelman & Moore, 2011) and aid (Dolsak 
& Dunn, 2006), are set in relation to CERs, we do not see a different picture. The figures 
show that Africa's smaller involvement in the CDM cannot be explained by just the simple 
relation between CERs and the two explaining factors FDI and ODA (as proxy for aid). If that 
were so, setting CERs in relation to FDI and ODA would not lead to such a high discrepancy 
between Africa and other continents. 
Figure 3.5 
 
Figure 3.5. CERs in Relation to ODA in Regions of CDM Eligible Countries (2005-2007; 
source: UNFCCC (2010), OECD.QWIDS (2010)) 
  





Figure 3.6. Foreign Direct Investments in Regions of CDM Eligible Countries (2005-2007; 
source: UNFCCC (2010), OECD.QWIDS (2010)) 
These figures show that explaining the small number and/or size of CDM projects in Africa is 
not straightforward. Attracting CDMs is neither simply a matter of general economic 
development or emissions reduction potential, nor just of development aid or foreign 
industrial involvement. 
This does not necessarily indicate that foreign non-CDM involvement is irrelevant for the 
existence and expansion of CDM projects. In fact, facilitation is not only hoped to help 
combating climate change but also combating poverty by furthering development (Rübbelke, 
2009). Therefore CDM projects themselves could be perceived as a form of development aid 
and in fact as aid projects. Even if CDM projects are not financed as aid, it is possible that 
existing or finished ODA-based projects make the establishment of CDM projects simpler by 
using existing contacts, one of many possible soft or immeasurable factors. In other words, if 
aid relationships are well established, they might present a favorable environment for other 
activities such as CDM projects. Such a relationship can be interpreted as a spillover effect 
caused by soft or immeasurable factors. 
In contrast to aid, CDM projects could also be planned and perceived as foreign direct 
investments by international partners. Therefore it is worthwhile analyzing the relationship 
between the amount of bilateral FDI flows and the number of CERs transferred back to 
financier countries. Many factors generally determining investments in foreign countries 
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possibly also determine investments in CDM projects. Factors commonly named as FDI 
determinants are political rights and civil liberties (Suliman & Mollick, 2009), the social 
development in a country (Kolstad & Villanger, 2004) as well as human capital (Noorbakhsh, 
Paloni, & Youssef, 2001), infrastructure (Kumar, 2001) and the geographical and cultural 
distance between the two countries involved (Ito & Rose, 2002). Accounting for these other 
factors will help isolating the effects that stem from a coinciding or previous engagement in 
FDI. 
In addition, comparable to ODA, certain spillover effects of FDI might exert an influence on 
CDM projects (for an overview of literature on FDI spillovers see Blomström, Globerman, & 
Kokko (1999)). Due to previous investment activities, CDM investors already might have 
contacts to a host country and knowledge about legal and institutional structure. Investors 
could then reuse their contacts and knowledge to finance CDM projects. If CDM projects 
indeed benefit from such thinking, FDI would seem to have an effect through these soft and 
immeasurable factors even in presence of other generally beneficial factors already explaining 
FDI inflows. 
3.3 Gravity Model and Data 
3.3.1 Theoretical Model and its Specification 
The model best suited to analyze the bilateral transfers of CERs from one country to another 
is an augmented gravity model. Gravity models account for bilateral determinants of two 
countries between which the transfer takes place as well as for determinants attributed to each 
country individually. In a gravity model these factors are all multiplicands, signifying that 
their effects on transfers are not separable from each other. A generic gravity model considers 
the geographical distance between two countries i and j (Distij) as bilateral and transfer-
inhibiting factor, GDPs of each country (GDPij) as individual and transfer-enhancing factors, 
and a constant A. It takes the following form: 
                               (1) 
To be able to estimate such a model in a regression, the multiplicands have to be turned into 
summands by taking the natural logarithm on both sides of the equation and adding 
coefficients as well as an error term. Thus equation (1) would turn into the following 
regression equation
2
:   
                                                 
2 Note that the change in the sign of the factor Dist will be reflected in an opposite sign in the coefficient. To wit, 
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                                             (2) 
Out of the many pairs of potential host and financier countries, only a fraction actually 
generates projects. Therefore the data set has a large number of observations with no project 
partnerships and hence zero transfers of CERs between countries. The inclusion of these pairs 
leads to a so-called zero-inflation. Simply discarding these zero-observations possibly means 
losing information on why some pairs do not interact. Treatment of zero-inflation is similar to 
a selection bias problem. Analogically to Helpman, Melitz, & Rubinstein (2008) and 
following Linders & de Groot (2006) as well as the specification of Martin & Pham (2008), 
regression calculations here use a 2-stage Heckman solution (Heckman, 1979). In the 2-stage 
approach, a first regression called selection equation determines the likelihood of having at 
least one project started by a pair of partners. So at the same time as countering the bias of the 
zero-inflation the selection regression enables us to make a statement about first project 
initiation. 
It is a common strategy for the selection equation of a Heckman correction to include the 
same variables as in the outcome equation and at least one more. This helps avoiding high 
multicollinearity between the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) and other variables in the outcome 
equation. As for zeros (or even negative values) in variables on the independent side, the 
solution is more straightforward. Strictly following the gravity model would mean that further 
independent variables would enter multiplicatively as well, like VarYij in equation (3). This 
would mean that rearranging the equation to an additive term leads to logarithms of variables 
which possibly contain negative values or values equal to zero (see equation 4). Since taking 
logarithms of these numbers is impossible, the variables can be added to the original model as 
an exponent of Euler's number, like VarZij in equation (3). Taking the logarithm of this term 
would simply lead to the actual variable being one of the summands (see equation 4), instead 
of its logged form. This would change the interpretation of variables such that if the value was 
indeed zero, the transfer of CERs would not necessarily become zero as well. 
                                   
           (3) 
                                                                (4) 
Seven models test for determinants of a first project partnership, i.e. what influences a project 
initiation between a pair of countries. Comparing these will show the differences between a 
                                                                                                                                                        
the negativity of the term is transferred to the coefficient. So judgment on the inhibiting or enhancing nature 
of the factor can be reserved until the regressions yields a coefficient. 
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general analysis of determinants, the effect of being an African host, including other big 
players in the CDM business (namely China and Brazil) and redefining the set of ‘African 
hosts’ excluding South Africa. 
These seven models are used as the selection equations to seven corresponding outcome 
regressions which analyze the determinants of flow size, i.e. number of produced CERs 
between countries. Again, comparing the seven models with each other shows particular 
country as well as region effects and demonstrates the robustness of the results. A further 
comparison between the selection equations and the outcome equations shows the difference 
in determinants between the two stages of CER production. 
The time-fixed effects regressions employed here use period dummies in a pooled data set. 
This dummy variable least squares (DVLS) approach offers two advantages over standard 
fixed-effects methods. First, not only does it allow controlling for period-specific effects but 
also retains information on the influence of periods to be interpreted. This includes effects like 
global crises, the global business cycle and changes in how CDM business was perceived or 
conducted. Second, standard fixed-effects models would hold effects of countries constant 
over time rather than periods' effects. However, this method would omit information on 
countries which could have an influence on CDM attraction. DVLS allows for interpreting the 
effects of countries separately. The drawback of losing some degrees of freedom compared to 
a standard fixed-effects method is negligible. 
3.3.2 Data 
In order to estimate the gravity model, a panel has been set up for the years from 2005 to 
2007. The panel contains pairs of all possible developed financier countries and all eligible 
developing project host countries. Summary statistics for the variables are listed in table 1. 
Data were taken from the following sources. 
Number of CERs and CDM project data stems from the UNFCCC (2010) database, which 
provides numbers of CERs granted to a project and information on which host and financier 
partners take part in the project. To make this data fit the other data and the bilateral 
observations needed for a gravity model regression, conversion from project data to country 
data is necessary. For this, all CERs from projects financed, say, by Germany in Tanzania in 
2007, are added up to one number. This number then reflects how many CERs result from 
CDM projects originating from the partnership between companies of those two countries in 
2007. However, a project in Tanzania could as well be jointly financed by a financier from 
Germany and one from France. Since the UNFCCC data does not contain information on how 
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many certificates are allocated to the German and French financier, respectively, every 
country is given equal weight for each project. Projects solely financed by a developing 
country are discarded from the dataset (less than 20 per cent of the cases). 
 
FDI values as bilateral flows in billion US-$ are taken from the database OECD.Stat (2010). 
To reflect the relationship between business partners in countries, not only the unilateral FDI 
flows are considered but rather the sum of FDI flows in both directions. 
Bilateral official development assistance (ODA) in million US-$ is taken from (OECD 
QWIDS, 2010) as a proxy for development aid. This data only has positive flows from 
developed countries to developing countries and none in the other direction.  
Table 3.1      
Summary statistics for the full sample (23 financier countries, 121 hosts) 










CERs 19761 319274 0 15641024 UNFCCC (2010) 
GDP PPP pc 4939 4535 185 21643 World Bank (2010) 
Log GDP PPP pc 3.50 0.44 2.27 4.34 World Bank (2010) 








World Resource Institute 
(2010) 














 0.05 0.40 -2642 11 OECD.Stat (2010) 
ODA flows
b
 0.02 0.08 -0.48 3.19 OECD QWIDS (2010) 
Import/GDP
c
 0.0021 0.0135 0 0.5643 Comtrade (2010) 
Common 
Language 
0.14 0.35 0 1 
Mayer & Zignago (2006) 
Colonial 
Relationship 
0.04 0.19 0 1 
Mayer & Zignago (2006) 
Log Distance 7873.16 3734.49 420.25 19333.78 Mayer & Zignago (2006) 
Governance 1.56 0.61 0.20 3.22 World Bank (2010) 
Infrastructure 0.17 0.16 0.01 1 
CIA Factbook (2010), 
SeBa World (2010) 
Literacy 76.73 21.53 5.74 104.14 
Nation Master (2010), 
World Bank (2010) 
Africa-Dummy 0.42 0.49 0 1  
China-Dummy 0.01 0.09 0 1  
Brazil-Dummy 0.01 0.09 0 1  
Africa-w/o-SA-
Dummy 
0.41 0.49 0 1 
 
a: data in bio.; b: data in mio.; c: both in bio.  
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Import data of host countries in US-$ stem from Comtrade (2010) and to further shed light on 
business relationships of partner countries. In the following regression these data were set in 
relation to the economic size of the country to avoid mistaking the country’s trade’s impact 
for the impact of its size. In the set the variable is called trade. Data for the total GDP were 
taken from the IMF (2010). 
GDP PPP per capita from the World Bank (2010) database is also included in the model’s 
data, to test for welfare and development levels of countries. GDP data covering the overall 
size of the economy is not taken up like in equation (2) since other variables already carry the 
size of the country. 
Per capita CO2-equivalent emissions (CO2e) data gauges the need for abatement certificates, 
in the case of developed countries, and the potential to abate, in the case of developing 
countries. Wang & Firestone (2010) showed that emissions are a factor in CDM emergence 
and Winkelman & Moore (2011) even base their main argument on project developers’ 
rationale to start CDM projects in emission heavy industries. To include this influence on 
CER transfers, emissions are taken up in the regression. The emission data originate from the 
CAIT data set and are augmented by forecasts from the POLES data set, both from the World 
Resource Institute (2010). 
A number of additional variables control for the determinants of FDI (and therefore probably 
also ODA and trade): A common colonial past dummy, a common language dummy to 
control for cultural proximity, a governance index as a measure for institutional quality, the 
literacy rate as a control for human capital, and an index for infrastructure. The cultural data, a 
common official language dummy and a former colonial relationship dummy, as well as 
distance data are taken from the CEPII set of Mayer & Zignago (2006). Those three are 
excluded from the outcome regression due to the Heckman exclusion restriction. In their 
seminal gravity model paper Helpman et al. (2008) argue that religious similarities (i.e. 
cultural closeness) can be used as exclusion restriction in Heckman models. Likewise the 
Heckman procedure here includes the measures for culture closeness of common official 
languages and former colonial relationships as well as a distance as a measure for the actual 
physical closeness. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein’s original cannot assume a pair 
relationship which is not on par. In the case of CDM, however, relationships are not on par by 
design. Therefore we chose to replace their cultural closeness indicator with a variable which 
captures more relevant kind of similarity or, in this case more likely, dissimilarity. Using 
distance as well is warranted by the same reasoning and the fact that, other than Helpman, 
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Melitz and Rubinstein’s trade example, CDM project costs do not systematically increase in 
costs with distance.  
Governance data stem from the Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2009) set for governance 
indicators. 
The literacy rate is taken from the Education Statistics of the World Bank (2010) for which 
missing literacy rate values had to be replaced with data from the Nation Master (2010) 
website. 
The infrastructure index used here is specifically constructed. Since no comprehensive 
infrastructure index exists, Martınez-Zarzosoa, Perez-Garcıab, & Suarez-Burguetc (2008) as 
well as Wang & Firestone (2010) use aggregates of certain infrastructure proxies to complete 
their gravity models. The following ad-hoc aggregate included in the model is constructed 
with the same rationale in mind: 
(5) 
Here EnProdi is the production of kwh per person in country i, Mobi is the number of mobiles 
per person, Landli the number of landlines per person, Ineti the number of internet 
connections per person, Roadsi the kilometers of paved and unpaved road per square 
kilometers and Airportsi the number of airports per square kilometer. Data for energy 
production, telecommunication, roads, area and population were taken from the CIA Factbook 
(2010); data for airports were retrieved from SeBa World (2010).  
After discarding countries with missing data, the set contains 23 industrialized countries and 
121 developing countries (see the appendix for a full list). 
3.4 Results 
As table 3.2 shows, GDP per capita, emissions of both partners, FDI flows, the ODA flow, 
governance
3
, infrastructure and literacy as well as the three cultural factors have a significant 
impact on project initiation in most selection models. When some of these variables do not 
have a significant impact, it is due to the inclusion of particular region or country dummies, 
                                                 
3 Note that to avoid taking logarithms of negative numbers, the governance index was shifted upwards. 
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which will be discussed below. The only of the analyzed variables which stays consistently 
insignificant in the selection models is the trade flow. 
Of the significant variables, the significantly positive GDP per capita shows that investors 
would rather invest in the economically more developed countries among developing 
countries. The higher per capita emissions the host country has, the more opportunity to abate 
and start CDM projects, therefore the likelier a financier will invest (compare Jung (2006); 
see Marc, Alphonse, & Vincent (2005) for a discussion of the so-called low-hanging fruit 
discussion). All selection models show a negative effect of financier country emissions. This 
is an indicator for the general inclination of financier countries to avoid emissions: Countries 
which avoid emissions at home also do so more likely through CDM projects abroad. FDI is 
positively significant in the selection models, which means that when first project 
partnerships of countries are concerned, a relationship like FDI requiring transfers of 
technology and finances as well as an established institutional framework, formal or informal, 
facilitates a first project partnership. Partners in countries (or country governments 
themselves) that previously established enough trust or a similar partnership leading to the 
necessary prerequisites for FDI partnerships can probably do so again for the sake of CDM 
projects. This replicates the finding of Jung (2006) who finds that a good general investment 
climate, next to mitigation potential (see above) and institutional capacity, is one of three 
indicators of CDM project activity. A similar explanation can be applied to the significantly 
positive impact of ODA: Previous relationships through this channel and required 
prerequisites of ODA make project initiation easier as well. Moreover, alleviating poverty or 
gaining political favors (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2008; Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland, 
2009) are two reasons for providing ODA, which could also be reasons for CDM projects and 
thus explain the significance of this factor. Governance, infrastructure and literacy cover their 
respective reasons for investing in a country. The better governance and literacy, the likelier 
an initial project partnership between actors exists because institutional strength and human 
capital are helpful to setting up projects. Conversely, the better the infrastructure, the less 
likely it is to have a first project partnership. This effect is a second indicator for project 
financiers getting into countries because of the low-hanging fruits rationale: Countries with 
bad infrastructure likely also have easily refurbished high-emission sites. Therefore financing 
a first project there comes easy to financiers. Including these three factors, infrastructure, 
governance and literacy, shows that the effect of ODA and FDI goes beyond simply being a 
proxy  for  good  investment  conditions.  The  three  controls  for  cultural  factors,  common  
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Table 3.2: Determinants of CER project initiation 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent: Dummy ‘any CER’ Dummy ‘any CER’ Dummy ‘any CER’ Dummy ‘any CER’ Dummy ‘any CER’ Dummy ‘any CER’ 
Intercept  -4.79 (0.72) *** -2.81 (0.78) *** -5.54 (0.75) *** -4.13 (0.73) *** -2.88 (0.82) *** -2,51 (0,79) *** 
Log GDP PPP pci  0.11 (0.07) * 0.09 (0.07)  0.25 (0.07) *** 0.04 (0.07)  0.16 (0.08) ** 0.13 (0.07) * 
Log CO2eEmiss pci  0.13 (0.05) *** 0.12 (0.05) ** 0.02 (0.05)  0.17 (0.05) *** 0.05 (0.05)  0.09 (0.05) * 
Log CO2eEmiss pcj  -0.28 (0.08) *** -0.30 (0.08) *** -0.27 (0.08) *** -0.28 (0.08) *** -0.28 (0.08) *** -0.30 (0.08) *** 
FDI flowij+FDI flowji  0.35 (0.05) *** 0.34 (0.05) *** 0.29 (0.05) *** 0.32 (0.05) *** 0.24 (0.05) *** 0.33 (0.05) *** 
ODA flowji  0.53 (0.22) ** 0.67 (0.23) *** 0.43 (0.23) * 0.55 (0.22) ** 0.57 (0.24) ** 0.72 (0.23) *** 
Tradeji -3.79 (3.81)  -5.39 (3.93)  -3.23 (3.65)  -3.51 (3.78)  -4.52 (3.75)  -5.22 (3.85)  
Governancei 0.16 (0.06) *** 0.23 (0.06) *** 0.17 (0.06) *** 0.17 (0.06) *** 0.27 (0.06) *** 0.24 (0.06) *** 
Infrastructurei -1.97 (0.33) *** -2.12 (0.34) *** -2.08 (0.34) *** -1.94 (0.33) *** -2.21 (0.37) *** -2.49 (0.36) *** 
Literacyi 0.01 (0.00) *** 0.00 (0.00)  0.01 (0.00) *** 0.01 (0.00) *** -0.00 (0.00)  -0.00 (0.00)  
Common Languageij -0.43 (0.11) *** -0.30 (0.12) ** -0.40 (0.11) *** -0.41 (0.11) *** -0.26 (0.12) ** -0.28 (0.12) ** 
Colonial Relationshipij 0.57 (0.14) *** 0.55 (0.14) *** 0.61 (0.14) *** 0.57 (0.14) *** 0.59 (0.14) *** 0.51 (0.14) *** 
Log Distance 0.27 (0.06) *** 0.18 (0.06) *** 0.23 (0.06) *** 0.26 (0.06) *** 0.12 (0.06) ** 0.13 (0.06) ** 
Africa-Dummyi   -0.85 (0.09) ***     -0.83 (0.09) ***   
China-Dummyi     1.5 (0.17) ***   1.48 (0.17) ***   
Brazil-Dummyi       1.02 (0.17) *** 0.96 (0.17) ***   
Africa-w/o-SA-Dummyj           -1.13 (0.11) *** 
Pseudo R
2 














Observations 8326  8326  8326  8326  8326  8326  
Levels of significance: *=10%.  **=5%. ***=1%. Standard errors in parentheses. Subscripts denote host countries (i) and partner countries (j). Source: Own calculations. 
 
 




Table 3.3: Determinants of CER transfers 
Table 3.3 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Dependent: Log of CERs Log of CERs Log of CERs Log of CERs Log of CERs Log of CERs 
Intercept  24.46 (3.36) *** 21.02 (2.9) *** 21.06 (4.01) *** 25.18 (3.12) *** 19.66 (3.16) *** 20.89 (2.96) *** 
Log GDP PPP pci  -0.76 (0.37) ** -0.59 (0.36) * -0.34 (0.44)  -0.85 (0.35) ** -0.35 (0.39)  -0.70 (0.38) * 
Log CO2eEmiss pci  1.27 (0.24) *** 1.25 (0.24) *** 1.03 (0.25) *** 1.29 (0.25) *** 1,07 (0.26) *** 1.35 (0.24) *** 
Log CO2eEmiss pcj  -0.31 (0.43)  -0.40 (0.46)  -0.59 (0.42)  -0.31 (0.42)  -0.64 (0.43)  -0.16 (0.50)  
FDI flowij+FDI flowji  -0.34 (0.22)  -0.29 (0.24)  -0.11 (0.20)  -0.33 (0.18) * -0.13 (0.18)  -0.36 (0.27)  
ODA flowji  2.59 (1.37) * 2.59 (1.50) * 3.03 (1.31) ** 2.47 (1.38) * 2.95 (1.41) ** 1.53 (1.62)  
Tradeji 31.85 (17.45) * 32.98 (18.1) * 25.47 (16.94)  31.87 (16.89) * 26.76 (16.84)  26.49 (18.21)  
Governancei -0.74 (0.38) * -0.92 (0.41) ** -0.23 (0.40)  -0.73 (0.38) * -0.36 (0.43)  -0.98 (0.43) ** 
Infrastructurei 1.43 (2.55)  2.81 (2.87)  -0.06 (2.59)  1.31 (2.46)  0.93 (2.84)  2.96 (3.08)  
Literacyi -0.06 (0.01) *** -0.04 (0.01) *** -0.06 (0.01) *** -0.06 (0.01) *** -0.05 (0.01) *** -0.03 (0.01) ** 
Africa-Dummyi   1.35 (0.93)      1.03 (0.85)    
China-Dummyi     -0.42 (1.15)    -0.29 (1,16)    
Brazil-Dummyi       -0.94 (0.78)  -0.95 (0.83)    
Africa-w/o-SA-Dummyj           0.38 (1.40) *** 
Inverse Mill's Ratioij 3.01 (0.87) *** 2.78 (1.03) *** 2.12 (0.89) ** 3.07 (0.82) *** 2.05 (0.96) ** 3.35 (1.20) *** 
Adjusted R
2 














Observations 351  351  351  351  351  351  
 Levels of significance: *=10%.  **=5%. ***=1%. Standard errors in parentheses. Subscripts denote host countries (i) and partner countries (j). Source: Own calculations. 
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language, colonial relationship and distance, are significant as well and show that culture 
matters for project partnership initiation.  
Models 2 through 6 introduce different country and region dummies to see the Africa effect 
and separate country effects. Model 2 shows that being an African country decreases the 
chance of finding a partner for a first project. This Africa effect lets the significantly positive 
effect of literature, which is a proxy for human capital, and GDP per capita become 
insignificant. This shows that whatever is holding Africa back explains it better than these 
two variables, and is connected to them. As for human capital, it stands to reason that 
financiers more likely invest in countries with better educated personal. That the Africa 
dummy takes up that effect here, in the probit regression, shows two things. First, Africa’s 
problem is more specific than not being able to provide qualified personal for projects 
(otherwise literacy would stay significant). Second, Africa’s problem occurs at the critical 
point of first project initiation. To show the robustness of the Africa effect, models 3, 4 and 5 
look at 2 of the 3 most successful CDM attracting countries, China and Brazil
4
. Naturally both 
dummies have a significant coefficient. Though both countries cause their own individual 
effects when models 3 and 4 are compared to the baseline model 1, major results do not 
change (though China notably takes up the effect of host emissions). It is only the inclusion of 
the Africa dummy which leads to the insignificance of literacy.  
Just as models 3, 4 and 5 tested the effect of big players outside of Africa, model 6 makes a 
distinction between South Africa and the rest of African countries. In the data from 2005 to 
2007 South Africa produced a third of all African CERs. As model 6 shows, however, even 
excluding South Africa, the only bigger African player, does not make a big difference to the 
robustness of models 2’s results: The Africa effect is still negative, even increases and when 
introduced takes up the literacy effect. 
Table 3.3 shows the results of the corresponding outcome regressions
5
: The determinants of 
overall CER production between pairs (as opposed to the probit selection regression looking 
at project initiation). As the baseline model 7 shows, GDP per capita, host emissions, ODA, 
trade, governance and literacy have a significant impact on the size of CER productions. The 
less developed a country, the more partners will invest in CDM projects in it (though as 
following models show, this result is not quite stable). The more emissions it has, the more 
                                                 
4 The third country, India, was omitted due to high multicollinearity of different variables in the set, including the 
inverse Mill’s ratio. 
5 Model 7 is the corresponding outcome regression to the selection equation of model 1; model 8 corresponds to 
model 2 and so forth. 
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can be abated and opportunity for new CER production exists, similarly to the explanation for 
selection models. For ODA flows and trade, the reasoning from the selection models applies 
as well: Having more relations through other partnerships facilitates CDM projects, no matter 
if they are first or following projects. Furthermore, higher governance and literacy lead to less 
CER production. One possible explanation for the negative effect of literacy is the altruistic 
attitude that goes with giving aid (Berthélemy, 2006). If giving aid is motivated by altruistic 
principles, results suggest that CDM projects might originate from the desire to improve the 
situation wherever the project takes place. Moreover, the literacy rate might not only be a 
proxy for human capital but also labor costs in general, analogous to the hypothesis of 
(Noorbakhsh et al., 2001) that labor costs might be a proxy for skills. Higher labor costs deter 
investments in a country, explaining the negative relationship. Controlling for sub-indices of 
governance, which are more diversified, leads to the same results and the corresponding 
regressions are omitted here. For an explanation of the governance effect, see the comparison 
between the selection and outcome equation below. 
Based on model 7, the following models test for the same country and region effects as 
models 2 through 6. Introducing the Africa dummy to the outcome regression in model 8 has 
no effect. This leads to the conclusions that whatever effect African countries carry that 
causes them to take such a small share of CER production, it does not have an impact beyond 
the first project. This result is stable, even when the China and Brazil dummies are introduced 
in models 9 through 11. However, it becomes clear that the governance effect of model 7 is 
explained by the China dummy: The fact that much CER production takes part in China and 
causes much variation in the governance variable leads the China dummy to take up the 
governance effect. Similarly, the China dummy takes up the GDP per capita and trade effect. 
This does not mean that the above explanations do not hold. It just means that China with its 
many and large projects dominates this effect. 
The Africa effect becomes interesting once more when Africa excluding South Africa is 
analyzed in model 13. In this case, the dummy turns positive and ODA even turns 
insignificant. This shows that the few African (but non-South African) CERs that are 
produced are mainly the result of ODA channels. So even when countries in the narrowed 
down set of non-industrialized Africa do get projects, their number and size is partly 
dependent on aid channels. Once this effect is taken up by this narrow Africa dummy, it is 
clear that ODA is not a determinant of CER production for other countries. 
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One more interesting point about the regressions of table 3.2 and 3.3 is their direct 
comparison. While the selection equations show a negative Africa effect, the outcome 
regressions either do not show an Africa effect at all or that an Africa effect depends on ODA, 
if South Africa is excluded. This is akin to the statement that African countries have a 
problem at first project initiation except for those projects which are a result of development 
aid (and therefore either aid projects or facilitated through aid project channels). There is a 
hurdle at project initiation that African countries need to overcome to take part in the CDM 
business. Though we cannot point directly at the hurdle, the regressions narrow it to a small 
set of possibilities. From the selection equations we know that this hurdle has to do with 
literacy or whatever literacy is a proxy for. That the Africa dummy takes up the literacy effect 
in the selection equation shows that the African problem can be identified as a junction in the 
process of CDM project initiation. This effect disappears after a first project partnership 
between two countries and is connected to human capital. Candidates for what causes this are 
singled out in literature as missing DNAs ( Michaelowa, 2003) due to high costs for setting up 
dedicated institutions (Ellis et al., 2007), lack of human capacity for technology transfer 
(Karani, 2002) as well as human capacity for climate research and development (Michaelowa, 
2007) and last of a non-exhaustive list, even if DNAs exists, a lack of institutional capacity of 
these DNAs (Desanker, 2005; Jung, 2006). 
To conclude the comparison, a few comments on other differences between selection and 
outcome regression are required: A few coefficients change their signs in the outcome 
regressions compared to the selection regressions. Of the two stable sign-changing effects 
literacy has been discussed. The other, governance, is negated by including the China dummy. 
Another remarkable change from the regressions on project initiation to the ones on CER 
numbers is the swap in the significance of FDI and trade. Trade can replace FDI as a 
significant factor here because of its substitutive nature. Generally speaking, while FDI is an 
indicator of intra-firm trade, foreign trade values measure the inter-firm trade (Yarbrough & 
Yarbrough, 2006). This inter-firm trade (here: Trade) takes place if ties between partners are 
not and need not be close. For a first project it makes sense that FDI shows a significant 
impact and trade does not: After all, whatever makes a big investment like FDI possible and 
less risky, like strong political or personal ties as well as previous business in a country, is 
also helpful in facilitating a first CDM project. Once a first project is setup and project 
expansion and repetition becomes possible, the relationship resembles a trade relationship 
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much more. Qualitative factors such as trust, experience and knowledge are not as necessary 
anymore since the process has become more repetitive. 
All models were subjected to robustness checks, such as replacing governance, literacy and 
infrastructure with their logged counterparts to do justice to the gravity model. None of these 
changes caused a noteworthy difference to the core results of the regression. No presented 
results suffer from heteroskedasticity (see Breusch-Pagan p-values for all models). Outcome 
models including China and Brazil dummies exhibit a variance inflation factor for the IMR 
slightly above the critical value of 10. Otherwise models do exhibit multicollinearity at all. 
Moreover, all outcome regressions have a significant IMR coefficient, showing that a bias 
was present and is countered by the two-stage approach employed here. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Using a two-step gravity regression model, this study analyzed channels for CDM project 
partnership promotion and Africa’s lack of success in this area. Results show that the set of 
factors for a first initiation of projects in a given year is different from the set for expanding 
existing efforts. In general CER creation is mostly driven by emissions, FDI, ODA and trade. 
When only the size of production is concerned, literacy as a proxy for labor costs has a robust 
effect. 
While first project initiation hinges more on FDI relation, overall CER volume is determined 
by trade relations instead. FDI requires a stronger relationship between investor and host 
country since considerable investments have to be made. A similar rationale might drive 
decision making for first project partnerships between countries. However, beyond this point, 
such strong relationships are not necessary anymore. The rationale of CDM investors changes 
from that of FDI investors to a business-as-usual attitude of commodity traders that can be 
surer about the continuity of processes since paths have been broken already. 
These paths are broken through soft and immeasurable factors associated with FDI, ODA and 
trade, like formal and informal collaboration or other institutional effects. That this has an 
influence on CDM project initiation and volume is a strong affirmation of current policy 
measures. The UNFCCC and UNEP Risoe Center established programs which are a 
framework for carrying out and facilitating partnerships and projects under the Kyoto 
Protocol umbrella. Our results show that political and industrial efforts that lead to informal 
institutions, business connection or exchange of inside knowledge as well as facilitating 
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partnership on a broader scale are crucial factors. This is especially true if these linkages 
cannot be established in other ways, as is the case if FDI and ODA do not take place. 
The same econometric investigation shows that as far as CER volumes are concerned, an 
African effect only appears if the biggest African producer is disregarded. In that case, and 
only then, African projects are revealed to be ODA driven. Otherwise there is no difference to 
being an African country or not. It is the project initiation step, however, which shows a 
strong Africa effect. African countries fail to attract initial investments. This interpretation of 
our results is supported by anecdotal evidence (e.g. Minang, McCall, & Bressers (2007); 
Nhamo (2006)) and consistent with reports of lack in technical, procedural and institutional 
capabilities concerned with the CDM process in Africa (Desanker, 2005; Ellis et al., 2007; 
Karani, 2002; Michaelowa, 2003, 2007). Capacity building in these areas will help Africa 
succeed in attracting investors for CDM projects and, with these projects, the capacity to find 
their way on a path to green growth. 
Chapter 3: Africa and the Clean Development Mechanism 
53 
Appendix 
Table 3.A1: List of countries 
Industrialized 
countries (23) 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark , Finland, France, 
Germany,  Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, United States of America 
 
Note: Even though countries might not have signed or ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol or might not have a nationwide emission trading scheme, single 
organizations in these countries might have partaken in CDM projects.  
Developing 
countries (121) 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape , 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, 
Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, 
Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet 
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4 The Economics of Wetlands: Market-Based Instruments and 
Effective Protection Strategies 
Abstract 
Among the instruments proposed for the sustainable management of wetlands, product 
certification for wetland-based goods, wetland mitigation trading and ecosystem certification 
are some of the most recent. Based on a general model of wetland management, this paper 
analyzes the applicability of these three market-based instruments using a static optimization 
model. Taking the example of agriculture and aquaculture, findings suggest a potential to 
increase welfare for all three instruments. However, product certification suffers from 
drawbacks owing to strong interdependencies between the ecosystem services. Wetland 
mitigation trading and ecosystem certification are first-best choices within this model as long 
as ecosystem services can be quantified properly and transaction costs are not prohibitive. 
4.1 The State of Wetlands 
Over the past years, awareness of wetlands and their importance for the biological cycle has 
been raised. Though cover of wetlands on earth as share of total land surface is relatively 
small (5-8 percent depending on the definition used (McCartney, Rebelo, Senaratna 
Sellamuttu, & de Silva, 2010b; Mitsch & Gosselink, 2007)), wetlands' impact in terms of 
ecosystem services (ESS) is far-reaching (Barbier, 2010; Costanza et al., 1997; Rebelo, 
McCartney, & Finlayson, 2009). On local and regional level, crucial functions include 
supplying and maintaining the quality of fresh-water, regulating disasters like floods, 
droughts, and disease, preserving the fertility of soils as well as providing intangible values 
such as leisure, space for religious activities and tourism (Falkenmark, 2007; Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). On a global level, wetlands play a decisive role in carbon 
sequestration (Badiou, McDougal, Pennock, & Clark, 2011; Bernal & Mitsch, 2012; Duan, 
Wang, Lu, & Ouyang, 2008; Hansen, 2009; Xiaonan, Xiaoke, Lu, & Zhiyun, 2008)  and are 
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home to some of the world's most precious biodiversity hotspots (Gopal & Junk, 2000; Keddy 
et al., 2009; Liu & Lü, 2011; Sukhdev & Kumar, 2008).  
While some human activities may interact in a positive way with each other, many activities 
are competing for the same resources and are mutually exclusive. As a result, wetlands are 
continuously degraded and depleted. For example, the extensive use of fertilizers in crop 
production belongs to one of the primary threats for biodiversity of inland water and coastal 
areas (Malmqvist & Rundle, 2002; Skourtos, Kontogianni, & Harrison, 2010; Wood & van 
Halsema, 2008). Land use change (such as deforestation and drainage for agriculture), urban 
development, water extraction, overexploitation and the dissemination of invasive species are 
further drivers of degradation (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). These interactions 
and their negative consequences are increasingly becoming a dilemma. Especially the rural 
poor in developing countries frequently find themselves in vicious circles; on the one hand, 
the ecosystem often provides the largest share of locals’ means of subsistence, which means 
the rural poor are highly vulnerable to ecosystem deprivation and the direct effects of climate 
change (droughts, floods etc.). On the other hand, limited funds in combination with lacking 
property rights and other market failures render sustainable management of wetlands very 
difficult. To sustain themselves, locals slowly degrade the ecosystem which delivers their 
livelihood (Lee & Neves, 2010; Ratner, 2011).  
4.2 Market-Based Instruments 
Various policy options are available for dealing with the usual type of externality and many of 
them are efficient, market-based instruments. However, the particular interconnectedness of 
ESS with each other and their surrounding ecosystem demands consideration when 
implementing policies.  
Classical MBIs for instance include taxes and subsidies, which optimally internalize the social 
costs and benefits by increasing or decreasing the market price. Typical examples are output 
or input taxes (e.g. on timber or fertilizers, see Bach & Gram (1996) as well as Claassen & 
Horan (2001)) and conservation subsidies (financial and technical assistance programs 
(Hoekman, Maskus, & Saggi, 2005), cost-sharing programs for habitat expansion (Bastos & 
Lichtenberg, 2001; Hardie & Parks, 1996), targeted product subsidies, etc.). A number of 
articles have highlighted the possibilities and limitations of these instruments also within the 
context of ESS, which are rival in their use (see e.g. Lankoski & Ollikainen (2003) and 
Havlík, Veysset, Boisson, Lherm, & Jacquet (2005)).  
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Apart from these measures there are various more recent market-based instruments (MBIs) 
driving the commodification of natural resources (Gómez-Baggethun, de Groot, Lomas, & 
Montes, 2010). In our analysis we will focus on three such instruments; (1) product 
certification, (2) capped mitigation trading, and (3) wetland certification. As opposed to taxes 
and subsidies, these instruments are often governed across borders and may - but must not 
necessarily - be administered by a public authority. As a result, they may be appealing 
especially for developing countries as they provide the possibility to find finance abroad 
(Freireich & Fulton, 2009; Gunatilake & De Guzman, 2008; Mandel et al., 2009; Nahman et 
al., 2008, 2009). 
The general approach of the first of those three, product certification, is to certify a specific 
ESS, e.g. an agricultural product. Many certification programs pursuing sustainable food 
products (coffee, sugar, fish and others) but also commodities and services like timber, 
flowers and tourism already exist (for an elaborate survey see Golden et al. (2010)). Other 
approaches focus only on one part of the production process such as greenhouse gas 
emissions (e.g. the EU Biofuel Renewables Directive (European Parliament, Council, 2009)). 
The second of the three MBIs considered here, capped mitigation trading, uses the market to 
provide incentives to control the quantities of the externalities rather than the prices. It allows 
offsetting damage to a particular ecosystem by saving or rebuilding an ecosystem elsewhere, 
as practiced with emission certificates gained through Flexible Mechanism projects (ETS, 
2003; UNFCCC, 1997) and in mitigation banking (Stein, Tabatabai, & Ambrose, 2000). 
Mitigation trading is criticized widely for unwanted side effects causing inefficiencies. This 
critique reaches from perverse incentives (Schneider, 2011; Winkler, 2004) over institutional 
misalignment and unintended financing side-effects (Castro, 2007; Axel Michaelowa & 
Michaelowa, 2007) to counterproductive outcomes (Kallbekken, 2007). However, least of this 
criticism is aimed at the core principle: Offset trading. This makes it worthwhile to discuss if 
it would be appropriate as alleviation mechanism for wetland externalities. 
Third, a relatively new approach for ecosystem protection and management is the idea of a 
certificate for the whole ecosystem (Dargusch, 2010; Jie, 2008). Within such schemes the 
management or area of an ecosystem is evaluated according to fixed standards and the 
ecosystem certificates can be sold to finance the sustainable management of the ecosystem. 
Buyers are companies participating in offset schemes or generally interested in fulfilling their 
corporate social responsibility as well as NGOs and private persons interested in nature 
conservation (Cohen, 2011; Hedden-Dunkhorst et al., 2011). 
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Careful re-evaluation of political instruments is necessary in a context as interconnected as an 
ecosystem. In doing so, we will consider existing measures as well as potential initiatives 
aimed to target ecosystems directly (such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD) and the Green Development Initiative (GDI)), which center on a more 
holistic approach and to our best knowledge have not been included in similar analyses. 
Chapter 4.3.1 presents an ecosystem with only one stakeholder. Advancing from there, 
chapter 4.3.2 adds stakeholders who do not have an influence on ecosystem use and 
production decisions, but profit from its ESS, in order to demonstrate the welfare loss through 
externalities. These two models serve as baseline for the private and, respectively, public 
optimal maximization to compare the three selected instruments to. Chapter 4.4 presents three 
possible political instruments to set incentives for all stakeholders to achieve socially optimal 
production demonstrated in 4.3.2. To show the advantages and disadvantages as clearly as 
possible, the three existing and proposed environmental protection systems are stripped to 
their essential features to create a model of stylized environmental protection measures. This 
helps to sharpen the view on the workings of different mechanisms and allows for a more in 
depth theoretical analysis of them. 
4.3 Basic Model 
4.3.1  Production Optimum of a Private Wetland Holder 
A wetland   provides a number of ecosystem services (ESS) with positive utilities, some of 
which are treated as commodities exchanged at the market (  ) (agricultural products, fish, 
hydro-power etc.) and some for which no market exists (  ) (e.g. biodiversity or carbon 
storage capacity). To simplify analysis, we consider only one landholder, although we could 
also imagine the more realistic case of numerous landholders with a commons law and 
commons decision makers (e.g. a common village head). That landholder produces two 
goods: One from agriculture (  ) and one from aquaculture (  ). Both goods compete for the 
same land resources  , but agricultural activities also impose additional costs on aquaculture 
through runoff and pesticide pollution (  )
6
 (Carvalho et al., 2002; Sarrazin, Tocqueville, 
Guerin, & Vallod, 2011; Thiere & Schulz, 2004). The producer may choose to reduce the 
impact of the negative externality by introducing abatement measures ( ). Hence, we define 
the functional relationship of    and    as 
                                                 
6 Negative or positive impacts of aquaculture on agriculture may exist as well, but for now we will ignore such 
externalities, i.e.    0. This assumption can be discarded in models with a higher number of ESS, but 
facilitates the presentation and is more realistic in context of the example ecosystem with agriculture and 
aquaculture. 
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          (1) 
and 
         [              ] 
 
(2) 
with    and    representing the amount of land used for the production respectively,    the 
negative externality of agriculture on aquaculture and   the abatement technology used in the 
production of   . To make both production processes as distinct as possible, we do not model 
a converse negative effect of aquaculture on agriculture. Production of both goods increases 
in land but with diminishing returns so that  
   
   
  0, and 
    
   
   0 for      . We further 
assume that the value loss in aquaculture is a positive concave function of agriculture, where 
   
   
  0, 
    
   
  0 and 0      . The underlying assumption is that the first unit of damage 
inflicted on an otherwise unharmed ecosystem will cause a greater value loss than further 
units. While the point of marginal increase or decrease is debatable
7
 and certainly depends on 
the interaction between specific ESS and production types, we assume diminishing marginal 
damage. If production inflicts damage to a pristine part of the ecosystem, it has still more 
environmental integrity to lose than an already damaged part of the ecosystem. We are aware 
that this very abstract line of reasoning does not hold for all ecosystem interactions we cover 
with our model, but due to its level of abstraction it can be applied in general to our model. 
Further,    is a convex decreasing function of abatement with 
   
  
   0 
    
   
  0  and 
    
     
 0 . The last term implies that the negative impact of agriculture on aquaculture 
products weakens when abatement is applied. For simplicity’s sake we consider linear cost 
functions both for production (   and   ) and for abatement (  ). Using this information we 
obtain the decision problem: 
   
       
                  [              ]                      (3) 
subject to 
        (4) 
      0 
  0 
(5) 
(6) 
                                                 
7 For example, (Roughgarden & Schneider, 1999) assume decreasing marginal damage while (Kahn & Kemp, 
1985) find empirical evidence for an increasing marginal damage function. 
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To simplify the analysis, we assume that production of both agriculture and aquaculture takes 
place and that all available land is used productively. Accordingly, strict equality in (4) 
applies and (5) cancels out, therefore the Lagrangian is 
                   [              ]                       
                
(7) 
Deriving (7) with respect to    as well as     , results in the following optimal prices p1 and p2: 
   
      
   
   
   
   
        
   




   
    
   
   




As would be expected, the price of agriculture    increases in marginal costs of land    as well 
as the shadow price of land μ and decreases in land productivity 
   
   
. However, the producer 
also internalizes the marginal value loss caused by agriculture on aquaculture       
   
   
   
   
 
   by demanding a higher price    than he would in the case of 
   
   
   
   
 0. Further, as can be 
seen in (9), the negative externality of agriculture also leads to a higher price of the 
aquaculture product, as the value loss lowers the land productivity term in the denominator. 
Finally, by deriving (7) with respect to  , we find that in the optimum 
          
   
  
    
(10) 
The producer will abate to the point where the marginal value increase from abatement on 
aquaculture equals the marginal cost of abatemen
t.
                                
4.3.2  Production Optimum under Welfare Considerations 
The previous profit function models the production rationale of an ecosystem holder. Hence 
maximizing it exclusively focuses on what is best from a producer's perspective. By contrast, 
members of society maximize their utility by consuming agriculture and aquaculture products 
but also through consumption of non-market ESS such as biodiversity, carbon sequestration 
and scenic beauty. We summarize the potential utility of these ESS in  . Land allocation to 
and production of    and    may have a positive impact on   when it implies a higher degree 
of conservation (for example, this could be the case of eco-tourism). Nevertheless, sticking to 
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the example of conventional agriculture and aquaculture, at this point we assume that 
production of both goods will have a negative impact   on  , but to different extents (for 
further discussion of wetland interaction compare Wood & van Halsema (2008)). This 
damage may be mitigated by introducing abatement    and     so that 
         ⏟
   
   ⏟
   
   ⏟
   
   ⏟
   
  0 (11) 
with   representing the damage on  , and    the initial stock of  . Damage d behaves similar 
to the value loss in aquaculture, accordingly 
  
   
 0 , 
  
   
 0  and 
  
   
 0 , 
   
   
  0 . 
Accumulating the utility gained from production and utility from other ESS, the welfare 
function therefore takes the following shape 
             (12) 
Deriving the welfare equation with respect to    and    under consideration of the constraints 
in (4)-(6), (13) and (14) yield the socially optimal prices: 
   
[   
  
   
]
   
   
   
   
            
  
   
   
   
   
   
 
(13) 
   
     
  
   
   
   
   
   
      
 
(14) 
In both (13) and (14), prices increase with the marginal damage caused by the production of 
both ESS, 
  
   
   
   
 and 
  
   
   
   
, as compared to a model that only considers the producer. This is 
in line with the general theory that social prices should be higher than private prices in 
presence of negative externalities (compare e.g. Tietenberg (2000)). We find the welfare-
maximizing abatement costs by deriving with respect to    and     
  
         
   
   
    
  




   
  
   
 
(16) 
Comparing to (10), the social optimum would therefore require the producer to abate above 
the private level until marginal abatement costs equal the marginal damage reduction in 
addition to any marginal value loss reduction on other goods produced by the landholder.  
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To conclude, both, optimal prices and abatement, are higher in a model that considers overall 
welfare beyond producer profit are higher. The first-best solution to this problem would be to 
introduce a pigouvian tax equal to the marginal damage caused by production on the non-
market ESS (compare Pigou (1952)). Yet, as has been discussed extensively in the literature 
(e.g. Baumol (1972) and Pearce & Turner (1990)), lack of information and information 
asymmetries restrict possible applications. Instead, policy makers often have to revert to 
alternatives which limit damage of production and stimulate more sustainable production 
methods. In the following section we will consider three such options that aim at increasing 
abatement of a single commodity (product certification), increase the cost of damaging 
production/benefit of conservation (mitigation trading) as well as compensating for provision 
of non-market ESS (wetland certificates). 
4.4 Models for Market-Based Instruments 
4.4.1  Resource Certification 
Targeted subsidies and sustainability certification may be useful instruments to increase 
abatement efforts of producers in the broader sense (including all kind of actions aiming at 
more sustainable production methods).  
Given the significance of agriculture for livelihoods of people living in wetlands and its 
impact on the deterioration of wetlands, targeted subsidies and certification programs may be 
a possibility to improve sustainability. Abatement measures could for example include a more 
sustainable nutrient management, better waste-water treatment and integrated pest 
management. In functional terms, we include this by distinguishing between conventional 
agriculture   
     
    with conventional abatement   
  and certified agriculture    
      
     with 
production methods according to the environmental certificate standards. (This case 
encompasses the targeted subsidy case.) To make it attractive for producers to increase the 
level of abatement above the private optimum, we consider a case where the producer 
receives a price premium per unit. Subtracting additional expenses of compliance and direct 
certification costs yields the net premium  
   
   . We assume that this abatement level would 
neutralize all negative externalities of production (i.e. both the impact of    on    and on  ). 
Moreover, we employ the assumption that the abatement level of certified production reflects 
an abatement ceiling of the producer, i.e. the producer may choose to produce in a 
conventional way or certify (part of the) production but will not abate above the fixed level 
corresponding to certification. 
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A possible impact of certified land area on the efficiency of abatement is ignored (
    
   
     
    
0 , as are potential productivity losses in    due to the sustainability standards. Finally, we 
suppose that the allocation of land to certified agriculture reduces the value loss in 
aquaculture  
   
   
    0  with 
    
   
    
 0  and a negative cross-elasticity  
    
   
     
    0 . This 
assumption may apply for some farming systems (e.g. when buffer zones are required, which 
might increase the carrying capacity of the wetland) but may not always be the case, as we 
will discuss later. The new decision problem is given by:   
   
  
     
        
  
     
     
         
      
             
           [    (             
        )]    
              
                  
(17) 
with the extended land constraint   
     
        . To analyze how resource certification 
affects the total damage level, it is necessary to analyze how it affects land allocation. In order 
to do so, we first hold land allocated to aquaculture    fixed. This makes sense for two 
reasons. First, many new certification schemes considering agriculture in wetlands (such as 
the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO, 2007) and the EU Biofuel Renewables 
Directive (European Parliament, Council, 2009)) rule out land with high carbon stock, such as 
peat, or high biodiversity (in which category many natural fishing grounds would fall). 
Second and perhaps most obvious, draining the fish ponds for agricultural land is related to 
costs and would generally not apply for the short term. Employing comparative statics, we 
find that an increase in     
    in most circumstances would imply an expansions of land used 
for certified production at the cost of conventional farming (for further mathematical 
derivation see appendix). We also find that the total amount of abatement outside of the 
certification program decreases, which is reasonable, since the area of conventional farming 
declines. The impact of these changes on damage depends on the aquaculture production on 
the one hand, and the damage function on the other hand. Looking first at 
aquaculture,    decreases as   
     
    decreases and   
    increases.  
      [       
     
      
     
    ] (18) 
If this value loss is not completely compensated by the decrease in    
  , productivity of 
aquaculture increases and as a result    turns out to be larger. As for the effect on non-market 
ESS  , we therefore obtain an ambiguous impact; the negative impact of farming falls 
whereas the negative impact of aquaculture increases 
         
        
       (19) 
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We may also consider the other case where the producer withdraws land from aquaculture for 
certified production or to replace the reduction in conventional farming (i.e.    as variable). 
However, to be able to derive clear results from the analysis we would have to specify prices 
and the functional relationships more explicitly (for more details, also see appendix). In 
general terms, the reduced damage in    would have to be weighed against negative effects 
from land use change. 
In conclusion, the use of certification to reduce negative externalities on non-market ESS   by 
means of increased abatement measures is likely to have impacts on the production of other 
(marketable) goods as well. With respect to our example, the aim of agricultural certification 
could be to improve biodiversity, soil and water quality et cetera. Nevertheless, as pesticide 
pollution and siltation decline, the certification standards may lead to a positive impact on 
aquaculture as well. If aquaculture has a positive impact on  , for example through higher 
food security and health, the beneficial effect of certification may be fortified. On the other 
hand, if - as assumed in 4.2.1 - the negative impact of aquaculture on   dominates (e.g. 
through feed pollution or other unsustainable methods; see FAO (2011)), the positive impact 
of abatement on agriculture is countervailed by increased pollution from    . As a result, 
certification as stand-alone measure to reduce damage of one good may have unwanted side-
effects.  
4.4.2  Mitigation Trading 
In most cases, resource certification as discussed above is voluntary (Golden et al., 2010). 
More sustainable production methods (captured by the abatement function) are awarded, 
depending on the willingness of consumers to shoulder the additional cost or price premium 
    
   . By contrast, so called mitigation trading systems focus on the maximum damage  ̅ that 
society is willing to accept. In mitigation trading systems the cost to keep damage below  ̅ 
(by producing less or increasing abatement) is shifted to producers (even though this generally 
affects prices paid by end-consumers). Prime examples for this method are some schemes 
under the Wetland Mitigation Banking framework in the US (Morgan & Roberts, 1999; Sip, 
Leitch, & Meyer, 1998; Wilkinson & Thompson, 2006) and, on a global scale, the cap and 
trade system under the Kyoto protocol (UNFCCC, 1997), most prominently implemented in 
the EU emission trading scheme (ETS, 2003). These kinds of systems, within their particular 
frameworks, allow for only a certain overall amount of environmental degradation or 
pollution which can be offset elsewhere. The optimal amount of  ̅, the cap, could be taken 
from the results of the model in 4.3.2, but is of no further concern here. It matters only that 
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such an amount is specified (e.g. by setting maximum levels of phosphorous runoff 
(Stephenson, Norris, & Shabman, 1998) or CO2 emissions (Gayer & Horowitz, 2006)) and 
that it is smaller than   . To pollute and destroy parts of the ecosystem, a polluter has to hold 
a proportional amount of permits to do so. An authority gives out these permits, producers 
buy these permits and can attain more (and in turn sell) by creating and maintaining buffer 
areas or protected zones    (   ) and so save a proportional amount of the ecosystem. Hence 
the total amount of pollution permits is described by 
                   ̅     (   ) (20) 
In this equation  ̅ represents the previously determined optimal amount that society is willing 
to accept as pollution and    (   )  is a function for the activity of converting land into 
protected areas or buffer zones. This protected area function is essentially a production 
function for permits. Externalities of the permit production are captured by including the 
production function as a factor of value loss v2. Under an offset scheme the outcome of 
   (   ) can be converted into offset certificates. It incurs costs caused by maintenance of the 
protected area     . Including input costs for abatement in    like for f1 and f2 is unnecessary, 
since permit creation by definition does not pollute or destroy the environment and therefore 
does not need to be abated. For simplicity we assume that each additional unit of land gives 
the same amount of additional permits. Damage caused by the production of products other 
than offset permits has to be accounted for through permits bought at price    . We cannot 
assume that each type of production causes the same amount of damage and therefore needs 
the same amount of permits to cover this damage. Hence a conversion factor        is 
necessary, which describes the negative environmental impact of production depending on 
abatement efforts. This factor for production-to-pollution conversion will be smaller the larger 
   gets, but decreasingly so. That is, 
   
   
 0 and 
    
   
  0 for both      .  
Hence the additional cost paid by the producer for damage caused by agriculture and 
aquaculture, the allowance cost, equals: 
                                  (21) 
                                  (22) 
Similar to resource certification, apart from the reduction in   to  ̅, also the value loss of 
aquaculture might decrease due to positive external effects of the production of permits. 
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Incorporating this interaction to accommodate a mitigation trading system thus changes the 
decision problem. 
Since a third type of land use is introduced, the land constraint changes to  
           . In addition, the Lagrangian contains a cap which constrains production 
 ̅    (   )                              with     0  Accordingly the new 
Lagrangian is defined as: 
                     (    (          (   )   ))        (   )     
         
             
                              
                                     
 (  ̅                         )    
 (    (          (   )   ))                         
        
(23) 
Derivation yields (24) and (25) which show that the mitigation trading scheme accounts for 
damage caused by production independently of the product.  
   
      
   
   
   
   
         
   
   
              
   
   
 
(24) 
   
     
   
   
              
   
   
      
 
(25) 
Accordingly, changing land allocation between the products is of minor importance.  
Comparing (24) and (25) to (13) and (14), respectively, shows that the marginal damage of 
production,
  
   
   
   
, in the optimality calculation for welfare has been replaced. Instead the 
terms show the marginal cost of land-use in terms of permit prices,  
   
   
            , and 
  
   
   
        , the shadow costs of permits, using the shadow price   and weighing it with 
the marginal damage. Both these terms are price drivers since they make production more 
costly and therefore decrease production and consequently pollution.  
The third price in the model,    , behaves differently than the prices of agriculture and 
aquaculture products, 
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Though it also increases in marginal productivity of input use and marginal production costs, 
it decreases in  
    
    
. This term simply is a measure of efficiency for permit production. As 
(26) shows, such changes in efficiency are passed on to the price, providing correct signaling 
on the mitigation trading market. 
Turning to the optimal abatement, equations (27) and (28) emerge.  
  
         
   
   
           
   
   
      
   
   
        
(27) 
  
         
   
   
      
   
   
⏞
  
        
 
(28) 
In comparison to (10) (and the analog case for   
 ), the cost functions in the mitigation trading 
model are extended with two terms. Producers will abate up to the point where marginal costs 
of abatement equal the marginal value increase in the other ESS plus the nominal and shadow 
decrease in production-to-pollution conversion. That means essentially two factors have been 
added to the cost rationale, gauging the potential of damage and potential of abatement of this 
damage. Thus mitigation trading gives an incentive to accept abatement costs not only due to 
gains through another ESS, but also due to cost savings in the production to the two 
considered goods. Higher acceptable costs for pollution and environmental destruction will 
lead to higher prices, which in turn will lead to less demand and therefore less production.  
Comparing the private optimum of chapter 4.3.1 to the results of (27) and (28) shows that any 
cap on environmental degradation or pollution will increase welfare as long as that cap is 
based on the value for    suggested by a calculation similar to the one from 4.3.2. This, 
however, only applies if homogenous units of environmental degradation are considered. 
With respect to emissions this might be realistic. When turning to biodiversity or scenic 
beauty, however, homogeneity or mathematical conversion is hard to achieve.  
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4.4.3 Wetland Certificates 
So-called wetland certificates are a third marked-based instrument worth considering. Similar 
to mitigation trading, the idea is to create a market for global payments for environmental 
services. However, while the mitigation trading approach is based on a cap of the negative 
externalities in the tradable commodities, wetland certificates put the focus on the positive 
externalities of a well-maintained wetland. The idea is relatively new and can be connected 
with initiatives like the Green Development Initiative (GDI)
8
. Here we assume that a wetland 
certificate xz can be sold to ESS users at a price pz depending on how well a set of non-market 
ESS are maintained. 
         ⏟
   
       ⏟
   
    ⏟
   
   ⏟
   
   ⏟
   
  (29) 
As can be seen in (29), xz decreases when conventional production of agriculture and 
aquaculture increase, and grows with conservation. However, note also that the producer can 
achieve certificates by introducing more a1 and a2. Hence - as opposed to mitigation trading 
where abatement could reduce the need for permits but not create new ones - the producer 
does not have to stop production of q1 and q2 in order to obtain a certificate. The extended 
objective function translates into: 
   
              
                  [                   ]    
                                        
             
    
         
(30) 
Deriving with respect to    and    under consideration of the necessary conditions now yields: 
   
      
   
   
   
   
         
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
(31) 
   
     
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
      
 
(32) 
As can be seen in the last terms containing  
   
   
   
   
   , wetland certificates increase the prices 
of agriculture and aquaculture products as we assume that     affects the vector of ESS 
in    negatively. The certificate price in turn can be established at a lower level if the impact 
of conservation on the value loss in        is large: 
                                                 
8 For more information on this initiative, see (GDI, 2011). 
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(33) 
Similarly, the more conservation affects the amount of certificates obtainable (i.e. the 
higher 
   
    
), the smaller can be the certificate price without losing its appeal to producers. By 
contrast, the additional costs connected with conservation would boost the price. In the break-
even point where the reduced marginal value loss in aquaculture and the opportunity cost of 
land (as reflected in the land constraint parameter  ) are equal to the marginal costs of 
conservation, the producer would conserve without any certificate.  
 
Marginal abatement costs are given by 
  
  
   
   
       
   
   




   
   
    
(35) 
As would be expected,   
  increases in the reduced marginal value loss in aquaculture (as 
before) and both marginal costs increase in the impact on   .  
4.5 Conclusion 
Modeling the interdependencies between ecosystem services in a wetland, we showed how 
applicable economic instruments fit into this model and whether they are effective and 
efficient. As flexible instruments with long tradition, product certification may be attractive 
given the (relatively) low requirements in terms of system infrastructure, monitoring and 
information costs. However, similarly to (Heberling, García, & Thurston, 2010), we conclude 
that instruments targeting abatement of one product only may also lead to counterproductive 
effects; as the negative impact on other goods declines, production of these other goods 
becomes more appealing. In which way this will affect the overall welfare depends on the 
positive or negative impact of these goods on non-market ESS. Setting incentives right and 
applying this method to wetlands in an efficient manner demands close monitoring. 
Therefore, depending on the transaction costs and the complexity of the system, this kind of 
instrument may be rated as second-best when compared to mitigation trading and wetland 
certificates. The former would punish all polluting and destructive production and hence 
internalize the externalities where they occur. Accordingly, as the equations in 4.3.2 show, 
prices would increase without giving cause to an unintended reallocation. One possible 
drawback might be the measurement of externalities. While it may be easier to do for single 
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pollutants as carbon dioxide or water contaminants (as is already practiced within the EU ETS 
(ETS, 2003) and various water trading programs (Colby, 2000; Schary & Fisher-Vanden, 
2004; Speed, 2009; Thompson, Supalla, Martin, & McMullen, 2009)), it is challenging with 
respect to biodiversity and other ESS, which tend to be very heterogeneous.  
By contrast, the wetland certificates as described here may be less demanding in terms of 
emission calculation, given that it is based on inventories of available ESS rather than 
ongoing emissions of production activities. They further allow the producer great latitude as 
conservation, production and abatement measures can be combined in the, for the producer, 
most efficient way. On the other hand, this advantage may also be a shortcoming of the 
system, as it demands a high degree of knowledge of the landholder how production and 
conservation affect biodiversity, carbon sequestration capacities, etc. Hence, depending on the 
circumstances, it will probably be easier - and less costly - to provide certificates for straight 
conservation or to compensate directly for the abatement measures taken.  
A second concern relates to the payment vehicle. In the case of resource certification, end-
consumers generally pay price premiums directly, while for mitigation trading the polluters 
pay the cost (although ultimately consumers may do, too, through higher prices). An 
advantage of these systems in terms of efficiency is thus the possibility to make use of the 
market mechanism for price signaling. Wetland certificates as bundles of ESS cannot as easily 
be connected with specific products. Because of this, non-governmental organizations, 
governments or companies with an interest in increasing their social responsibility could be 
potential funders.  
Having provided a framework to capture the interactions in a wetland ecosystem, there are 
still many open questions that need to be addressed. For example, the multiple producer 
structure present in many wetlands and how traditional institutional settings (e.g. with respect 
to property rights) may affect the outcome of policy measures are two of many issues that 
remain to be tackled successfully. Finally, empirical research to follow up new initiatives is 
crucial, especially for developing countries where the market potential is high, but little 
infrastructure is available.  
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Appendix: Comparative Statics 
To evaluate the impact of certified production for a fixed land area   , we take the first order 
conditions of (17) with respect to the optimization variables and derive again with respect to 
the net price premium       
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From the assumptions in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, we know that:   
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We may use this information to calculate the determinant  : 
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Then by Cramer’s Rule 
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A price premium increase would clearly have a positive impact on land allocation to certified 
production   
    and a negative impact on land for conventional production   
  . By contrast, 
the system does not provide an unambiguous answer for the impact on   
  . In general, a small 
impact of agricultural production on the value loss in aquaculture increases the probability of 
a reduction in abatement for conventional farming (reflected in the diagonal element in the 
third row).  
If we assume that land for aquaculture is variable as well, we would do the same exercise but 
include the first and second order conditions with respect to    and     
   . However, the 
complexity of such a system does not allow a straight reply but would have to be checked in a 
numerical context.  
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5 Financing Protected Areas in sub-Saharan Africa through 
International Market-based Instruments 
 
Abstract 
Many Protected Areas (PAs) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are severely underfinanced ‘paper 
parks’ that offer only scant protection for the resources they contain. This calls for new PA 
financing approaches. This paper reviews opportunities for and obstacles against the use of 
international market-based instruments (MBIs) to provide supplemental financing of PAs in 
SSA. Causal loops of low effectiveness, high transaction costs and limited efficiency have 
resulted in relatively few international MBI projects in SSA compared to Asia or Latin 
America. The current shift from state-based ‘fines and fences’ PA management towards 
integrated sustainable use concepts will allow for a better integration of international MBIs 
into PA concepts, as exemplified by Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) 
certified PAs.  
5.1 Introduction 
The impact of human activities on natural ecosystems is significant, and is escalating 
worldwide (CBD, 2010; Chapin & Matson, 2011; UNEP, 2010). Over the last decades, many 
convincing arguments have been made that support the need for more sustainable use of our 
world’s ecosystems (Biermann et al., 2012; Rockström et al., 2009). There are a number of 
multilateral agreements which indicate international concern in this regard. These include the 
Rio Conventions, which were drawn up in 1992, the outcomes of the Kyoto climate 
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conference in 1997, the Millennium Development Declaration from 2000, and the Nagoya 
Biodiversity Summit in 2010. Focus has increasingly shifted from the impacts of economic 
growth on the world’s ecosystems to the impacts of ecosystem degradation and destruction on 
economic productivity and human well-being (Dalby, 2009). Incentives are needed to 
minimize both of these impacts. This requires institutional structures capable of guiding 
human society away from critical tipping points and irreversible change to ensure sustainable 
livelihoods (Kanie, Betsill, Zondervan, Biermann, & Young, 2012). 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) boasts some of the world’s richest and most diverse natural 
landscapes and biological resources, including several global biodiversity hotspots and areas 
of particularly high endemism (Biervliet, Wiśniewski, Daniels, & Vonesh, 2009; Davies et al., 
2011). However, in the last half century, population growth coupled with agricultural 
expansion, rural poverty and technological progress have massively increased pressure on 
SSA’s ecosystems, often leading to their irrevocable destruction (Kideghesho, Røskaft, & 
Kaltenborn, 2007; McCartney et al., 2010a; Schuyt, 2005; Turpie, Barnes, Lange, & Martin, 
2010; Wood & van Halsema, 2008). In response, most SSA countries have established 
extensive national systems of environmentally Protected Areas (PAs) (Chape, Blyth, Fish, 
Fox, & Spalding, 2003; C. N. Jenkins & Joppa, 2009). In 2003, about 9 per cent of Western 
and Central Africa was formally protected according to the standards of the International 
Union for Nature Conservation (IUCN), of which 35 per cent belonged to IUCN’s protection 
categories I-III (Chape et al., 2003). Similarly, 17 per cent of Eastern and Southern Africa was 
formally protected of which 26 per cent was under protection categories I-III (Chape et al., 
2003). On a national scale, some figures are even higher. Tanzania, for example, designated a 
total of 792 PAs, which account for more than 38 per cent of the country’s total area 
(Consortium, 2003). The main responsibility for managing and financing these extensive 
systems of PAs lies with governmental agencies. 
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In practice, however, most PAs in SSA are ‘paper parks’ (Duffy, 2006; Wilkie et al., 2001). 
They offer little de facto protection for the natural and biological resources they contain and 
are under considerable threat from anthropogenic modification and habitat destruction. Many 
PAs no longer harbour the biological resources and ecosystems for which they were 
established. Reasons are institutional weaknesses alongside population growth, technological 
progress, rural poverty, armed conflict, forced relocation, and most importantly, the massive 
and chronic lack of funding (Frazee, Cowling, Pressey, Turpie, & Lindenberg, 2003; King, 
2009). PA budgets, both from own revenues or financiers such as the state, international 
donors or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), rarely allow for an effective long-term 
management of PAs in SSA. In this context, scholars and practitioners are working towards 
the development of international market-based financing mechanisms that promote private 
investments for the more effective management of PAs (Parker, Mitchell, Trivedi, Mardas, & 
Sosis, 2009). 
Scholar and practitioners pay increasing attention to Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
on the one hand and PAs in SSA on the other. The class of PES that is commonly called 
market-based instruments (MBIs) are often mentioned in this debate as applicable for 
financing PAs in SSA. This paper aims to provide a critical review and assessment of the 
major opportunities for and obstacles to use of international MBIs in SSA. Based on 
theoretical and empirical literature from various disciplines and the authors’ own empirical 
field research in Tanzania, Namibia and Ethiopia, this paper critically reflects on MBIs and 
their actual and potential effective implementation in SSA, and attempts to reconcile some 
contrasting views. 
Section two briefly reviews the recent PA discourse and current trends in PA financing, with a 
particular focus on SSA. Part three deals with the performance and potential of currently 
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applied or developed international market-based instruments for financing PAs in SSA. Part 
four provides the concluding summary, outlook and policy recommendations. 
5.2 Protected areas as spaces for nature conservation and sustainable 
livelihoods  
The importance of PAs is growing. In most areas of the world, their numbers and size have 
increased considerably in the last two decades. Since 1990, the increase in developing 
countries has been higher than in developed ones (WDPA, 2011). This trend is likely to 
continue in the near future. In 2010 the CBD COP10 in Nagoya set the ambitious goal that 
“by 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial […] areas […] should be conserved through 
effectively and equitably managed, ecologically representative and well-connected systems of 
protected areas” (CBD, 2010). 
5.2.1 Definition and categorization of protected areas  
PAs are established to promote the conservation and sustainable use of terrestrial or aquatic 
ecosystems. The overall aim of a PA is to locally plan and manage human-nature interactions 
in order to create synergy between the conservation of natural and biological resources and 
the maximization of societal or individual human welfare, or at least the avoidance of inferior 
welfare outcomes (CBD, 2010). 
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) defines a PA as “a clearly 
defined geographical space, recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other 
effective means, to achieve the long term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem 
services and cultural values” (Dudley, 2008). This definition is widely accepted and adopted 
by policy-makers and scholars worldwide. The IUCN classifies Therefore, PAs into six 
categories, based on primary management objectives, doing justice to the multitude of 
functions that PAs have today (Dudley & Phillips, 2006). As multi-functional landscapes, 
PAs provide a variety of services ranging from carbon storage, biodiversity conservation and 
water purification to tourism and recreation as well as direct contribution to local livelihoods 
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e.g. through the provision of food and firewood. PAs can hence function as catalysts that may 
help local, regional and national economies move towards integrated concepts of 
sustainability. 
5.2.2 The need for (co-)funding 
PAs are expensive. There are real and significant running costs associated with ensuring that 
PAs are effectively protected, that the ecosystem services they provide are maintained and 
that local communities benefit from them. Someone has to pay for these costs. But acquiring 
these funds is particularly challenging in developing countries where most PAs depend on 
funding from international bilateral and multilateral donors.  In Uganda, for example, more 
than three quarters of the country’s PA budget in 1995 was contributed by foreign donors 
(Emerton, Bishop, & Thomas, 2006). Since its establishment in 1991, the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) allocated US$10 billion worldwide, supplemented by more than 
US$47 billion in co-financing for more than 2,800 projects, many of which are related to PA 
financing (GEF, 2010). Today, GEF is the largest multilateral fund for environmentally 
related projects in developing countries. Consistent with the CBD, the GEF has defined 
strategic priorities for catalyzing the financial sustainability of PAs. 
The extent of both required and available funds for PAs worldwide is difficult to assess due to 
a lack of consistent reporting and the absence of an international clearing-house of 
information about PA funding (Emerton et al., 2006). Nevertheless, three separate studies 
have estimated the costs for the effective management of all existing PAs in developing 
countries as falling somewhere in the range of US$1.1 billion to US$2.5 billion per year; The 
funding gap is estimated between US $1 billion and $1.7 billion per year (Bruner, Gullison, & 
Balmford, 2004; A. James, Gaston, & Balmford, 2001; A. N. James, Gaston, & Balmford, 
1999; Vreugdenhil, 2003). These studies are relatively old, however. As number and size of 
PAs rises, along with costs related to increased governance complexities, the discrepancy 
between required and available funds is likely to increase in the future. State and donor 
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funding opportunities do not keep pace with this trend (M. Jenkins, Scherr, & Inbar, 2004; 
Scherr, Milder, & Shames, 2010). Much emphasis is now placed on developing ‘Proactive 
Investment in Natural Capital’ (Trivedi et al., 2009). This holistic view of natural capital 
offers the potential for global biodiversity finance. A recent study on biodiversity finance, 
published by the Global Canopy Programme, reviews 17 mechanisms which together could 
raise up to US$ 160 billion per year (Parker et al., 2009). In 2010 the global scale of funding 
for biodiversity and ecosystem services is estimated at US$ 52 billion - of which Africa 
receives as little as 6.24 per cent (Parker et al., 2009).     
5.2.3 Towards integrated concepts  
Most PAs in SSA have been established in geographically ‘remote’ rural areas with relatively 
low population densities. In the last few decades, population in and around PAs has grown, 
and agriculture as well as technical infrastructure has spatially expanded and developed. This 
has increased land use pressure, leading to conflicts between PAs and groups of individuals 
living in or adjacent to the PAs, often referred to as local communities (Balmford et al., 
2001).  
Most local communities depend on agriculture or pastoralism for their livelihoods, often using 
subsistence-based and land-intensive production systems. They are predominantly members 
of the rural poor. The nexus between rural poverty and PAs in SSA has hence gained 
increasing attention (Ferraro, 2002; Teklenburg, ten Brink, & Witmer, 2009). Local effects of 
a PA establishment can aggravate poverty, e.g. when local communities lose their user rights 
to their farmland or when they are forcibly resettled due to the establishment of a new PA. In 
recent times, therefore, more emphasis is placed on the role of PAs as instruments for 
mitigating rural poverty, as in “Integrated Natural Resource Management” (INRM) (Ash et 
al., 2010; Carew-Reid, 2003; Reid et al., 2006).  
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Assessing local opportunity costs for restricting the use of resources from PAs is an important 
factor in designing cost-effective conservation schemes that minimize adverse effects on local 
communities. The failure to measure the local opportunity costs of PAs often leads to 
ineffective and inefficient conservation strategies, and not only in developing countries 
(Fuller et al., 2010; Kramer & Sharma, 1997; Wiersma & Nudds, 2009). In depth ex-ante 
assessments of the local impacts of PA establishment are therefore increasingly becoming a 
more and more critical component in the PA debate.  
5.3 International MBIs as a source of finance for Pas in SSA?  
The past decade has seen a growing international discourse on how to make conservation and 
sustainable utilization of ecosystems financially rewarding. The PES approach is one idea 
aimed in this direction. It has gained momentum since the 1990s as a way to generate 
revenues for the conservation and sustainable utilization of ecosystems (Engel, Pagiola, & 
Wunder, 2008; Farley & Costanza, 2010; Polasky & Segerson, 2009; Redford & Adams, 
2009). PES includes a variety of concepts aimed at promoting the sustainable use of the 
environment by evaluating the economic value of its services and then getting private or 
public buyers to pay for it (Wunder, Engel, & Pagiola, 2008). In the last years, PES was also 
targeted by criticism, largely referring to problems related to the commoditization of public 
goods (Kosoy & Corbera, 2010) or the hidden political ambiguities of PES (Van Hecken & 
Bastiaensen, 2010).  
Many PES-labeled approaches are designed as MBIs which are “regulations that encourage 
behaviour through market signals rather than through explicit directives” (Stavins, 2001). 
Marketability can ensure appropriate valuation of ecosystem services, proper functioning of 
market signals and consequently the provision of ecosystem services according to market 
demand (Beder, 1994). But how is the use of ecosystem services carried over into market 
signals?  
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Ecosystem services have varying degrees of excludability and use-rivalry (Deke, 2008):  
- In the case of lumber-provision from a PA, for example, certain user groups can be 
physically excluded, and lumber can only be used once. Both, the properties of 
excludability and use-rivalry, make this ecosystem service a purely private good. A 
service like carbon sequestration, on the other hand, can benefit anyone, and nobody 
can be excluded. There is no incentive to sequester carbon at an optimal level like a 
private good.  
- Cap-and-trade schemes attribute property rights similarly. Without such schemes, the 
amount of carbon that could be emitted to the atmosphere would be unallocated, and 
whatever carbon there is would be freely usable. Within the scheme, property rights 
make exclusion and rivalry in consumption possible, and bring use of the atmosphere 
to the realm of private goods.  
- Another group of MBIs concerns markets for ecosystem services that are non-rivals in 
use but for which excludability can be established, so that service users can be forced 
to pay user charges. MBIs for these so-called ‘club goods’ can be separated into 
payments for direct use values, e.g. National Park entrance fees, and indirect ones, e.g. 
payments for the provision of water from protected watersheds (Deke, 2008). 
Figure 5.1 
Figure 5.1: Conceptualization of MBIs (source: Own) 
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International MBIs are characterized by having supplier an ecosystem service and its a a 
buyer in different countries. The discussion about the potential of international MBIs to 
generate revenues for the conservation and sustainable use of ecosystem services has heralded 
a lot of international recognition, reputation and expectation. Parallel to this, new 
communication channels have developed. The webpage ecosystemmarketplace.com, for 
example, has become a leading PES trading floor. The CBD COPs regularly call for the 
development and implementation of international MBIs to support the achievements of the 
CBD in general and those of the CBD Program of Work on Protected Areas (PoWPA) in 
particular. Large international donors such as GEF or the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund 
promote international MBIs in order to help them achieve their objectives. Governmental and 
non-governmental agencies field-test MBIs together with stakeholders on the ground (Milder, 
Scherr, & Bracer, 2010). While national MBIs are mainly located in developed countries, 
many international MBIs focus on ecosystem services provided in developing and transition 
countries (Richards, 2004).  
The focus, structure and extent of international MBIs in developing countries, however, varies 
considerably (Gutman & Davidson, 2007). Most MBIs value ecosystem services that also 
play central roles in PAs, such as prevention of deforestation (carbon sequestration), 
biodiversity conservation or watershed protection (Meijaard et al., 2011). However, despite 
the important role that PAs in developing countries play for the provision of ecosystem 
services of local, national and global importance, little academic attention has been given so 
far to the question of how international MBIs can contribute as a catalyst to PA (co-
)financing. 
In the following, we will review the three groups of international MBIs which are currently 
referred to as having the greatest potential for contributing to the improved financing of PAs 
in SSA. These are carbon markets/CDM; REDD+; and sustainability certification approaches. 
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Their respective foci are arranged along a gradient, from covering a single ecosystem service 
(carbon) to three such services (carbon, local people benefits, biodiversity conservation) 
towards concepts that value bundles of ecosystem services and local community development.  
5.3.1. Carbon markets/CDM 
Carbon markets aim to combat climate change as cost efficiently as possible. The idea behind 
it is that pollution rights can be traded. Ideally, those who can get the highest marginal value 
out of a unit of pollution will pay the highest price to actually pollute.  
The most prominent carbon trading mechanism was set up under the Kyoto Protocol, 
underpinned by the UNFCCC signed in 1992, with the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) being the most relevant part for developing countries. The CDM allows developed 
countries to meet their carbon emission commitments by financing carbon saving or 
sequestration projects in exchange for certified emission reductions (CERs) in developing 
countries. Alternatively, organisations and companies in developing countries can themselves 
invest in CDM projects and then sell their CERs to companies in industrialized countries. 
These CERs can be used to cover the carbon emissions allowed under the emission cap of 
industrialized countries. As such, the CDM has been heavily critiqued internationally as a 
“green wash” business opportunity for companies in developing countries.  
However, according to the World Bank, “to date [2010], Africa hosts less than 2 percent of all 
registered CDM projects” (WBI, 2010). One major reason for the lack of projects in African 
countries is the large transaction costs involved in starting a CDM project (Chadwick, 2006). 
These costs are often prohibitively high for small projects and cannot be justified by the gains 
from selling CERs (Michaelowa, Stronzik, Eckermann, & Hunt, 2003). A large part of these 
costs is attributable to the extensive bureaucracy and checking mechanisms involved in 
approving a project. Namibian accounts state that these costs are the foremost reason as to 
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why they do not start afforestation/reforestation projects under the CDM umbrella (own 
interview with Namibian Nature Foundation, 21/03/2012, Windhoek). 
General criticism of the CDM points at the relatively low price of the certificates as well as its 
poor sustainability and environmental scope (Boyd et al., 2009; Lovell, 2010; Sutter & 
Parreño, 2007). As a consequence, the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS, formerly Voluntary 
Carbon Standard) emerged in 2005 (Bryan, Akpalu, Yesuf, & Ringler, 2010). In principle, the 
voluntary carbon offsets of the VCS work like the CDM. Some major points differ, however. 
The larger bureaucratic overhead of the CDM allows it to include an intensive review and 
approval process for projects and methodologies. The VCS in contrast has a more simplified 
set of institutions and stakeholders at the decision-making level. As a response to the CDM’s 
tight focus on carbon, VCS offsets also certify ancillary benefits with respect to 
environmental sustainability and poverty eradication (Lovell, 2010). VCS could offer 
opportunities for African countries to access carbon offset funds: Africa recently held a larger 
portion (almost 7 per cent) of the transaction volume in the voluntary offsets market than in 
the CDM market (2 per cent) (Peters-Stanley, Hamilton, Marcello, & Sjardin, 2011; 
UNFCCC, 2010). This does not make up for the fact that SSA is still the region least engaged 
in offset projects, but it does show that the voluntary offset market has some advantages in 
this region. The VCS might be a stepping stone for SSA countries to more fully participate in 
the carbon offset market.  
5.3.2 REDD  
In 2007, the parties of the UNFCCC COP 13 in Bali adopted a decision to reduce emissions 
from deforestation in developing countries (REDD). REDD initiatives aim to provide 
financial incentives to reduce or stop deforestation (Emerson et al., 2010). REDD+ 
additionally aims to yield co-benefits for community development and biodiversity 
conservation to generate synergies for the achievement of both UNFCCC and CBD 
objectives. However, REDD+ is not yet internationally binding. In SSA, REDD activities are 
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sponsored by bilateral donors or multilaterals such as the World Bank Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (WBFCPF), the African Development Bank or the Congo Basin Forest 
Fund (Cerbu, Swallow, & Thompson, 2011). 
REDD readiness aims to help countries preparing REDD payment mechanisms by developing 
REDD national strategies, building capacities and analyzing emission sources and forest 
carbon stocks. REDD readiness activities are relatively evenly distributed across Asia, Latin 
America and Africa. As of 2009, Africa plays host to 22 REDD readiness activities, 11 in 
East Africa, 8 in Central Africa, and 3 in West Africa (Cerbu et al., 2011). However, Africa 
lags behind in terms of on-the-ground REDD field testing and pilot project implementation, 
with a total of 18 local REDD demonstration and pilot projects throughout the whole 
continent. With its 31 projects, Africa hosts far less projects than e.g. the Amazon region 
(Cerbu et al., 2011). The relatively small number of REDD demonstration and pilot projects 
in Africa mirrors the limited number of CDM projects in Africa. 
Tanzania is at the forefront of REDD demonstration and piloting in SSA. As part of the 
Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative, launched at the Bali Summit to initiate early action 
on REDD in developing countries, Norway invested large amounts (some speak of US$100 
million) to establish REDD pilots in Tanzania between 2008 and 2013. This helped Tanzania 
to prepare for a future global REDD regime, and to launch 10 REDD local pilot projects (own 
interview with REDD Secretariat Tanzania, 13/08/2011, Dar-es-Salaam). However, the 
practical outcomes on the ground give little reason for optimism. The pilots struggle with 
questions of how to develop equitable and corruption-free benefit-sharing, and how to 
monitor and certify the systems. 
Deforestation and forest degradation generate almost one fifth of global anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions (Pelletier, Ramankutty, & Potvin, 2011). It is undeniable that the 
potential for REDD in SSA is enormous. As of 2005, about 21.4 per cent of Africa’s total 
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land area comprised a total of 635 million hectares of forest – about 16 percent of the world’s 
total (FAO, 2006). At the same time, SSA experiences some of the highest deforestation and 
degradation rates in the world. The loss in forest area mainly reflects the conversion of forest 
land to agriculture (FAO, 2007). Estimates suggest that Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia are 
potentially the most important SSA suppliers of REDD carbon credits during the first 
commitment period 2013-2020 (Emerson et al., 2010). 
Many forests threatened by deforestation and degradation are located within PAs. As REDD 
increasingly shifts its attention towards the integration of CO2 emission reduction, 
conservation of biodiversity, sustaining ecosystem functioning and supporting local 
livelihoods (Elliott, 2010), REDD could be used to monetize the protection of these forests by 
building upon existing PA structures. However, the complexities involved in implementing 
REDD are even greater than with CDM. This makes it particularly difficult to use it as an 
instrument for financing PAs in SSA. The direct commercial benefit to a private company 
investing in REDD in SSA is questionable (own interview with Carbon Tanzania, 19/08/2011, 
Arusha).
 
 In this regard, the manager of a private forest investment company in Tanzania 
stated that: 
“Everybody talks about REDD. However, for a commercial company the avoidance of 
deforestation is difficult to be commercially viable. You would need very large areas to 
get sizable amounts of carbon. Afforestation makes commercially more sense. With 
REDD you have to work intensively with the local communities, which takes even more 
time and money [than CDM], and gains should go to the local communities. Therefore 
there is hardly any private company in the REDD sector, but mostly NGOs and GOs“ 
(own interview with Green Resources, 12/08/2011, Dar-es-Salaam). 
The consequence is a limited number of pilot projects which entirely depend on external 
donors for funding. To make matters more uncertain, the structure of REDD is vague and 
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constantly changing (Agrawal, Nepstad, & Chhatre, 2011; Elliott, 2010). It is still not clear to 
what extent funding of REDD will be based on MBIs, carbon credits, public funds, or a 
mixture of these. Coupling carbon markets with pro-poor development under REDD further 
complicates the design of the mechanism, and payments to communities from REDD may not 
be sufficient to cover the opportunity costs of conservation. Accordingly, the aim of global 
carbon markets to deliver low-cost mitigation is not necessarily conducive to supporting the 
priorities and needs of local communities (Mustalahti, Bolin, Boyd, & Paavola, 2012).  
5.3.3 Sustainability certification  
“Certification is a process of controlling particular aspects of a system to provide some 
guarantee to outsiders that the system complies to an agreed set of rules” (Meijaard et al., 
2011). With regard to PAs in SSA, three clusters of certification are particularly relevant, 
namely product certification, forest management certification and certification of ecosystem 
services.   
5.3.3.1 Product certification  
Agriculture is the largest land use category in the world and one of the main reasons for the 
loss of ecosystem services. Even though, the area and intensity of agricultural activity are still 
on the rise (Tejeda-Cruz, Silva-Rivera, Barton, & Sutherland, 2010). According to (UNEP, 
2011), environmental sustainability could be largely driven by positive agrarian change 
towards increased use efficiency, productivity and profitability. In order to promote socio-
economic and ecological transformation of agricultural sectors worldwide, a broad range of 
product- and process-related certification schemes were developed in the last decade.  
Most international certification standards for agricultural products place a strong emphasis on 
environmental sustainability. Many studies have been conducted on the impact of certification 
on natural ecosystems in developing countries. For example, Poncelet, Defourny, & De 
Pelsmacker (2005) evaluated Fair Trade projects with bananas in Costa Rica and Ghana, and 
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with coffee in Tanzania and Nicaragua, and concluded that the impact of Fair Trade is easily 
identifiable with respect to human and social capital, but that it has an ambiguous effect on 
environmental sustainability. Philpott, Bichier, Rice, & Greenberg (2007) found that Fair 
Trade coffee brought economic benefits to farmers, but did not necessarily protect 
biodiversity.  
However, using certification of agricultural products to generate revenue for the financing of 
PAs is a relatively new phenomenon, especially in SSA. A particular challenge of certification 
schemes is the complex interaction between conservation of ecosystem services and 
smallholder agricultural practices within or adjacent to a PA. As shown by Stellmacher & 
Grote (2009) using the example of the certification of forest coffee in Ethiopia, the benefit 
paid to local farmers due to certification can provide strong incentives for them to increase 
their agricultural activities and management intensities within PAs, with negative 
environmental consequences. As chapter 4 of this dissertation shows, this can also be shown 
on theoretical grounds. Hence the use of product certification for PA financing needs to focus 
on the development areas and buffer zones of PAs. One alternative approach to generating 
funding for PAs by means of product certification is exemplified by the Darara Bunna coffee 
project in Ethiopia. It uses revenues generated from organic certified coffee produced in 
unprotected areas of Ethiopia to co-finance a UNESCO Coffee Forest Biosphere Reserve in 
Ethiopia, which harbours some of the last wild coffee (coffea Arabica) populations in the 




5.3.3.2 Forest management certification 
Forest management certification was introduced as an international market-based instrument 
in 1993 to mitigate unsustainable forest management practices, with a focus on developing 
countries. Since then, the instrument has addressed growing public concerns about 
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deforestation worldwide, a phenomenon which is increasingly linked to debates on climate 
change, loss of biodiversity and local participation (Rametsteiner & Simula, 2003). Today 
there are more than 60 forest management certification systems around the world, which 
certify a total of about 10 per cent of the worldwide forest area (Preece, 2011). 
In Africa, the total area of certified forests increased by about 18 per cent between 2002 and 
2007 and in 2007 an additional 0.6 per cent of Africa’s forests were certified (ITTO, 2008). 
When compared to the worldwide figure of 10 per cent this shows the remarkably small 
contribution that Africa makes to the global forest management certification system.  
The main forest management certification scheme currently used in SSA is that of the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC). National forest certification systems are largely absent, and “FSC 
does not play a role on the domestic timber markets in Africa” (own interview with Green 
Resources, 12/08/2011, Dar-es-Salaam). FSC certified products hence mainly aim at markets 
in Europe and North America.  
As of 2007, the total FSC certified area in Africa was 7.3 million ha. This accounts for only 
about 5 per cent of the total FSC certified areas worldwide (ITTO, 2008). With 1.7 million ha, 
South Africa accounts for the largest portion of this percentage (ITTO, 2008). The dominant 
share of FSC certified forests in Africa are forest plantations rather than primary forests 
(FAO, 2007) and they are managed by the private sector (ITTO, 2008). The Norwegian 
private company Green Resources (GR), Africa’s leading forestation company, for example, 
afforested 22,000 ha in Eastern Africa with Pine and Eucalyptus, and holds another 300,000 
ha of land for future planting. It has begun pursuing FSC certification for its forests in 
Tanzania and Mozambique, and aims to certify all of its forests in Africa according to FSC in 
the near future. Beyond that, GR has started to register its activities as CDM projects and to 
certify them according to the Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) 
Standard. In 2010, the 2,000 ha GR Kachung forest project in Uganda was registered as a 
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CDM project and validated to the CCBA standard (own interview with Green Resources, 
12/08/2011, Dar-es-Salaam).  
5.3.3.3 Certifying bundles of ecosystem services and community development 
Certification of ecosystem services and community development can be used as an instrument 
to verify PAs or other spatial areas according to certain international standards. Depending on 
the projects’ characteristics and the specific preferences of buyers, they may well be 
incorporated into CDM, REDD or other carbon markets, and guarantee their co-benefits 
beyond carbon sequestration. Companies or other organisations wishing to offset greenhouse 
gas emissions can then purchase offset certificates. The most widely implemented 
certification standards in this regard in SSA are those of the Climate, Community & 
Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) and Plan Vivo. In addition, new certification initiatives like the 
Green Development Initiative (GDI) are currently under development. 
The CCBA is a global partnership of private companies (e.g. BP, GFA Envest, Intel, SC 
Johnson) and NGOs (e.g. Conservation International, CARE, Rainforest Alliance) created in 
2003. It aims to leverage policies and markets to promote the development of forest 
protection, restoration and agroforestry projects through high quality multiple-benefit land-
based carbon projects. CCBA does not issue quantified CERs itself but encourages the use of 
a carbon accounting standards such as VCS or CDM in combination with CCB Standards. Its 
standard design comprises of 14 required criteria and 3 optional ‘Gold Level’ criteria. As of 
February 2012, CCBA had registered 47 projects worldwide, 12 out of which are located in 
SSA (5 in Kenya, 2 in Tanzania, 2 in Uganda, 1 in Ethiopia, 1 in Mozambique, and 1 in 
Zimbabwe). As of early 2012, 22 projects are currently undergoing validation, 8 of which are 
located in SSA (CCBA, 2012). 
Plan Vivo is a certification standard for sustainable land use projects aimed at improving the 
livelihoods of local communities in developing countries by connecting them to international 
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carbon markets. Plan Vivo does not issue CERs, but issues Plan Vivo Certificates (PVCs) 
instead. PVCs are environmental service certificates, each representing the reduction or 
avoidance of one metric ton of CO2, plus livelihood and ecosystem benefits. Until December 
2010, Plan Vivo issued PVCs for a total of 1 MtCO2e (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). 
In 2012, Plan Vivo has 5 registered projects worldwide, 3 out of which are located in SSA (1 
in Mozambique, 1 Tanzania, 1 in Uganda). 8 more projects are in the pipeline, of which 5 are 
located in SSA (Plan Vivo, 2012a). Of the 3 current Plan Vivo projects in SSA, 2 are 
designed to generate revenues for financing PAs. The project in Mozambique is located in the 
buffer zone of a National Park; that in Uganda is part of a Ugandan REDD pilot project (Plan 
Vivo, 2012b).  
Although the total number of CCBA and Plan Vivo certified projects in SSA is still rather 
small, their relative engagement in SSA (CCBA: 12 out of 27 projects; Plan Vivo: 3 out of 5 
projects) is higher than that of CDM or REDD, as well as that of the certification of 
sustainable agricultural production or forest management. Additionally, CCBA and Plan Vivo 
both have a relatively large number of projects in SSA in the pipeline. In bringing together 
local community-based PA approaches and international frameworks and conventions, CCBA 
and Plan Vivo can be seen as pioneers for integrated international MBI approaches in SSA.  
 
Certification of ecosystem services and community development can also be used as a 
justification for the high prices of carbon credits from SSA. With 9.1 US$/ tCO2e, the price 
of carbon credits from SSA on the international voluntary market is substantially higher than, 
for example, that of carbon credits from Asia (5.4 US$/tCO2e) or Latin America (5.3 
US$/tCO2e) (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). This can be attributed to the limited supply of 
credits from African locations. In this context, certification according to CCBA and Plan Vivo 
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can act as a ‘shopping guide’ that helps buyers to ‘cherry-pick’ carbon credits from PA 
projects with benefits going far beyond carbon sequestration (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011).  
Most projects on the international voluntary market are large-scale. 93 per cent of all projects 
have a transaction volume larger than 20,000 t CO2/year. Carbon emission reductions from 
PA projects are relatively small. However, some buyers preferentially buy credits from small 
projects with high publicity potential for reasons related to their public image (Peters-Stanley 
et al. 2011).  
In the context of the CBD PoWPA and the CBD Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, a 
number of new global biodiversity initiatives have been established in recent years that try to 
promote biodiversity conservation by establishing international MBIs. The most prominent of 
these is the Green Development Initiative (GDI). It was established to support the CBD in its 
work on innovative MBIs by developing an international certification system for land 
management and biodiversity conservation that particularly promotes business engagement. 
Comparable to the CDM and carbon credits, the GDI is supposed to mobilize additional 
private sector finance. GDI does so by establishing a standard and an accreditation process for 
certifying the management of geographically-defined areas in accordance with objectives in 
the areas of conservation, sustainability, equity, and development. Among other things, GDI 
aims at certifying the supply of biodiversity-protected areas in developing countries, which 
can then be sold in the form of GDI credits to buyers in developed countries (OECD, 2010). 
In its scheme, GDI envisages a major role for the private sector in financing projects. 
Contributions are especially likely to originate from companies whose production processes 
depend on genetic diversity (e.g., pharmaceutical companies, seed producers, or 
bioengineering companies). This broader GDI concept could be appropriate for regions that 
cannot apply for REDD+ projects because of little forest cover, but have a low ecological 
footprint and a high biocapacity. GDI could also be combined with other schemes like 
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REDD+ or CDM, if there is biodiversity or any other ecosystem service apart from carbon 
sequestration involved (OECD, 2010). It is envisaged that a future GDI scheme will enable 
PA managers that use and manage the biological resources sustainably to be legally 
recognized and financially rewarded for their efforts.  
In response to a call for pilot projects in 2011, GDI received 20 Project Information Notes 
(PINs). 10 of these PINs were received from SSA (2 from Namibia, 2 from South Africa 1 
from Central Africa, 1 from Ghana, 1 from Kenya, 1 from Mozambique, and 1 from 
Tanzania) (GDI, 2012). These PINs provide a pipeline for a GDI pilot phase and are expected 
to become the first GDI-registered areas. However, GDI is in its early stages and many 
questions related to financing, enforcement and monitoring are still unsolved.  
Biodiversity conservation is also the focus of a number of other certification standards which 
are currently under development. The Standard on Biodiversity Offsets (SBO), developed by 
the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Program (BBOP), aims at promoting best practices for 
biodiversity offsets in developing countries. The Global Conservation Standard (GCS) and the 
Biodiversity Area Management Standard (BAMS) both focus on commercial land use and the 
management of protected areas. The main difference between GCS and BAMS is that GCS 
aims to release above-ground carbon stocks, whereas BAMS works on the concept of issuing 
credits for areas managed rather than for units of ecosystem service generated. All of these 
standards, however, are works in progress. 
5.4 Summary and conclusion  
Most PAs in SSA have been established in a top-down manner using a ‘fines and fences’ 
approach that provides little incentive for local communities to engage in PA maintenance. 
Today, funds for PAs are highly dependent on international donors. However, PAs are still 
often managed as ‘costless places’ and are therefore chronically underfinanced, which 
negatively affects their effectiveness. 
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The establishment of effective PAs alone is not enough to guarantee the conservation and 
sustainable use of SSA’s ecosystem services. PAs are only one instrument among others. 
However, given the large and increasing size of PAs in SSA and the value of ecosystem 
services they contain, they should be more qualified and able to contribute more effectively to 
‘green development’ solutions than they do today. The effectiveness of PAs, both within and 
beyond SSA, is, however, greatly determined by the question of who shares in their monetary 
costs and benefits.  
On these grounds, voluntary international MBIs contribute to establishing value chains that 
link ecosystem service providers to beneficiaries and make the beneficiaries pay for them 
(Farley & Costanza, 2010). In recent years a number of theoretical approaches have been put 
into practice, driven by international conventions and donors. Although PAs are large-scale 
providers of ecosystem services, it is not clear to what extent revenues can be generated for 
them from international MBIs. This paper aims to contribute to this discussion.  
Few voluntary international MBI projects have been implemented in SSA, and domestic 
instruments and markets rarely exist. SSA countries are lagging behind in the implementation 
of CDM projects and REDD demonstration and pilot activities when compared to countries in 
Asia and Latin America, which often provide similar ecosystem services in international 
markets. The major problem of certification in SSA is related to the costs of accreditation and 
evaluation, which are prohibitively high for smaller projects and local communities (Frost, 
Mayers, & Roberts, 2003; Molnar & Trends, 2003; Richards, 2004). “Certification needs 
certain economies of scale. This limits local initiatives in Africa.”9 Costs arise, for example, 
from complex application, evaluation and auditing processes, or from complying with audit-
related recommended actions (Molnar & Trends, 2003). Beyond the question of costs, the 
successful combination of certification tools, in terms of effectiveness and equity, depends on 
                                                 
9
 Interview Green Resources, 12/08/2011, Dar-es-Salaam  
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a set of beneficial policy and governance pre-conditions. These relate to the existence of 1) 
clearly defined and secure land tenure rights, 2) land management units with the necessary 
administrative and technical capacities to access certification markets, 3) social and 
environmental pressure groups with the capacity to participate in certification standard-setting 
processes, 4) effective and regular audits, and 5) transparent information flows (Richards, 
2004). 
One obstacle to the initiation of new MBI projects is related to high upfront costs. Entering 
new markets, particularly international ones, is complex and expensive. In comparison with 
providers of ecosystem services from Asia and Latin America, most of those in SSA are 
relatively small, as are the range of services they provide. Economies of scale are limited. The 
upfront costs for entering international markets for ecosystem services are therefore mostly 
prohibitive in SSA, particularly for NGOs and local community-based organisations. For the 
most part, international start-up capital and human expertise remain decisive factors in kick-
starting projects. This external factor limits the potential for growth and sustainability. 
In addition, buyers will only pay if they are confident that the ecosystem service they are 
paying for is actually effectively delivered by the PA (Scherr et al., 2010). This calls for 
operationalization and constant monitoring. Measuring and valuing ecosystem services, which 
are complex, dynamic and participatory, can be extremely difficult and costly. The definition 
of baselines for ecosystem services, for example, necessitates in-depth empirical research, 
which is often done by international research consortia or consultants. There is hence a need 
to continue working towards better methods to operationalize, map, model and value 
ecosystem services at multiple levels.  
There is often little information on the real costs of PAs and the ecosystem services they 
provide. Available data mostly refers to management expenditures, whereas opportunity costs 
and transaction costs often remain unknown. Information on the local opportunity costs of 
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restricting resource use from PAs is critical in generating a product and its price when traded 
in international MBIs. Many PAs in SSA face rising opportunity costs due to population 
increase, expansion of smallholder agriculture and large-scale agricultural investments. These 
costs have to be valued and incorporated in MBIs. In order to minimize costs, PAs with 
relatively low actual and projected opportunity costs should be prioritized. Similar 
considerations apply to transaction costs, which burden small projects over-proportionally. 
This particularly concerns SSA providers of ecosystem services from PAs. 
PAs need reliable and foreseeable budgets. International MBIs are mostly established without 
a time limit; however, they are prone to market fluctuations, price volatilities and market 
failures. Although this happens in all markets, it particularly holds true for new and voluntary 
ones. This mostly affects smaller projects. One should hence try to avoid using budgets 
generated through international MBIs to finance fixed costs of PAs. 
Another challenge concerns local participation. Most international MBIs that may be used to 
contribute to PA financing are aimed at involving local people and communities in decision-
making processes and to make them direct beneficiaries. In many SSA contexts, this is a 
challenging task. Ecosystem services that qualify for international trading often provide the 
livelihood basis of poor smallholders living in or adjacent to PAs. In the last 20 years, a 
mixture of democratization, liberalization and decentralization efforts have been made in SSA 
countries. PA governance has increasingly shifted towards joint, participatory and 
community-based approaches. The relation between poverty, natural resource use and PAs is, 
however, still both strong and contested. In this context, international MBIs may help by 
providing incentives for local people and communities living in or around the PA to work 
towards its conservation, but can also add new complexities and conflict lines to the situation.  
Our assessment of the effectiveness of international MBIs in contributing to financing PAs in 
SSA provides mixed results. A lot of good and innovative ideas for increasing funding for 
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PAs in developing countries by international MBIs have been suggested in the last decade 
(Gutman & Davidson, 2007). Many important stakeholders, such as GEF, the World Bank 
and other donors, massively support the implementation of these ideas. However, little has 
happened so far and bringing potential into practice will be a long road. International MBIs 
are far from reaching the breakthrough point or scale at which they attain global significance. 
In most SSA countries, the necessary underlying human, technical and institutional capacities 
for using international MBIs to internalize PA benefits that are currently externalized are not 
yet developed. This results in limited efficiency, high transaction costs and a small number of 
projects. Paradoxically, if the underlying capacities necessary to implement international 
MBIs were stable and effective, these MBIs might not be needed. 
However, things are changing for the better. Many PAs in SSA ultimately left the 'fines and 
fences’ road to reduce their dependency on state structures and funding. This provides greater 
space in which to choose and develop individual paths. The use of international MBIs to 
support these PAs can create synergies, e.g. with regard to organisational structures or 
property rights. Simultaneously, the global demand for ecosystem services is rapidly 
increasing. Although markets are still mainly concerned with carbon credits, particularly from 
BRIICS countries, the interest in ecosystem services and (co-) benefits from SSA is growing. 
This is evidenced, for example, by the high demand for CCBA certified projects from SSA. 
PAs mostly harbour complex ecosystems and a multitude of functions. Ecosystem services 
could therefore be bundled into certificates, as was intended by the Green Development 
Initiative. In a manner similar to that seen in product certification in the 1990s, a ‘survival of 
the fittest’ of international MBIs will likely take place in the next few years. However, 
voluntary international MBIs will remain only one of the many options for generating budgets 
for PA in SSA. If well designed and properly implemented, synergies between MBIs, 
innovative PA approaches and a combination of other financing sources can significantly 
contribute to achieving the goals of the UNFCCC and CBD environmental conventions.   
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6 Conformity, Leadership and Why Strong Rules Work – A 
Namibian Common-Pool Resource Experiment 
Abstract 
In the vast literature on communities facing common-pool resource dilemmas, the interplay 
between the effects of social dynamics group cohesion, governance and the framing of an 
experiment has not been fully explored. As factors of these categories influence the 
experimental results and their interpretation, this paper analyzes how participants in common-
pool resource experiments cooperate depending on these factors. The results show that the 
strength of rules in an experiment can determine the relevance of group conformity for an 
extraction decision: The most important indicator for conformity in the experiment loses 
relevance in the presence of strong rules. Other guiding factors like personal relationships and 
leadership retain relevance, even in strong rule settings. Furthermore, the experiments show 
that framing plays a decisive role. This implies the possibility to tailor experiments to their 
specific use: If they are meant to give concrete information on the situation on the ground or 
even help with capacity building, they can be adapted to the relevant local situation. 
6.1 Introduction and literature 
Environmental Economics is inherently anthropocentric. Therefore it ultimately has to 
grapple not only with the ecological side of environmental problems, but also with behavioral 
aspects. Stakeholders of an ecosystem will not only react to their surrounding environment 
and the natural resources it contains, but also to each other and the rules, implicit or explicit, 
with which they govern themselves. Since Gardner et al. (1990) conducted their seminal field 
work on community behavior in the presence of common pool resources (CPR), it is clear that 
a certain cooperative behavior is ingrained in stakeholders that constrains them from 
exploiting resources as much as they could. Numerous field experiments in different parts of 
the world have since painted a similar picture with respect to overuse, even though outcomes 
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show diverse behavioral patterns (e.g. Cardenas et al. (2000), Gardner et al. (2000), Hackett, 
Schlager and Walker (1994); for an early overview see Agrawal (2003)). What is clear in all 
of them, is that resource extraction in the real world is not as exploitative as previously 
thought (Hardin, 1968) or as  predicted by applying policy or game theory to the common 
pool resources (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992).  
Much research has been done in communities in developing countries into how different 
forms of governance can solve the prevalent problem of resource overuse, like overfishing, 
deforestation and overgrazing (Agrawal, 1999; Cardenas, Ahn, & Ostrom, 2004; Cavalcanti, 
Schläpfer, & Schmid, 2010; Janssen, Bousquet, Cardenas, Castillo, & Worrapimphong, 2013; 
Nordi, 2006; Ostrom, 2006; Travers, Clements, Keane, & Milner-Gulland, 2011). Many field 
experimental papers dealing with common-pool resources focus on testing different rule 
mechanisms, but not factors of decisions and how they change under new rules. Only a few 
researchers look into the process of decision-making which leads to the results obtained in the 
field. Velez, Stranlund, and Murphy (2009) find that decisions in CPR experiments hinge on 
expectation and are a result of the human tendency to conform10 to the group, i.e. behave as 
they see others behave and therefore make similar decisions. Furthermore, Hayo and Vollan 
(2011) attribute decisions to group cohesion, among other things, of which conformity is one 
form. These results go some of the way towards explaining decision-making in common-pool 
resource situations. Still they do not fully meet the call of Anderies et al. (2011) and Ostrom, 
Dietz, and Dolsak (2002) to do more research on what they label “micro-situational variables 
and broader context” or more fully examine what Agrawal (2003) calls “more variables than 
possibly analyzable”. Among others, Anderies et al. (2011) and Castillo and Saysel (2005) 
reinforce the point that economic and game theory cannot fully explain behavior in field 
experiments, much less its determinants. Most importantly though, existent research does not 
pave the way for finding why certain rules change decision making and why others do not. 
Following the implicit challenge behind these findings, this paper helps filling the knowledge 
gap for what determines decisions in cooperative experiments. More specifically, it 
contributes to research on CPR behavior by answering two research questions in CPR 
experiment analysis.  
                                                 
10 There are, of course, variations of other-regarding tendencies that could in principle lead to the same effect as 
that which this paper calls conformity. The most prominent of those similar other-regarding tendencies is 
reciprocity (which can be further split into direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and network reciprocity 
according to Nowak (2006); for an experiment and discussion on conformity versus reciprocity, see Bardsley 
and Sausgruber (2005)) In this paper other-regarding effects will solely be referred to as conformity since 
neither a useful distinction can be made based on the present data nor is it necessary to answer the posed 
research questions. 
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The first research question is on the interplay between rules on the one hand and conformity 
as well as leadership on the other. Though the cited work on governance and rules for 
common pool resources showed their different - or not so different - impact in CPR 
experiments, they do not explain why certain measures work better than others (if any such 
claim can be generalized at all). Two factors - conformity and leadership - have been treated 
before, but not necessarily in CPR field experiments and in connection with rules. While it is 
common knowledge that greater cohesion leads to more cooperation (Dayton-Johnson, 2003; 
Evans & Dion, 1991; Vos & van der Zee, 2011) there seems to be a driver beyond cohesion 
that lets participants in field experiments conform to others’ decisions to cooperate (Hayo & 
Vollan, 2011; Tavoni, Schlüter, & Levin, 2012; Velez et al., 2009) . What is missing with 
respect to cohesion is the interplay between conformity within a group and newly introduced 
rules: Is conformity independent, supportive or obstructive to new rules? Similar to cohesion, 
leadership has proven to be an important factor in CPR (Ostrom, 2006; Vedeld, 2000) and 
other cooperation scenarios (Moxnes & Heijden, 2003; van Dijk, Wilke, & Wit, 2003). 
Therefore, similarly to conformity, the interplay between leadership and the introduction of 
new rules is possible and worthwhile analyzing. This paper contributes to a fuller 
understanding of the rationale behind a participant’s decision to change behavior (or not) 
based on rule changes, especially with respect to conformity and leadership. 
The second research question the analysis answers is on framing, or more specifically the 
‘context’, as Anderies et al. (2011) call it. In general, framing distorts experiments and 
therefore, experimenters try to test theories under abstraction from these distorting outside 
factors so as to make the result as generalizable as possible (Davis, 1993). However, if 
experimental results are used to justify political measures pertaining to very specific 
situations, the experiments should approximate these specific situations as much as possible. 
After all, presumably this specific context has an influence on real-life results just as it would 
on experimental results. Therefore the experiments described in this paper were framed to 
analyze the reaction of participants to different contexts. Framing with contexts introduces 
more realism to the experiment and therefore results and their interpretation relate more 
strongly to the real world situation. 
The field study site offers the opportunity to test the framing effects of contexts. Data was 
collected in the October of 2012 in the community-managed conservancy Sikunga, an area in 
the Namibian Caprivi strip. In the conservancy subsistence fishing and farming as well as a 
fledgling tourism business are main income sources. Fishing and the interplay of tourism with 
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subsistence farming present fitting CPRs as a background for CPR experiments. Fishery 
resources are endangered through overfishing and a fledgling ecosystem-based tourism and 
hunting industry is endangered by destruction of wildlife habitat through slash and burn 
farming. While fishing has been analyzed many times in CPR experiments (Bwalya, 2007; 
Cavalcanti et al., 2010; Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2008; Velez, Murphy, & Stranlund, 2006), 
framing wildlife habitat maintenance as a CPR problem is seldom done. Nevertheless, 
framing more complex and realistic context experiments can bridge the gap between 
experimental research of a qualitative nature (e.g. Lankford (2004)) and the purely 
quantitative but abstract experimental sphere. Therefore the experiments in Sikunga were 
presented in the fishery and in the wildlife context, as will be explained further in the next 
section along with other aspects of the experimental design. In the section following that, we 
will remark on the direct evaluation of decisions made under different rule settings. The 
sections after that deal with the regression analysis of determining factors of decisions, 
starting with a section describing the econometric method in detail, followed by a section 
describing the variables at hand, which leads into the section of the interpretation of 
econometric results. The last section concludes. 
6.2 Experimental design 
The following common-pool resource experiment reuses the basic design of Cardenas (2004). 
In this design the five individuals in each experiment group individually decide on an effort 
level of resource extraction (referred to from here on as effort or extraction) from 1 to 8, 
which they note on their participant sheet (see appendix). A “1” would represent the lowest 
effort level of extraction of the CPR, an “8” the highest effort level of extraction. Depending 
on a participant’s decision and the decision of the four others, participants achieve a payoff 
for each played round. A higher payoff is achieved with higher individual efforts, given the 
decision of the other participants, and vice versa. Contrary to that, the individual payoff is 
lower with higher cumulative efforts of the rest of the group, given an individual level of 
effort, and vice versa. Every experimental group conducts 20 rounds. After all 20 rounds are 
finished the payoff for only one randomly chosen round is paid out in Namibian Dollars. For 
payoff function (1) the Nash equilibrium (NE) is at 8 and the social optimum (SO) lies at 1, 
which is a corner solution. For a full table of payoffs given a participant’s decision and the 
cumulative decisions of the four other participants rounded to the next dollar, see the 
appendix. Note that the payoff equation of Cardenas (2004) was adjusted with a factor for 
currency conversion to Namibian dollars of 5/64: 
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Similar to Cardenas (2004), participants are not allowed to communicate and have to decide 
on effort levels in secret and on their own. For the last 10 of the 20 rounds the experiment 
introduces one of three different rules. As summarized in table 6.1, the three treatments 
introduce additional rules to 30 of the 40 groups; ten groups conducted all 20 rounds under 
the same conditions to form a baseline. Of the 40 groups, 9 were allowed to talk to each other 
and coordinate their decisions after round 10. Before their 11th round, they were allowed to 
talk for ten minutes, for rounds 12-20 the allowed time was five minutes. In these 9 groups, an 
individual however, would still make their decision in secret and none of the group 
discussions and agreements were binding (hence the name ‘cheap talk’ (CT)). 21 further 
groups were told what the socially optimal amount was and that they would suffer a penalty 
of four Namibian dollars towards their payoff for every unit above the socially optimal effort 
level. After the rule had been established after round 10, they were not allowed to talk with 
each other for the remainder of the game and made decisions in secret. In these groups 
participants’ decisions were checked and participants were penalized with a certain likelihood 
if they cheated. In 10 of those 21 groups the likelihood of being checked upon (‘being 
caught’) was 20 per cent (‘Weak Enforcement’ (WE)), for the other 11 groups it was 70 per 
cent (‘Strong Enforcement’ (SE)). This difference in likelihood of being caught tests the 
difference in strength of enforcement. We deviate from Cardenas (2004) in this respect to 
simulate realistic circumstances of the conservancy. Locals reported in previous stakeholder 
workshops that the likelihood to be checked upon and punished for certain abuses of the 
ecosystem has a strong influence on the decision to actually transgress. Therefore the 
difference between weak and strong enforcement is the change in likelihood of being caught 
cheating rather than the size of the penalty. Equations (6) and (7) in Cardenas (2004) provide 
the underlying math. Instead of changing the fine f, paid for every unit above the SO, the 
experiments in Sikunga changed P, the likelihood of being caught, between weak enforcement 
and strong enforcement. Therefore f stays at four Namibian dollars for every additional level 
of effort, but the likelihood to get caught cheating P changes from 1/5 to 175/50 ∙ 1/5=0.7. 
These numbers are still comparable to Cardenas (2004), except for the 4 Namibian dollars 
fine, which is an approximation to Cardenas’ fine of 50, rounded up from 50 ∙ 5/64=3.91. 
Nevertheless, the best response in a symmetric NE for weak enforcement is an effort level of 
6, while it is 1 for strong enforcement. The practical simulation of being checked was done by 
letting all participants draw one marble randomly from a bag of ten at the end of each round. 
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If the marble was black, the participant’s sheet was marked for cheating in this round and the 
participant was penalized accordingly. For the treatment with 20 per cent likelihood, which 
simulates weak enforcement, the bag held two black and eight white marbles. Accordingly, 
for the treatment with 70 per cent likelihood, simulating strong enforcement, the bag held 
seven black and three white marbles. 
As additional difference between groups and another deviation from Cardenas (2004), the 
experiment was conducted in three different contexts to test framing effects. In the baseline 
context participants were told that the experiment was about an abstract natural resource 
without adding any further details. This kept the experiments as neutral as possible and was 
conducted that way for 14 of the 40 groups. In the two other contexts the experiment was 
orientated towards two prevalent cases of resource overuse in the area. One of these overuse 
cases was overfishing; a classical CPR problem. Though only a small part of the Sikunga 
population identifies as fishers, the nearby fish stocks of the Zambezi are noticeably being 
depleted (Heider, 2012). To reflect that in the CPR experiment 14 groups of the remaining 26 
were told that the experiment was about fishing resources. Participants had to decide on an 
effort in the form of sending 1 to 8 of their hypothetical household members either fishing or 
do subsistence farming on marginal land. The second resource overuse case is the use of slash 
and burn practices in the area. Though in itself not a CPR, it has an indirect but strong effect 
on wildlife in the area. The areas which are slashed and burned as well as the surrounding 
areas are habitat for wildlife. While there are many ways to profit from wildlife, the one 
reflected in the experiment is a regularly issued and tradable hunting quota. Depending on the 
amount of wildlife the conservancy regularly receives a permit to shoot certain numbers of 
animals, which can be resold to a professional hunter or hunting tourists for a substantial 
amount of money. This money has in the past been distributed among the members of the 
conservancy. In this context the money from the hunting quota is the CPR. The extent of slash 
and burn farming takes on the role of the extractive action, because while it diminishes 
wildlife habitat and therefore the equally distributed hunting quota, it increases the 
productivity of the land and therefore the yield and farming income. Again, farming on 
marginal land is the alternative to the exploitative choice. The trade-off decision in this CPR 
context becomes: Slash and burn farming for the farmers own good versus more sustainable 
but marginal farming and thereby protecting valuable wildlife habitat. The remaining 12 
groups conducted the experiment in this context. The decision participants had to make is the 
number of fields from 1 to 8 that participants could farm using the slash and burn practice. 
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of rule change and context treatments. 
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 Table 6.1: Distribution of contexts over experimental groups (source: Own data) 
Rule/Context Wildlife Fishery No Context  
None 3 4 3 10 
Cheap Talk 1 4 4 9 
Weak Enforcement 4 2 4 10 
Strong Enforcement 4 4 3 11 
 
12 14 14 40 
For both contexts the experiment host used visual aids for the explanation to make the 
respective context tangible (see Figure 6.A1 and Figure 6.A2 in the appendix). The main 
visual aid was a wooden board with a map of the conservancy and the bordering Zambezi 
river on it. Depending on the context applied, the experiment host used either animal figures 
on the conservancy map or ellipsoid marbles representing fish on the Zambezi part of the 
board. They aided the host in explaining the ecological situation and the difference between 
one participant making a large or small effort and the other participants making a large or 
small effort. The game host was trained to keep value judgments on different strategies out of 
his explanation. For a word by word transcript see appendix. 
The experiment host explained the setup in the local language, then answered participants’ 
questions on the experiment, trained participants to read the payoff table correctly, explained 
how to fill in the decisions on the provided player sheet, and conducted 3 test rounds after 
which he would answer participants’ questions again (see appendix for an experiment host 
transcript, the payoff table and a player sheet). After conducting the full experiment, the game 
host tested participants on their understanding of the experiment mechanics with a small 
comprehension test and conducted a short questionnaire collecting data further described 
below (see appendix for the comprehension test and the participant questionnaire). 
6.3 Descriptive results 
Figure 6.3 shows the average decision on effort the participants chose from the range between 
1 and 8 for every round, by rules treatments. The drop in efforts for all treatments after round 
10 indicates an effect of the treatments on participants’ behavior. The baseline (BL) centers 
closely around its mean value of 3.69. With that value the baseline is not only far below its 
own NE (8), but also even below the NE for the weak enforcement case (6). Further, the 
baseline does not deviate from this value too far, neither before nor after round 11. This is 
consistent with the assumptions that there is no progression dependent effect (e.g. a learning 
effect) or natural tendency to switch strategies after a few rounds involved. 
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The cheap talk treatment leads to a slow drop over the last 10 rounds. While initially, after the 
first round of talking, participants only slightly deviate from their strategy from rounds 1-10, 
they increase their deviation in the next rounds. Although values fluctuate too much to make a 
clear statement, there seems to be a continuous downwards trend leading to values at a 
relatively low level between 2 and 3. This downward trend might be a sign for a high 
sustainability of this rule change. Concerning the limit on discussion time for the cheap talk 
rule treatment, it should be noted that participants never had to be told to stop because their 
time was up in one of the 10 minute discussion and rarely even used the five minutes slots 
after round 11 to reiterate their group discussion.  
Figure 6.1 
 
Figure 6.2: Average effort in the experiment by rules (source: Own depiction) 
The punitive treatments weak enforcement and strong enforcement led to an initial drop to 
almost the SO and then rises slowly but steadily for the rest of the rounds. However, under 
this treatment average efforts never reach the baseline values again. Instead the lines for both 
punishment treatments seem to approach their own asymptote, which would roughly be 3.5 in 
the case of weak enforcement and just above 2 in the case of strong enforcement. Participants 
likely were intimidated by the prospect of punishment at first and then started experiencing 
the new rule and how costly it really was to break. This is not an unusual effect in behavioral 
experiments (Smith, 2010) and that participants become more competitive, i.e. test if they 
could  not gain a greater share after all, has also been observed in repetitive CPR experiments 
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strong enforcement are 6 and 1. This has implications for the interpretation under both 
punitive rules. Under the weak enforcement regime, on the one hand, although disobeying the 
new rules, participants still behave more social than the NE predicts. On the other hand, even 
under strong enforcement participants orientate towards a value above the SO and even above 
the NE. Over time, participants even move further away from the SO.  
Factors explaining this bounded rational behavior are captured in the regression of the 
following section. What we can see here already, though, is that weak enforcement is indeed 
weaker in reaching the SO as strong enforcement. The same applies to cheap talk. In that 
sense weak enforcement and cheap talk are not only the weaker rules in that enforcement is 
by design less likely to lead to punishment, but also that they indeed reach a higher average 
effort in equilibrium. Therefore the following discussion adopts the term weak rules for weak 
enforcement and cheap talk and strong rule for strong enforcement. 
6.4 Econometric model 
For further analysis of participant’s decision-making, the influence of socio-economic factors 
as well as environmental awareness, context, personal relationships, leadership and 
conformity are regressed on the effort levels participants decided on. The basic regression 
looks as follows: 
                                                  
                                          e     (2) 
In this regression equation SEcon is a vector of socio-economic variables, CX a vector of 
simple context variables and EA a vector of environmental awareness variables. Others’ 
extractiont-1 captures the most likely indicator for what to conform to and Opinion Leadership 
captures the presence of a leadership figure in the experiment group. Both variables are 
explained further in the next section. Further iterations of the regression include dummies for 
the introduction of rules and more specific context variables. 
The estimator is a right- and left-censored Tobit model with cluster-robust standard errors. 
Using a censoring model is necessary because the number 0 and numbers higher than 8 are 
plausible for the dependent variable - the decision about the effort level in the experiment - 
but the experiment restricts them to between 1 and 8. Further, the regression uses cluster-
robust effects because participants make their decisions over 20 consecutive rounds. The 
regression has to account for a possible relationship between the decisions of a participant. 
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Since it is plausible that an underlying decision making process of participants does not 
correlate with that of other participants, apart from the variables controlled for, the data 
demands using cluster-robust standard errors. Comparing results of the following regression 
to a random effects specification (see table 6.A2 in the appendix) show that results of this 
paper cannot solely be caused by misspecification: They are practically identical. 
The above results of the impact of rule changes might be real outcomes of rational (or at least 
bounded rational) individuals, and therefore are represented in figure 6.3 using the full 
sample. They are what an investigator wants to look at when the impact of rules is concerned 
that are actually implemented. Rules apply to everyone, not only those who understand them, 
so gauging their impact using the full data set as basis is the correct procedure. But 
interpreting the statistical effect of particular factors on behavior only makes sense if we can 
be sure that the interpretation based on the experimental setup is valid. That is, behavior 
should be a result of deliberate and informed decisions as opposed to choosing a number 
between 1 and 8 just because the game host tells participants to do so. If rules are 
implemented in the real world, compliance would be expected from everyone, not only those 
that understand them. This makes it reasonable to use the full sample for figure 6.3. But why 
should a regression analysis which is supposed to find causal factors in making a decision 
include observations for which we have to assume that the dependent variable decision is a 
random choice due to failing to understand the experiment? The participants included as 
observations should be able to understand these ramifications under which the observations 
are made. If they would not, making conclusions based on their introduction or omission 
would be misleading. List and Shogren (1998) and Galarza et al. (2009), for example, found a 
distortion of results by participants misunderstanding the experimental setup or not 
understanding it at all. Smith (2002) criticizes the experimental method on a fundamental 
level for the same reason. To make the regression meaningful, it includes only observations of 
participants who have understood the experiment fairly well. The employed subsample is 
based on the results of a post-experiment multiple choice comprehension test. The test checks 
how well participants actually understood the central element - the payoff table - used in the 
experiment (see comprehension test in the appendix). If a participant answered 50 per cent or 
more correctly, their data is considered in the subsample. This leaves 64 of 200 participants 
for the subsample. The sample is stripped further by one observed round per participant, since 
the model contains a lagged variable, as well as by discarding observations for missing 
values, resulting in an overall subsample size of 1216 observations. 
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6.5 Variable description 
This chapter characterizes the variables used in the regression and explains the rationale for 
including them. Table 2 shows an overview of basic statistics. 
The first set of variables included in the regression, SEcon, is a set of relevant basic socio-
economic variables. Age is a common control indicating differences in experience and 
between age cohorts. To include an indicator for wealth, we asked participants to rate the 
extent of land possession and welfare in comparison to the rest of the group. The respective 
variables are comparison land participants and comparison welfare participants. Two further 
variables describe the occupation of participants as either farmer or fisher, other being the 
third and in the regression model omitted alternative. 
 Table 6.2: Variable descriptives (source: Own data) 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. 
Decision 1254 3.39 2.20 1 8 
Age 1254 36.18 14.81 16 77 
Comp. Land Participants 1254 3.61 1.11 1 5 
Comp. Welfare Participants 1254 2.74 0.99 1 5 
Farmer 1254 0.83 0.37 0 1 
Fisher 1254 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Awareness Fishery 1254 3.97 3.93 1 16 
Awareness Wildlife 1254 2.50 2.40 1 10 
Awareness Conservancy 1235 0.91 0.29 0 1 
Wildlife Context 1254 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Fishery Context 1254 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Personal Relationship 1254 3.26 1.21 0 4 
Opinion Leadership 1254 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Others' Extractiont-1 1254 13.90 5.74 4 30 
Slash & Burn Farmers * Wildlife 
C. 1235 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Fishers * Fishery Context 1254 0.09 0.29 0 1 
The second set of variables used in the regression, EA, describes the environmental 
disposition relevant to the contexts. Participants were asked for their degree of awareness of 
fishery problems, degree of awareness of wildlife problems, and if they are aware of 
conservancy management. The awareness for wildlife and fishery were each gauged on two 
scales between 1 and 5. On the first scale, participants answered to the question how strong 
they think the amount of big game and fish, respectively, has changed recently. On the second 
scale participants answered to a question asking if the change had a negative impact on locals 
within the conservancy. These results were multiplied to get to the awareness variables used 
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in the regressions. Awareness of the conservancy is captured by a binary response in a 
dummy variable. 
The third set of variables, CX, is that of variables controlling for the experiment’s framing. 
The set is a simple set of dummies for the three possible contexts: Changes attributable to 
framing are caught by wildlife context and fishery context, and no context. The regression 
omits no context as the precaution against a dummy trap. 
The influence of the number of personal relationships with others in the group is measured 
and also taken into account. Further, identifying opinion leadership gives clues on how strong 
the influence of a hierarchy is or at least how strongly participants orientate toward the 
behavior of a perceived leader. For that the opinion of every participant who of the others has 
the most influence in general was reported. For every group in which the same individual was 
named by three or four other participants as having influence on decisions, the dummy for 
opinion leadership is 1, indicating that a perceived opinion leader was present. Further, a 
dummy for each group is included to hold group effects constant. 
Last, as far as the basic regression of equation 2 is concerned, the lag variable others’ 
extractiont-1 captures the effect of the respective last round’s extraction by the rest of the 
experimental group; it is the sum of the other four players’ decisions. This variable reveals the 
influence of using other participants’ behavior as a guide for decision-making. This is the 
indicator for conformity in the model, because it shows how much participants are oriented 
towards what other group members do.   
To test the effect of the introduced rules, models 2-5 include rules treatments using dummy 
variables for cheap talk, weak enforcement or strong enforcement. The variable for the 
baseline groups with no rule changes is excluded.  
To test context-specific behavior, model 6, based on equation 2, adds two interaction 
variables. They interact self-reported real-life behavior with the experiment contexts. Self-
reported slash and burn practice, though condemned in many parts of the world, is not likely 
to be underreported due to the social acceptance of the practice in the area. The regression 
includes this variable in one of the two interaction terms between occupational behavior and 
context. The interactions pair the occupation slash & burn farmers and fishers with the 
wildlife or fishery context, respectively. These two interaction terms show the specific impact 
of the context if paired with people that have a larger practical understanding of and possibly 
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a deeply rooted behavioral pattern in that context. Model 7 brings all variables together to 
check for any possible interaction. 
6.6 Econometric results 
Table 6.3 shows the results of seven regressions: The basic regression tests for the effects of 
context, opinion leadership and conformity while controlling for other possible determinants. 
The rules regressions add rule changes of the experiment as factors to test for the changes in 
other variables, specifically a change in the effect of conformity. A first regression for all 
rules includes cheap talk, weak enforcement as well as strong enforcement. Further 
regressions test changes for each rule separately. The context-specificity regression adds 
interactions to the basic regression testing for context-specific behavior and what difference 
that makes for the explanatory power of other variables. Finally there is the combined 
regression to see if the combination of rule changes and framing effects yield discernible 
differences. For all regression results negative coefficients represent a smaller extraction of 
natural resources due to the coefficient’s variable. This can either be interpreted as more 
environmentally friendly, because a smaller extraction effort per se leads to a higher 
sustainability of the environment, or it can be interpreted as more social, because a smaller 
extraction effort leaves more resources for others to extract. Since recorded data does not give 
any indication which of those two rationales spurs a participant’s decision-making, the 
interpretation of each variable’s influence is based on what seems most appropriate for that 
particular variable. 
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Table 6.3: Determinants of common-pool resource game decision (1-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Basic All Rules Cheap Talk Weak Enforcement Strong Enforcement Context Specificity Combined 
Constant 3.574 *** 6.097 *** 4.535 *** 3.750 *** 4.690 *** 4.054 *** 6.539 *** 
 (1.067) (1.114) (1.132) (1.081) (1.047) (0.969) (1.042) 
Age 0.031 ** 0.030 *** 0.030 ** 0.030 ** 0.031 *** 0.036 *** 0.034 *** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Comp. Land Participants -0.004 0.009 -0.007 -0.009 0.018 0.198 0.203 
 (0.140) (0.132) (0.139) (0.140) (0.135) (0.188) (0.178) 
Comp. Welfare Participants -0.500 *** -0.485 *** -0.492 *** -0.496 *** -0.500 *** -0.644 *** -0.626 *** 
 (0.165) (0.156) (0.163) (0.164) (0.160) (0.179) (0.170) 
Farmer 1.798 *** 1.645 *** 1.782 *** 1.788 *** 1.683 *** 1.005 0.881 
 (0.540) (0.515) (0.531) (0.534) (0.534) (0.584) (0.560) 
Fisher 2.414 *** 2.320 *** 2.381 *** 2.394 *** 2.386 *** 1.201 1.180 
 (0.718) (0.676) (0.706) (0.713) (0.697) (0.671) (0.649) 
Awareness Fishery -0.046 -0.043 -0.047 -0.046 -0.042 -0.020 -0.018 
 (0.063) (0.058) (0.062) (0.063) (0.060) (0.066) (0.061) 
Awareness Wildlife 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.061 0.062 -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.065) (0.060) (0.064) (0.064) (0.062) (0.084) (0.078) 
Awareness Conservancy -1.721 *** -1.686 *** -1.717 *** -1.711 *** -1.705 *** -1.808 *** -1.757 *** 
 (0.440) (0.396) (0.438) (0.439) (0.403) (0.421) (0.388) 
Wildlife Context 0.020 -0.614 -0.085 -0.043 -0.389 -1.592 * -2.130 ** 
 (0.546) (0.509) (0.541) (0.542) (0.529) (0.806) (0.774) 
Fishery Context 2.134 *** 1.362 * 1.999 *** 2.057 *** 1.645 ** 2.504 * 1.783 
 (0.632) (0.585) (0.628) (0.625) (0.611) (1.122) (1.027) 
Personal Relationships -0.326 ** -0.309 ** -0.323 ** -0.326 ** -0.315 ** -0.388 *** -0.370 *** 
 (0.120) (0.110) (0.119) (0.119) (0.115) (0.125) (0.115) 
Opinion Leadership -3.034 *** -2.266 ** -3.678 *** -3.014 *** -1.620 * -3.166 *** -2.456 * 
 (0.799) (0.810) (0.796) (0.797) (0.817) (1.073) (1.011) 
Others' Extractiont-1 0.079 *** -0.010 0.064 * 0.071 ** 0.021 0.082 *** -0.005 
 (0.026)  (0.020) (0.027) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026) (0.020) 
Cheap Talk   -1.482 *** -1.253 ***    -1.463 *** 
   (0.362) (0.343)    (0.358) 
Weak Enforcement   -1.563 **  -1.444 *   -1.564 ** 
   (0.561)  (0.571)   (0.563) 
Strong Enforcement   -2.902 ***   -2.729 ***  -2.859 *** 
   (0.576)   (0.572)  (0.572) 
Slash & Burn Farmers * Wildlife       1.894 *** 1.798 *** 
       (0.617) (0.592) 
Fishers * Fishery       -0.029 -0.089 
       (0.921) (0.870) 
Pseudo-R² 7.7% 10.1% 8.1% 8.1% 9.1% 7.6% 10.1% 
AIC 4714 4596 4698 4695 4646 4664 4547 
BIC 4889 4786 4877 4875 4825 4843 4741 
N 1235 1235 1235 1235 1235 1216 1216 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.005 
Notes: Model is a Tobit I regression with cluster-robust standard errors and dummies for experimental groups. 
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The results for the basic regression show that age leads to a higher extraction, which is 
founded in the cultural background of Namibian locals. Though not uniformly true, age is 
generally equated with power and influence in sub-Saharan Africa (Sokolovsky, 2002). Older 
people are generally more respected to the extent that they are used to claiming a larger share 
of common resources. Therefore they also claim more in the experiment and thus make 
decisions that leave less for others. Further, the regression shows that feeling comparatively 
well-off makes participants take less. The converse interpretation is that participants who feel 
poorer are less social or environmentally friendly. This is likely due to prioritization for 
generation of income through immediate use of natural resources over environmental 
friendliness (Duraiappah, 1998). Among the group of experiment setup variables, others’ 
extractiont-1 shows a positive impact, revealing that participants have a tendency to follow 
what the group does. Similar to Velez et al. (2009), the basic regression also finds this pattern 
of conformity based on an expectation formed by the cumulative extraction decision of the 
rest of the group in the previous round. Other than that, conducting the experiment in the 
fishery context made participants extract more compared to the other contexts. This is an 
expression for the disregard for fishery problems, even though the awareness for overfishing 
is relatively high (see table 6.2). Among the attitude variables, the occupation variables 
farmer and fisher indicate that someone whose livelihood depends on the ecosystem in real 
life extracts more. These participants are used to exploiting the ecosystem and therefore do it 
in a hypothetical setting as well. Though the awareness for the particular ecological problems 
is not significant, the awareness for the conservancy organization, through which restrictions 
on fishing and hunting wildlife are enforced, leads to lower extraction. Participants who are 
aware of the conservancy certainly know also what it stands for and are also generally aware 
of what not to do. Therefore they take less, as they would in real life. The number of personal 
relationships to other candidates also leads to lower extraction. In a group with more 
acquaintances participants simply are more social. Lastly, the regression shows that opinion 
leadership matters. The mere presence of a leader decreases the extraction decision due to 
obedience to an implicit or, in the case of cheap talk rounds, possibly explicit behavioral 
guideline of a respected voice in the group. 
The rules regression (2) shows that including dummies for rounds played under different rule 
settings changes the interpretation of only one variable: Others’ extractiont-1. Introducing 
clear rules (or letting the group find their own rules, in the case of cheap talk) replaces the 
extraction of others as orientation for own behavior. In other words, rules explain the forming 
of expectations better than previous action by those the expectations are formed about. So as 
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long as a rule exists, participants will assume that others behave accordingly. Looking closer 
at the separate effects of introducing single rule changes, shows more specific effects on 
others’ extractiont-1. In the regressions which control only for cheap talk and weak 
enforcement, i.e. the weaker rules, the rule change itself has a negative impact on extraction, 
but the extraction of others still is positively significant. So, apart from the expectation effect 
caused by the new rule, participants still look at their peers and leader for clues on what to 
conform to. Under the rule setting with strong enforcement these conformity effects are gone. 
Since the rule more strongly dictates behavior, there is no reason to look for any other 
indication of behavior to conform to. 
The context specificity (6) regression shows that the effect of having an occupation fitting the 
context, and therefore the effect of daily direct use of the ecosystem, has an even more direct 
impact on experiment results than just testing for the occupation. The slash and burn 
interaction takes up the effect of being a farmer. That shows that the interaction is the more 
specific of the two variables. At the same time the wildlife context dummy has a negative 
coefficient. The interaction variable is more specific and helps distinguishing between those 
farmers who keep to their pattern of ecosystem use and those who react to the danger of 
losing yet more wildlife. Introducing the fishery interaction cannot quite achieve a similarly 
clear picture, but also subtracts from the significance of the fishery context dummy. The 
fishery interaction also renders the occupation dummy insignificant, even though the 
interaction itself stays insignificant as well.  
The all-encompassing combined regression shows that having all relevant variables in one 
model does not change results much. The only remarkable difference is that the fishery 
context’s significance level is reduced to the point of insignificance and the wildlife context is 
significant at an even higher level here. 
Thorough robustness checks show that results of all regressions are stable. The low Pseudo-R² 
values are due to the inherent randomness in human behavior, which, after all, is the subject 
of economic experiments. Our CPR experiments are no exception (Hayo & Vollan, 2011). 
Models with additional variables yield better values for the AIC and the BIC, showing that 
specifications were indeed useful and not simply a case of overfitting. The variance inflation 
factor test consistently yields values below 10 for all variables used in the 7 different models. 
Running the same regressions without omitting observations of participants who answered 
less than half of the comprehension test right justifies the decision to include only the 
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subsample (see table 6.A1 in the appendix). Results for this regression show smaller R²-
values and less diverse results. What is most striking is the apparent stronger dependency of 
participants on orientation with respect to what the others do and what the participants 
themselves know about the context. The variables accounting for these two strands of 
explanation (others’ extraction, the rules and the contexts) are the only significant 
determinants left in this set. This shows what is an understandable result, but can endanger 
many experimental field research projects: Including data from participants who did not fully 
understand the experiment will heavily bias the regression towards points of orientation 
variables. This is a result of not knowing what to do when confronted with an experiment that 
participants did not understand. These participants will rely on the few points of reference 
which remain; in this case, what the others do or what they think the others do, i.e. 
conforming to the rules. Conforming to the perceived will of a leader, considering the effects 
of decisions on others or carrying own real-life behavior to an imagined situation loses its 
significance in this situation. While the R² alone is already indicative, these biased results 
show why it is important to consider the participants comprehension of the experimental 
method. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The results of this paper allow us to comment on the modus operandi of implicit versus 
explicit rules in CPR experiments. While effects of rules in CPR experiments have been 
tested before (Cardenas et al., 2004; Cardenas, 2004; Cavalcanti et al., 2010) and literature on 
the effect of conformity on CPR experiments also exists (Velez et al., 2009), analyzing the 
interplay between explicit rules and implicit guidelines leads to new insights in decision 
making. Not only does the analysis show that rules can break or replace the effect of 
conformity, but also that it depends on the rules and their possible enforcement which kind of 
orientation participants choose. Although figure 6.3 shows that not only strong rules can have 
an impact, the regression results revealed that the factors influencing decisions change 
depending on the introduced rule. What clearly emerges is that rules which are harder to 
undermine give stronger guidance. Therefore either there is no perceived possibility to deviate 
too far from the SO or reassurance of conformity is strong enough under better enforced rules 
that conforming is the perceived best option. In summary, conformity has either a supportive 
effect on behavior independent of rules, as long as those rules are relatively weak, or is 
replaced by rules, as long as these rules are strong. 
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Either way, the implications for a real world setting in a traditionally governed community 
such as the case study area of Sikunga are clear. In Sikunga, like in many other areas under 
community-based natural resource management, strong enforcement is costly, sometimes 
prohibitively so, and often underlies other constraints outside of the sphere of control of 
community leaders. For that reason, strengthening conformity by using leadership characters 
like the traditional authorities, i.e. tribal leaders, themselves or promoting exemplary villagers 
as role models might be a low cost practical approach, as long as strong enforcement remains 
infeasible or cost-inefficient. 
To meet the call of Anderies et al. (2011) to analyze framing effects, we can also comment on 
CPR experiments as a method and the relevance of context. The regression shows that results 
are dependent on framing, partly because established behavioral patterns in that particular 
context matter. On the one hand, this result shows that bringing lab experiments to the field 
adds to the distortions in the results of the experiments. On the other, it makes clear that 
modeling an experiment to more specific situations can give an even better insight into the 
behavior of the people actually affected in that setting as opposed to impartial outside lab 
subjects. Using well-specified CPR experiments to tailor policy measures based on the results 
of a specific area would therefore possibly be a new approach to design and test new 
governance measures. 
Moreover we can say that field experiments truly deserve a place beside lab experiments 
precisely because lab experiments do not allow for simulating the social environment of the 
field. This is especially true for the implicit interaction like the opinion leadership which 
comes from outside the experiment and cannot be separated from the participants’ decisions 
making within the experiment. Additional to that, while a more realistic context might be 
possible to simulate in the lab, a deeply ingrained pattern of behavior in such a context cannot 
possibly be fabricated. This behavioral pattern resulting from daily use of a CPR cannot be 
simulated in a lab, but might make a difference for experimental results and policy 
recommendations based on those results. The same might be true for social interaction like 
opinion leadership and conformity to a group of peers, which is hard to carry into the lab. 
  





You 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Others 
        
Others 
4 47 49 51 53 54 54 55 55 4 
5 46 48 50 51 52 53 54 54 5 
6 45 47 49 50 51 52 52 53 6 
7 44 46 47 49 50 51 51 51 7 
8 42 44 46 48 49 49 50 50 8 
9 41 43 45 46 47 48 49 49 9 
10 40 42 44 45 46 47 47 48 10 
11 39 41 42 44 45 46 46 46 11 
12 37 39 41 43 44 44 45 45 12 
13 36 38 40 41 42 43 44 44 13 
14 35 37 39 40 41 42 42 43 14 
15 34 36 37 39 40 41 41 41 15 
16 32 34 36 38 39 39 40 40 16 
17 31 33 35 36 37 38 39 39 17 
18 30 32 34 35 36 37 37 38 18 
19 29 31 32 34 35 36 36 36 19 
20 27 29 31 33 34 34 35 35 20 
21 26 28 30 31 32 33 34 34 21 
22 25 27 29 30 31 32 32 33 22 
23 24 26 27 29 30 31 31 31 23 
24 22 24 26 28 29 29 30 30 24 
25 21 23 25 26 27 28 29 29 25 
26 20 22 24 25 26 27 27 28 26 
27 19 21 22 24 25 26 26 26 27 
28 17 19 21 23 24 24 25 25 28 
29 16 18 20 21 22 23 24 24 29 
30 15 17 19 20 21 22 22 23 30 
31 14 16 17 19 20 21 21 21 31 
32 12 14 16 18 19 19 20 20 32 
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(Totall minus You) 
Points (See 
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Recall the first 10 turns of the natural resource game you just played with the other 4 
players. Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. Imagine you know that everyone else extracts 4 (Others: 16). What extraction level would 
you have to write down, to earn more than everyone else? 
More than 4   Less than 4    Exactly 4 
 
2. Imagine everyone else extracts 5, but you extract 3. Do you earn more than anyone else? 
 I would earn more    I would earn less    
I would earn as much as other players 
 
3. Imagine everyone including you chose an extraction level of 5 in the first turn (Your 
effort: 5; Others' effort 20). In the second turn, everyone including you increases their 
extraction level to 6 (You: 6; Others: 24). How does the income of everyone change 
compared to the first turn? 
Every player earns more     Every player earns less  
Every player earns the same as in the first turn 
 
4. Imagine everyone choses the same extraction level as in the turn before. How do the 
incomes of the players change compared to the turn before? 
Only you earn more   Everyone earns the same as last turn 
Everyone but you earns more  Everyone including you earns more   
 
(Note: This is the game mechanics comprehension test for the unframed groups. For the fishery and wildlife 
contexts, more specific vocabulary according to the context was used. Otherwise questions remained the same 
and therefore imply the same understanding of the experiment.) 






Figure 6.A1: Game host explains fishery context using visual aids (source: Own) 
Figure 6.A2 
 
Figure 6.A2: Complete visual aids for wildlife and fishery context (source: Own) 
  




Table 6.A1: Determinants of common-pool resource game decision (1-8) in a random effects model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Basic All Rules Cheap Talk Weak Enforcement Strong Enforcement Context Specificity Combined 
Constant 4.436 *** 6.097 *** 4.539 *** 4.397 *** 4.930 *** 4.942 *** 6.534 *** 
 (1.020) (1.023) (1.034) (1.019) (1.017) (1.021) (1.026) 
Age 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.034 *** 0.034 *** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Comp. Land Participants -0.006 0.009 -0.007 -0.008 0.012 0.191 0.203 
 (0.124) (0.123) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.145) (0.144) 
Comp. Welfare Participants -0.482 *** -0.485 *** -0.482 *** -0.482 *** -0.489 *** -0.627 *** -0.626 *** 
 (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.151) (0.150) 
Farmer 1.759 *** 1.645 *** 1.759 *** 1.762 *** 1.690 *** 0.977 * 0.882 
 (0.511) (0.505) (0.511) (0.511) (0.511) (0.567) (0.563) 
Fisher 2.377 *** 2.320 *** 2.375 *** 2.376 *** 2.377 *** 1.175 1.181 
 (0.734) (0.726) (0.733) (0.734) (0.733) (0.948) (0.943) 
Awareness Fishery -0.046 -0.043 -0.047 -0.046 -0.044 -0.021 -0.018 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Awareness Wildlife 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.062 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.051) (0.050) 
Awareness Conservancy -1.707 *** -1.686 *** -1.707 *** -1.706 *** -1.704 *** -1.792 *** -1.757 *** 
 (0.496) (0.490) (0.496) (0.496) (0.494) (0.510) (0.504) 
Wildlife Context -0.298 -0.614 -0.296 -0.283 -0.478 -1.890 ** -2.129 ** 
 (0.763) (0.752) (0.763) (0.763) (0.759) (0.927) (0.916) 
Fishery Context 1.740 ** 1.362 * 1.742 ** 1.759 ** 1.531 ** 2.090 * 1.784 
 (0.774) (0.763) (0.774) (0.774) (0.770) (1.260) (1.250) 
Personal Relationships -0.317 *** -0.309 *** -0.317 *** -0.318 *** -0.312 *** -0.378 *** -0.370 *** 
 (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.097) (0.096) 
Opinion Leadership -3.010 *** -2.266 *** -3.113 *** -3.007 *** -1.926 ** -3.131 ** -2.456 * 
 (0.853) (0.866) (0.871) (0.854) (0.868) (1.250) (1.255) 
Others' Extraction t-1 0.035 * -0.010 0.035 * 0.037 ** 0.008 0.037 ** -0.005 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Cheap Talk  -1.482 *** -0.198    -1.460 *** 
  (0.277) (0.337)    (0.277) 
Weak Enforcement  -1.563 ***  -0.401   -1.561 *** 
  (0.302)  (0.360)   (0.302) 
Strong Enforcement  -2.902 ***   -2.119 ***  -2.856 *** 
  (0.321)   (0.364)  (0.320) 
Slash & Burn Farmers * Wildlife C.      1.866 *** 1.798 *** 
      (0.614) (0.607) 
Fishers * Fishery Context      -0.022 -0.088 
      (1.000) (0.995) 
Pseudo-R² not applicable not applicable not applicable not applicable not applicable not applicable not applicable 
AIC 4690 4622 4692 4691 4658 4635 4575 
BIC 4931 4878 4938 4937 4904 4885 4840 
N 1235 1235 1235 1235 1235 1216 1216 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Notes: Model is a Tobit I regression with random effects and dummies for experimental groups. 
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Table 6.A2: Determinants of common-pool resource game decision (1-8) with full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Basic All Rules Cheap Talk Weak Enforcement Strong Enforcement Context Specificity Combined 
Constant 4.110 *** 6.469 *** 4.925 *** 4.240 *** 5.273 *** 4.321 *** 6.686 *** 
 (0.723) (0.684) (0.740) (0.726) (0.676) (0.724) (0.688) 
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Comp. Land Participants -0.067 -0.057 -0.067 -0.068 -0.058 -0.034 -0.026 
 (0.102) (0.097) (0.102) (0.102) (0.099) (0.103) (0.097) 
Comp. Welfare Participants -0.094 -0.093 -0.093 -0.094 -0.093 -0.140 -0.136 
 (0.121) (0.114) (0.120) (0.120) (0.116) (0.127) (0.120) 
Farmer -0.267 -0.249 -0.264 -0.266 -0.255 -0.292 -0.274 
 (0.378) (0.358) (0.375) (0.377) (0.365) (0.394) (0.372) 
Fisher -0.607 -0.547 -0.604 -0.602 -0.559 -0.636 -0.580 
 (0.464) (0.439) (0.459) (0.463) (0.446) (0.495) (0.468) 
Awareness Fishery 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.020 0.019 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Awareness Wildlife -0.056 -0.052 -0.056 -0.056 -0.053 -0.063 -0.058 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) 
Awareness Conservancy 0.843 0.804 0.836 0.845 0.811 0.863 0.821 
 (0.497) (0.477) (0.493) (0.496) (0.483) (0.500) (0.480) 
Wildlife Context -1.838 ** -2.385 *** -1.919 *** -1.878 ** -2.222 *** -2.556 *** -3.079 *** 
 (0.675) (0.628) (0.677) (0.672) (0.633) (0.620) (0.572) 
Fishery Context -1.767 * -2.333 *** -1.860 ** -1.807 ** -2.156 *** -1.753 * -2.342 *** 
 (0.699) (0.653) (0.704) (0.695) (0.657) (0.696) (0.648) 
Personal Relationships -0.124 -0.120 -0.123 -0.125 -0.121 -0.154 -0.148 
 (0.081) (0.077) (0.080) (0.081) (0.078) (0.083) (0.079) 
Opinion Leadership -0.870 -0.057 -1.458 -0.872 0.594 -0.858 -0.027 
 (0.794) (0.789) (0.791) (0.788) (0.797) (0.804) (0.798) 
Others' Extraction t-1 0.051 *** -0.037 *** 0.040 * 0.044 ** -0.013 0.053 *** -0.035 ** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) 
Cheap Talk  -1.392 *** -1.149 ***    -1.391 *** 
  (0.239) (0.224)    (0.240) 
Weak Enforcement  -1.205 ***  -1.052 ***   -1.206 *** 
  (0.298)  (0.306)   (0.299) 
Strong Enforcement  -3.331 ***   -3.197 ***  -3.331 *** 
  (0.380)   (0.379)  (0.382) 
Slash & Burn Farmers * Wildlife C.      1.062 * 1.026 * 
      (0.435) (0.411) 
Fishers * Fishery Context      0.067 0.092 
      (0.347) (0.331) 
Pseudo-R² 4.4% 6.6% 4.6% 4.6% 6.0% 4.5% 6.7% 
AIC 14924 14590 14894 14897 14675 14557 14225 
BIC 15242 14927 15218 15221 14999 14886 14573 
N 3781 3781 3781 3781 3781 3686 3686 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.005; Notes: Model is a tobit I regression with cluster-robust standard errors. 




Agrawal. (1999). Greener pastures: politics, markets and community among a migrant 
pastoral people. Duke University Press. Retrieved from 
http://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=I9hZk0oBUU4C&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=agraw
al+1999+greener+pastures&ots=Cm4FW76LLB&sig=NViNMv8bytidHxEjWdZdNznds4k 
Agrawal, A. (2003). Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources: Context, Methods, 
and Politics. Annual Review of Anthropology, 32(1), 243–262. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.32.061002.093112 
Anderies, J. M., Janssen, M. A., Bousquet, F., Cardenas, J. C., Castillo, D., Lopez, M.-C., … 
Wutich, A. (2011). The challenge of understanding decisions in experimental studies of 
common pool resource governance. Ecological Economics, 70(9), 1571–1579. 
Bardsley, N., & Sausgruber, R. (2005). Conformity and reciprocity in public good provision. 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 26(5), 664–681. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2005.02.001 
Bwalya, S. M. (2007). Dissertation abstract: The experimental analysis of the political 
economics of fisheries governance. Experimental Economics, 10(2), 181–182. 
doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9141-1 
Cardenas, J. C. (2004). Norms from outside and from inside: an experimental analysis on the 
governance of local ecosystems. Forest Policy and Economics, 6(3), 229–241. 
Cardenas, J. C., Ahn, T. K., & Ostrom, E. (2004). Communication and co-operation in a 
common-pool resource dilemma: a field experiment. Advances in Understanding Strategic 
Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments and Bounded Rationality, 258–86. 
Cardenas, J. C., Stranlund, J., & Willis, C. (2000). Local environmental control and 
institutional crowding-out. World Development, 28(10), 1719–1733. 
Castillo, D., & Saysel, A. K. (2005). Simulation of common pool resource field experiments: 
a behavioral model of collective action. Ecological Economics, 55(3), 420–436. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.12.014 
Cavalcanti, C., Schläpfer, F., & Schmid, B. (2010). Public participation and willingness to 
cooperate in common-pool resource management: A field experiment with fishing 
communities in Brazil. Ecological Economics, 69(3), 613–622. 
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.09.009 
Chapter 6: Conformity, leadership and why strong rules work 
141 
 
Davis, D. D. (1993). Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press. 
Dayton-Johnson, J. (2003). Knitted warmth: the simple analytics of social cohesion. The 
Journal of Socio-Economics, 32(6), 623–645. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2003.10.002 
Duraiappah, A. K. (1998). Poverty and environmental degradation: A review and analysis of 
the nexus. World Development, 26(12), 2169–2179. doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(98)00100-4 
Evans, C. R., & Dion, K. L. (1991). Group Cohesion and Performance A Meta-Analysis. 
Small Group Research, 22(2), 175–186. doi:10.1177/1046496491222002 
Fehr, E., & Leibbrandt, A. (2008). Cooperativeness and Impatience in the Tragedy of the 
Commons. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich. Retrieved 
from http://ideas.repec.org/p/zur/iewwpx/378.html 
Galarza, F., McPeak, J., Barrett, C. B., Carter, M. R., Chantarat, S., Fadlaoui, A., & Mude, A. 
G. (n.d.). Dynamic Field Experiments in Development Economics: Risk Valuation in 




Gardner, R., Herr, A., Ostrom, E., & Walker, J. A. (2000). The power and limitations of 
proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources. Journal of Development Economics, 62(2), 
515–533. doi:10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00095-X 
Gardner, R., Ostrom, E., & Walker, J. M. (1990). The Nature of Common-Pool Resource 
Problems. Rationality and Society, 2(3), 335–358. doi:10.1177/1043463190002003005 
Gillet, J., Schram, A., & Sonnemans, J. (2009). The tragedy of the commons revisited: The 
importance of group decision-making. Journal of Public Economics, 93(5–6), 785–797. 
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.02.001 
Hackett, S., Schlager, E., & Walker, J. (1994). The Role of Communication in Resolving 
Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 27(2), 99–126. doi:10.1006/jeem.1994.1029 
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, (162), 1243–48. 
Chapter 6: Conformity, leadership and why strong rules work 
142 
 
 Hayo, B., & Vollan, B. (2011). Group Interaction, Heterogeneity, Rules, and Co-operative 
Behaviour:, Evidence from a Common-Pool Resource Experiment, in South Africa and 
Namibia. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268111002307 
Heider, L. (2012). Fish Never Finishes versus Shifting Baseline Syndrom (Master Thesis). 
Wageningen University, Wageningen. Retrieved from 
http://library.wur.nl/WebQuery/clc/2014307 
 Janssen, M. A., Bousquet, F., Cardenas, J. C., Castillo, D., & Worrapimphong, K. (2013). 
Breaking the elected rules in a field experiment on forestry resources. Ecological Economics, 
90, 132–139. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.03.012 
Lankford, B., Sokile, C., Yawson, D., & Lévite, H. (2004). The river basin game: A water 
dialogue tool. Iwmi. Retrieved from http://www.lk.iwmi.org/pubs/working/WOR75.pdf 
List, J. A., & Shogren, J. F. (1998). Calibration of the difference between actual and 
hypothetical valuations in a field experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
37(2), 193–205. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00084-5 
Moxnes, E., & Heijden, E. van der. (2003). The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad 
Experiment. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(6), 773–795. doi:10.1177/0022002703258962 
Nordi, N. (2006). Common Property Resource System in a Fishery of the São Francisco 
River, Minas Gerais, Brazil. Human Ecology Review, 13(1), 1. 
Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 314(5805), 
1560–1563. doi:10.1126/science.1133755 
Ostrom, E. (2006). The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions 
and common-pool resources. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 61(2), 149–
163. 
Ostrom, E., Dietz, T., Dolsak, N., Stern, P. C., Stonich, S., & Weber, E. U. (2002). The drama 
of the commons. National Academies Press. Retrieved from 
http://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=Du3qICRxtgIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=drama+
of+the+commons&ots=4-n3-ZVjWt&sig=xTKCIqhYtAii_qab1rZ06Y_N06M 
Chapter 6: Conformity, leadership and why strong rules work 
143 
 
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-
Governance is Possible. The American Political Science Review, 86(2), 404–417. 
doi:10.2307/1964229 
Smith, V. L. (2002). Method in experiment: rhetoric and reality. Experimental economics, 
5(2), 91–110. 
Smith, V. L. (2010). Theory and experiment: What are the questions? Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 73(1), 3–15. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.008 
Sokolovsky, J. (2002). Status of Older People: Tribal Societies. Ekerdt DJ (ed.), 1341–1346. 
Tavoni, A., Schlüter, M., & Levin, S. (2012). The survival of the conformist: Social pressure 
and renewable resource management. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 299, 152–161. 
doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.003 
Travers, H., Clements, T., Keane, A., & Milner-Gulland, E. J. (2011). Incentives for 
cooperation: The effects of institutional controls on common pool resource extraction in 
Cambodia. Ecological Economics. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800911003533 
Van Dijk, E., Wilke, H., & Wit, A. (2003). Preferences for leadership in social dilemmas: 
Public good dilemmas versus common resource dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 39(2), 170–176. doi:10.1016/S0022-1031(02)00518-8 
Vedeld, T. (2000). Village politics: Heterogeneity, leadership and collective action. Journal of 
Development Studies, 36(5), 105–134. doi:10.1080/00220380008422648 
Velez, M. A., Murphy, J. J., & Stranlund, J. K. (2006). Centralized and decentralized 
management of local common pool resources in the developing world: experimental evidence 
from fishing communities in Colombia. Retrieved from 
http://works.bepress.com/john_stranlund/18/ 
Velez, M. A., Stranlund, J. K., & Murphy, J. J. (2009). What motivates common pool 
resource users? Experimental evidence from the field. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 70(3), 485–497. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.02.008 
Chapter 6: Conformity, leadership and why strong rules work 
144 
 
Vos, M., & van der Zee, K. (2011). Prosocial behavior in diverse workgroups: How relational 
identity orientation shapes cooperation and helping. Group Processes and Intergroup 







Experiment Host Script  
(English transliteration from the Silozi original) 
Welcome and thank you for coming to our game today. My name is [name] and I am here as a 
representative of the research team from the Leibniz University of Hanover. Although we are 
not affiliated with them, I’d like to thank the Namibia Nature Foundation for their support in 
organizing the games in your conservancy. Let me make clear at this point, that the money 
you will take away from today’s game does not come from the NNF and that in future 
projects in your conservancy you cannot expect to be paid money just because you get some 
today. [handout clipboards with questionnaires, participant sheet, payoff sheet, 
comprehension test] 
Today, in the next 3 to 4 hours, we will conduct a game, which will take up the largest part of 
the time, and then I will ask you a few questions. Afterwards you will be paid according to 
your performance in the game. Let me start all this with explaining the game. [Distinguish 
between the three cases here; explain only one of them].  
1.) The game you will conduct now will be about a natural resource in the conservancy. 
Imagine you 5 are the only people in Sikunga that can use this natural resource.  
You can decide to adjust your level of extraction of this resource between 1 and 8. Whatever 
effort you do not put into extracting this resource, we will assume you put it into farming. 
Provided there is enough of the resource left, you will be left with a relatively good income 
from extracting the resource compared to farming. 
If, however, everyone decides to put much effort into extraction, the resource will be more 
exhausted because it cannot regenerate quickly enough, and extraction will be less profitable.  
What each of you gets is therefore dependent on what you do and what the others do. What 
you get in total you can see in this Payoff Table [point to table]. If you extract a total of 4 
[point at You-row] and the others together extract 27 [point at Others-column], you end up 
with 30 R for this turn [let pointing finger wander to the payoff]. If you decide to farm at a 
level of 2, which means you extract with an effort level of 6 [point at You-row], and the 
others combined extract at a level 15 of their total 32 [point to 15 on the Other-column], you 




extract at a level of 3 plots. So you extract at 3 [point to You-row] and the others extract at 
level 3 each, too, so 3 plus 3 plus 3 plus 3 equals 12 [point to Others-row]. Your earning 
would be 51 R.  
Are there any questions? [Count to 10 if no question arises immediately. If anyone even 
slightly looks like he might be asking a question, politely ask him to ask it.]  
These earnings will be real money. This game will be played 10 times and then 10 times more 
with a slight change in the rules of the game. At the end of the 20th turn, a random turn of the 
20 will be chosen. Whatever you earned in this turn will be paid out to you.  
So, to test if I have not made a mistake in my explanation, I will ask you some test questions 
now. [From here on in start asking some combinations of You- and Others-numbers, like 5 
and 17, 7 and 19 and so on. Ask a particular player and if they don’t know, explain it again. 
Then ask the next player. Do this until everyone has confidently called out the right Payoff to 
your question at least once.]  
Every turn will be a reset, so it has nothing to do with what you decided before. So every turn, 
you get a fresh start.  
Now, to how we conduct the game and record what we do. On your clipboard you all have a 
sheet which says ‘Participant Sheet’ [show them a Participant Sheet]. First things first: Please 
enter your name in the top right. As you can see, we have 3 rows for test turns we will play 
first, then 10 rows for the real game, then 10 rows for the real game with changed rules [point 
to each while talking about it]. In each row, you will find 4 columns:  
 
1.: A column where to enter your decision [point] 
2..: A column where the total the group decided on will be entered [point]. I will announce 
this number once I took a look at every Participant Sheet and added them up. 
3.: A column where you enter the number from column 2 minus your own decision in column 
1 [point to each]. You calculate that in your head, if you are comfortable with that, or use the 
calculator we provide. 





Every turn we will do the following: 
1.: I will ask you to make a decision. You put that number in the first column. 
2.: Once everyone has done that, I will go around and look at the numbers and add them up. 
3.: I will announce the total number, which you will enter in your 2nd column then [point]. 
4.: You subtract your decision from the number in  column 2 and enter it in column 3. If you 
are not sure if you subtracted correctly, use the calculator we provided. 
5.: You look up your payoff in the Payoff-Table like we discussed before. 
6.: Then we’ll start the next turn, where I’ll ask you to decide again. 
We’ll do that for 10 turns, during which you are not allowed to communicate and also are not 
allowed to look on the sheets of other players. 
 
2.) The Fishery Game 
“The game you will play now will be about the fishery in the conservancy. 
Imagine you 5 are the heads of the only fishing families in Sikunga and each of you has a 
household of 8 people, including yourself. I don’t know if your household really has 8 people, 
but for the sake of this game, let’s pretend this is so. Imagine your brothers or sisters moved 
in with you, for example.  
You can decide for your household if only 1 or 2 or up to all 8 people should go fishing. 
Provided enough fish are still in the Zambezi, fishing will leave your family with a relatively 
good income. The rest will work on your family plot as farmers, leaving you with little 
income per family member working. 
If however all other families [point to group of players] are fishing a lot as well, fishing 
grounds are so exhausted that they cannot regenerate quickly. Accordingly fishing will be less 
profitable for everyone who is fishing. 
What each one of you gets, therefore, is dependent on your own amount of family members 




What you get in total you can see in this Payoff Table [point to table]. If 4 of your family 
members go fishing [point at You-row] and from the other families together 27 family 
members go fishing [point at Others-column], you end up with 30 R for this turn [let pointing 
finger wander to the payoff]. If 2 of your family members farm on the family plot, which 
means the rest, so 6 family members, go fishing, [point at You-row], and the others combined 
send 15 of their total 32 family members fishing [point to 15 on the Other-column], you earn 
51 R. A third example: Imagine you decide to do the same as the others. Everyone sends 3 
family members fishing. So you send 3 [point to You-row] and the others send 3 each, so 3 
plus 3 plus 3 plus 3 equals 12 [point to Others-row]. Your earning would be 51 R. 
Are there any questions about this table? [Count to 10 if no question arises immediately. If 
anyone even slightly looks like he might be asking a question, politely ask him to ask it.] 
These earnings will be real money. This game will be played 10 times and then 10 times more 
with a slight change in the rules of the game. At the end of the 20th turn, a random turn of the 
20 will be chosen. Whatever you earned in this turn will be paid out to every player. 
So, to test if I have not made a mistake in my explanations, I will ask you some test questions 
now. [From here on in start asking some combinations of You- and Others-numbers, like 5 
and 17, 7 and 19 and so on. Ask a particular player and if they don’t know, explain it again. 
Then ask the next player. Do this until everyone has confidently called out the right Payoff to 
your question at least once.] 
Every turn will be a reset, so it has nothing to do with what you decided before. So every turn, 
you get a fresh start. 
Now, to how we play and record what we do. On your clipboard you all have a sheet which 
says player sheet [show them a Player Sheet]. First things first: Please enter your name in the 
top right. As you can see, we have 3 rows for test turns we will play first, then 10 rows for the 
real game, then 10 rows for the real game with changed rules [point to each while talking 
about it]. In each row, you will find 4 columns:  
 
1.: A column where to enter your fishing decision [point] 
2..: A column where the total of all fishers the group decided on will be entered [point]. I will 




3.: A column where you enter the number from column 2 minus your own decision in column 
1 [point to each]. You calculate that in your head, if you are comfortable with that, or use the 
calculator we provide. 
4.: A column in which you enter the payoff resulting from the numbers in column 1 and 3. 
 
Every turn we will do the following: 
1.: I will ask you to make a decision on how many of your household members you send 
fishing. You put that number in the first column. 
2.: Once everyone is finished, I will go around and look at the numbers and add them up. 
3.: I will announce the total number which you enter in your 2nd column then [point]. 
4.: You subtract your decision from the number in  column 2 and enter it in column 3. If you 
are not sure if you subtracted correctly, use the calculator we provided. 
5.: You look up your payoff in the Payoff-Table like we discussed before. 
6.: Then we’ll start the next turn, where I’ll ask you to decide again to send between 1 and 8 
family members fishing. 
We’ll do that for 10 turns, during which you are not allowed to communicate and also are not 
allowed to look on the sheets of other players. 
[Do exactly as you said you would. Always leave enough time for players to fill in their 
columns and do their calculations. While checking on the decisions of participants, check if 
they maybe calculated or entered unreasonable numbers like 0 or 105.] 
 
3.) The Wildlife Game 
The game you will conduct now will be about the effect of slash and burn farming on the 
wildlife in your conservancy. Imagine you 5 are the only people in Sikunga who work their 
plots.  
You can decide to slash and burn between 1 and 8 of your plots. If you do not slash and burn 




is one of two sources of income for you. If you slash and burn them, you will have a higher 
yield and therefore income, but you will also destroy habitat for wildlife in the conservancy. 
[Note by the author: It is a widespread belief in the conservancy that the slash and burn 
practice is beneficial in that way.] This wildlife is your second source of income. The 
conservancy can sell hunting permits based on how much wildlife lives in Sikunga due to the 
habitat left after farming. The money from these permits is distributed equally among you, 
independent of how much habitat was destroyed through slashing and burning. 
Provided there is enough habitat for wildlife left, you will be left with a relatively good 
income: Your share plus the slash and burn farming. If, however, everyone decides to slash 
and burn a lot, habitat and therefore wildlife will be rarer, and the everyone’s share of money 
will be smaller. 
What each of you gets is therefore dependent on what you do and what the others do. What 
you get in total you can see in this Payoff Table [point to table]. If you slash and burn a total 
of 4 plots [point at You-row] and the others together slash and burn 27 plots [point at Others-
column], you end up with 30 R for this turn [let pointing finger wander to the payoff]. If you 
decide to slash and burn on 6 plots [point at You-row], and the others combined slash and 
burn on 15 plots of their total 32 [point to 15 on the Other-column], you earn 51 R. A third 
example: Imagine you decide to do the same as the others. Everyone uses slash and burn on 3 
plots. So you take 3 [point to You-row] and the others slash and burn on 3 plots each, too, so 
3 plus 3 plus 3 plus 3 equals 12 [point to Others-row]. Your earning would be 51 R.  
Are there any questions? [Count to 10 if no question arises immediately. If anyone even 
slightly looks like he might be asking a question, politely ask him to ask it.]  
These earnings will be real money. This game will be played 10 times and then 10 times more 
with a slight change in the rules of the game. At the end of the 20th turn, a random turn of the 
20 will be chosen. Whatever you earned in this turn will be paid out to you. 
Now my colleague outside will ask you a few questions which you can answer using the short 
questionnaire on your clipboards. Afterwards your winnings will be handed out separately to 
each one of you. 
So, to test if I have not made a mistake in my explanation, I will ask you some test questions 
now. [From here on start asking some combinations of You- and Others-numbers, like 5 and 




ask the next player. Do this until everyone has confidently called out the right Payoff to your 
question at least once.]  
Every turn will be a reset, so it has nothing to do with what you decided before. So every turn, 
you get a fresh start.  
Now, to how we conduct the game and record what we do. On your clipboard you all have a 
sheet which says ‘Participant Sheet’ [show them a Participant Sheet]. First things first: Please 
enter your name in the top right. As you can see, we have 3 rows for test turns we will play 
first, then 10 rows for the real game, then 10 rows for the real game with changed rules [point 
to each while talking about it]. In each row, you will find 4 columns:  
1.: A column where to enter your decision [point] 
2..: A column where the total the group decided on will be entered [point]. I will announce 
this number once I took a look at every Participant Sheet and added them up. 
3.: A column where you enter the number from column 2 minus your own decision in column 
1 [point to each]. You calculate that in your head, if you are comfortable with that, or use the 
calculator we provide. 
4.: A column in which you enter the payoff resulting from the numbers in column 1 and 3. 
 
Every turn we will do the following: 
1.: I will ask you to make a decision. You put that number in the first column. 
2.: Once everyone has done that, I will go around and look at the numbers and add them up. 
3.: I will announce the total number, which you will enter in your 2nd column then [point]. 
4.: You subtract your decision from the number in  column 2 and enter it in column 3. If you 
are not sure if you subtracted correctly, use the calculator we provided. 
5.: You look up your payoff in the Payoff-Table like we discussed before. 
6.: Then we’ll start the next turn, where I’ll ask you to decide again. 
We’ll do that for 10 turns, during which you are not allowed to communicate and also are not 




[Do exactly as you said you would. Always leave enough time for players to fill in their 
columns and do their calculations. While checking on the decisions of participants, check if 










To evaluate the results of the experiment we are here for, it is helpful for us to know a little 
more about your background. On this sheet we kindly ask you to answer questions concerning 
you as a person. We assure you that we will use this data for research purposes only and will 
not share data which could make you identifiable in any way. The other players will not see 
what you answered here. 
Please indicate how you relate to the following statements: 
 I strongly 
agree 
I agree I am 
neutral 
I disagree I strongly 
disagree 
1. The Zambezi near Sikunga is 
overfished. 
     
2. Overfishing of the Zambezi 
would be a serious problem for 
people in Sikunga. 
     
3. Wildlife visits in Sikunga have 
decreased over the last 10 years. 
     
4. Decrease of wildlife visits in 
Sikunga over the last 10 years 
would be a serious problem for 
people in Sikunga. 





Better off Same Worse off Much 
worse off 
5. How well off do you consider 
yourself in comparison to the 
other 4 players? 
     
6. How well off do you consider 
yourself in comparison to others 
in your village? 
     
 












 Much more More Same Less Much less 
7. In comparison to the other 4 
players here, how much more or 
less farmland do you think you 
have? 
     
8. In comparison to the others in 
your village, how much more or 
less farmland do you think you 
have? 
     
 
 






9. Outside of the flooding season, 
do you spend your working hours 
rather fishing or rather farming? 
     
 






10. During the flooding season, 
do you spend your working hours 
rather fishing or rather farming? 
     
 
 All Most 50/50 A few None 
11. How much of your working 
hours do you spend at a job other 
than fishing or farming? 








Please answer the following questions: 
12. Have you taken part in the survey by the University of Hanover, which is conducted in the 
conservancy from 23rd of September until 14th of October? 
  Yes   No   Don’t know 
 
13. What is the name of the village you live in?      
  Kalimbeza   Kalundu   Mabula 
  Malindi   Nasisangami  Old Isize  
Sifuha    Other (please specify):……………….……………………… 
 
 
14. How many years did you successfully complete in school? 
 
15. How many children do you have? 
 
16. How many people other than you live in the same household as you? 
 
17. How old are you? 
 
18. What do you consider your occupation? Please mark only one appropriate answer. 
Farmer  Fisher    











19. Which position do you have in the Sikunga Conservancy? Please tick the appropriate 
answer. 
  Member, but not in the committee  Part of the committee 
  None 
20. Which tribe/ethnical group do you belong to, if any? 
  Mayeyi  Masubia  Caucasian 
Other (please specify): ……………………………………………………………………………….. 
21. Are you the decision-maker in your household (household head)? 
  Yes, and I decide on my own   No    
Yes, but I consult with other household members first 
22. Which religious group do you belong to? 
  7th Day Adventist   Roman Catholic 
  New Apostolic Church  None 
Other (please specify): …………………………………….. 
23. Before today, have you discussed this game with anyone before? 








The following questions aim at finding out more about the relationship between you and the 
other players. Please indicate to the best of your abilities, but without asking the other 
players, what you think describes your relationship best. Ignore the lines for your own player 
number. 
 
24. How much more or less 
well off do you consider 










A lot less 
wealthy 
…player 1 
     
…player 2 
     
…player 3 
     
…player 4 
     
…player 5 




25. You are in the same tribe 
as… 
Yes No I don’t 
know 
…player 1 
   
…player 2 
   
…player 3 
   
…player 4 
   
…player 5 









26. Do you share a religion 
with… 
Yes No I don’t 
know 
…player 1 
   
…player 2 
   
…player 3 
   
…player 4 
   
…player 5 




























…player 1      
…player 2      
…player 3      
…player 4      












28. How long do 
you know… 
(…best estimate in 
years) 
  
…player 1    
…player 2    
…player 3    
…player 4    
…player 5    
 
 
29. Among the 




(mark only one)? 
  29. Among the 
other 4 players, 







…player 1   …player 1  
…player 2   …player 2  
…player 3   …player 3  
…player 4   …player 4  





31. This is how 
important 
[player] is in my 









…player 1      
…player 2      
…player 3      
…player 4      
…player 5      
 
The next question is to be filled out by an enumerator or the game leader. Please wait until he 
























           
…player 2 
           
…player 3 
           
…player 4 
           
…player 5 
           
 
Thank you for your participation. 
